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A b s t r a c t
In the wake of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the extent to which 
classified (i.e., officially secret) information is shared within and between organizational 
groupings has emerged as a matter of great importance. This thesis examines the social 
psychological processes underlying problematic non-disclosure of classified information 
in the context of the Australian Defence Force (ADF). In doing so, it provides a 
psychological account of why ADF personnel might be reluctant to disclose classified 
information to one another when doing so could be detrimental to the organization as a 
whole.
The thesis contains four theoretical chapters which address: (1) our current 
understanding of how classified information comes to be known and not known by ADF 
personnel (Chapter 2); (2) the contribution that psychology has made in understanding 
the factors affecting disclosure behaviour (Chapter 3); (3) the social identity perspective, 
which incorporates both social identity theory and self-categorization theory (Chapter 5); 
and, (4) the contribution of psychology toward understanding decision-making under risk 
(Chapter 7). Guided by the analyses in those chapters and insights provided by related 
sociological literature, two factors emerge as being important to disclosure outcomes, 
those of Service affiliation and perceived risk. These factors then provide the foundation 
for the empirical program.
Five studies are reported in the thesis, in addition to a pilot study and some 
qualitative data gathered by way of interviews with ADF personnel. The issue of 
whether ADF personnel can be expected to breach official rules in order to avert 
problematic outcomes associated with the concealment of classified information is 
examined in the pilot study and Study 1. The role of Service identity with respect to 
problematic non-disclosure of classified information in the ADF is examined in Studies 2 
and 3. Finally, Studies 4 and 5 test a hypothesis of problematic non-disclosure which 
affirm the centrality of perceived risk in disclosure outcomes, the so-called guardedness 
hypothesis.
The results of these studies allow us to draw conclusions about the factors likely 
to contribute to problematic non-disclosure of classified information in the context of the 
ADF. In Chapter 9, the implications of the work are discussed, some limitations and 
future directions are outlined, and a final comment about the broader significance of the 
thesis is made.
Ch apter  1
Introduction  and overview  of the thesis
The issue examined in the thesis
It is now well known that in the months prior to the terrorist attacks of 
September 11, 2001, the agencies of the United States ‘Intelligence Community’ had 
amassed a considerable amount of information pointing to a planned attack on the 
American mainland (United States House Committee, 2002). Yet, despite the fact 
that many of these agencies cross-detailed people to each other, the extent to which 
this information was shared between them was minimal. Instead, information relating 
to the terrorists’ plans (e.g., meetings held, visas granted, pilot training conducted, 
etc.) was kept largely within the boundaries of the agency that ‘owned’ it. According 
to members of the Intelligence Community, the flow of information across agency 
boundaries had long been impeded by a complex, thorny, and largely informal 
phenomenon which they had colloquially termed “the Wall” (United States House 
Committee, 2002, p. 363).
The breakdown of the US intelligence system in relation to the events of 
September 11, 2001 is arguably the most significant organizational failure in recent 
history. This particular organizational failure can be seen as an example of a broader 
phenomenon that could be termed problematic non-disclosure. Disclosure is the 
communication of restricted information (Corcoran & Spencer, 2000; Steele, 1975). 
Hence, the term problematic non-disclosure refers to situations where concealed and 
often officially secret information is not communicated and this ‘non-communication’ 
results in negative organizational and/or societal outcomes. One need not look far 
back in history to find other instances of problematic non-disclosure. In 1991 for 
example, the U.S. Secretary of Defense cancelled a major U.S. Navy project to build 
the A-12 aircraft after it fell nearly two years behind schedule and $1 billion dollars 
over budget. Amongst other things, the costly demise of the A-12 was blamed on 
excessive secrecy between stakeholder groups (Montgomery, 1991). More recently, 
the Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) concluded that one cause of the 
loss of the Space Shuttle Challenger and its seven crew was that NASA has
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developed a culture of ineffective communication where problems were left 
unreported and concerns unexpressed (CAIB, 2003).
Of course, problematic non-disclosure of officially secret information within 
and between organizational groupings need not constitute an organizational fiasco as 
is illustrated by these cases. In the Australian Defence Force (ADF) for example, 
officially secret information must be routinely and appropriately disclosed amongst 
the three Services, that is, the Royal Australian Navy (RAN), the Royal Australian Air 
Force (RAAF) and the Australian Regular Army (ARA). Any reluctance on the part 
of ADF personnel to disclose officially secret information, say, that relating to 
problems with the readiness or capability of their Service, would also be a form of 
problematic non-disclosure. While it would not likely attract the kind of attention 
bestowed on those responsible for the A-12 debacle or the Columbia disaster, this 
form of problematic non-disclosure would represent a particularly troubling issue for 
the ADF. In short, it would signal a breakdown in cooperation between the elements 
of the ADF, one that could potentially undermine the organization’s ability protect 
and defend Australia’s interests.
Why might people who ostensibly share a common organizational purpose fail 
to disclose valuable information to each other, despite knowing that non-disclosure 
may court negative outcomes, even disaster? Traditionally, the answer given to this 
question is one informed by a view of organizations as ‘rational’ systems (see Scott, 
1992; Thompson, 1967). Problematic non-disclosure, traditional reasoning goes, is a 
largely aberrant event that can be avoided if organizational rules and procedures are 
better designed, defined, and followed (Erickson, 1979). This reasoning paves the 
way for the introduction of structural solutions designed to minimize or indeed, 
eliminate problematic non-disclosure. Yet, it side-steps a more fundamental and 
critically important issue, one that ultimately determines the efficacy of such 
solutions. This issue relates to the psychological factors that give rise to problematic 
non-disclosure in the first place.
The broad aim of this thesis is to investigate these factors. To that end, two 
factors are examined. The first is group affiliation, that is, people’s sense of 
belonging to various organizational groups and categories. As implied above, the
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particular organizational groups of concern in this thesis are the Services to which 
ADF personnel belong, that is, the RAN, the RAAF and the ARA. The second is risk, 
that is, people’s perception that the consequences of their decision-making include the 
prospect of loss (Smithson, 1994). Guided by the results of an exploratory study, 
these factors are manipulated in a series of scenario-based experimental studies 
involving ADF personnel that focus on the potential disclosure of classified (i.e., 
officially secret) information. In the following sections, the background to the 
research problem is outlined and a brief review is made of the psychology of 
disclosure behaviour. The chapter then concludes with an overview of the thesis 
chapters.
Background to the research problem
Over the past two decades, organizations across Australia and indeed the 
world over, have sought to undergo a transformation. Government bureaucracies, 
finance companies, and developers of information-technology to name but a few, 
have attempted to step out of the mould they occupied during the 1980’s to become 
fully-fledged ‘knowledge organizations’. To support the transformation, an entire 
industry devoted to organizational change has emerged, offering technologies and 
ideologies believed to be essential for effective knowledge management (see Lawson 
& Samson, 2003). Despite this activity, the ‘knowledge organization’ remains a fuzzy 
concept, as does for that matter, the notion of ‘knowledge management’ (Warne, 
Agostino, Ali, Pascoe, & Bopping, 2003). However, a number of simple ideas can be 
distilled from the literature. For one, the knowledge organization is said to leverage 
better organizational outcomes by exploiting the tacit knowledge or ‘organizational 
wisdom’ of members, rather than just their knowledge of organizational rules and 
procedures (Warne, Agostino et al., 2003). Further, knowledge organizations are seen 
to be those that exhibit high levels of trust between members which underpins the free 
and appropriate sharing of knowledge and information (Chandra Sekhar & Anjaiah, 
1995). In the words of one industry participant, the knowledge organization is one 
with a “knowledge-sharing culture” (Smith & McKeen, 2003, p. 5).
These ideas are not entirely new. For some years, organizational theorists and 
practitioners have espoused the benefits of harnessing both tacit knowledge (Wagner
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& Sternberg, 1987) and trust (Kramer & Tyler, 1996; Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman, 
1995). Indeed, for decades it has been argued that the success of all organizational 
endeavours depends on the effective sharing of information and knowledge, whether 
it be between individuals, groups, divisions or departments (Katz & Kahn, 1966; 
March & Simon, 1958). However, the ideas generated by contemporary discourse on 
knowledge management do retain a particular potency in respect to certain types of 
organizations. In these organizations, a ‘sharing culture’ is not just desirable for the 
sake of increased productivity, profit or workplace harmony, but because the 
consequences of not having one can be catastrophic. Clearly, the exemplar in this 
respect is the modem military organization. Military personnel such as those of the 
ADF must now plan for, conduct, and manage a range of activities both on and off the 
battlefield, most of which are ill-defined, opened-ended, and demand a high degree of 
cooperation and information-sharing between people of different Services (Dorman, 
Smith & Uttley, 1998). The backdrop to most (if not all) of these activities is the risk 
of placing people’s lives and a nation’s security in jeopardy, and of wasting 
staggering amounts of money, time and effort. If a sharing culture must be achieved 
anywhere, it is in the modem military organization.
Over the past decade or so, defence policy makers in various countries have 
produced a number of strategic-level ‘frameworks’ that speak to the idea of securing 
such a culture. The most salient of these at the present time is the doctrine of Network 
Centric Warfare (NCW) which has held the centre-stage of military policy in 
Australia, the United States and Great Britain for a number of years now (see Wilson, 
2004). According to NCW, increases in computer processing power and networked 
communications will be exploited over the next decade to provide military and 
defence personnel with a ‘shared awareness’ of situations, both inside and outside the 
theatre of operations (Warne, Ali, Bopping, Hart, & Pascoe 2003; see also Wilson, 
2004). The vast amount of discussion that NCW has generated has provided answers 
to many important questions about securing this shared awareness, such as what 
information-technologies are likely to be required and what structure the ‘network­
centric’ defence organization should take (Warne, Ali et al., 2003). However, despite 
such progress, relatively little is said about other factors that may facilitate or indeed 
underpin the emergence of a shared awareness in the military context (Warne, Ali et 
ah, 2003). Instead, there is a sense of inevitability about the issue of free and
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appropriate transfer of information once the correct organizational structures and 
information technologies are devised and put in place. Put another way, there is an 
assumption amongst many defence policy makers that ‘if you build it, they will 
share’.
The basis of this assumption, at least in large part, is the idea that other more 
fundamental organizational processes will take care of information-sharing, ensuring 
it is as free and appropriate as is required. This idea is grounded in the correct belief 
that the information of major relevance to military activities, and indeed that which 
forms the core of NCW, is likely to be classified (i.e., officially secret) information. 
Specifically, classified information is “information in any form or of any nature, 
which requires protection in the interests of national security” (Australian Department 
of Defence, 1998, Glossary, p. 4) and this protection takes the form of a set of rules 
that govern its transfer between not only ADF personnel but those of the broader 
Australian Defence Organization (ADO)1. As a result, there is a normative 
framework already in place regarding the sharing of classified information between 
defence personnel and this constitutes our ‘commonsense view’ of how certain 
individuals come to know (or not know) certain pieces of classified information. In 
other words, we intuitively believe that classified information flows along the 
contours of official policy and because official policy is inherently objective and 
‘rational’ (Scott, 1992), it flows are always sufficient and in the ‘right’ direction. For 
the personnel concerned, this belief provides a sense of certainty and predictability for 
activities that are very often performed against a backdrop of uncertainty and risk.
Yet this idea has critical limits. For one, the official rules shed no light on 
why classified information may sometimes not flow along the contours of official 
policy or why the decrees of official policy may not always match what defence 
personnel themselves think is ‘right’. More fundamentally however, the idea that 
classified information flows according to the objective prescriptions of official rules 
must be questioned. Classified information is, by definition, concealed information 
and therefore the extent to which it is disseminated stems from individuals and groups
1. The Australian Defence Organisation includes all personnel of the Australian Defence Force and 
all civilian members o f the Australian Public Service employed by the Department of Defence.
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making disclosure decisions. Like all decision-making, the disclosure and non­
disclosure of classified information is grounded in psychological processes no matter 
how ‘objective’ or impartial the decision-making criteria appear to be. Indeed, it is 
because the disclosure of classified information is a psychologically mediated activity 
that we can explain why disclosure outcomes do not always accord with what is 
envisaged by official policy. Thus, the nature of any sharing culture as it relates to 
classified information is underpinned by the psychological factors affecting 
individual’s disclosure decisions.
As outlined earlier, the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 have brought 
this deeper psychological issue into sharp relief. On this occasion, the attacks were 
enabled not because classified information was shared when official policy said it 
should not be, but because it was not shared when the letter and the spirit of official 
policy said it should be. Furthermore, this particularly catastrophic instance of 
problematic non-disclosure is merely the most prominent amongst many others, 
eroding the idea that such episodes are merely aberrant events or random results in an 
imperfect system. Indeed, problematic non-disclosure of classified information 
enjoys an even longer history than these cases suggest (e.g., Lowry, 1972). In recent 
years, its most salient form has been the phenomenon known as overclassification 
(see Washington Post, 2001). The core idea here is that in order to impede or restrict 
another’s access to classified information, the source of the information will classify it 
to a degree well above that which is adequate and appropriate. There is a psychology 
that underpins overclassification and problematic non-disclosure more generally, yet 
systematic efforts to investigate the factors influencing this psychology have not been 
made.
In contrast, and as alluded to above, the standard response to problematic non­
disclosure of classified information has tended to be structural in nature. In the wake 
of September 11 for example, the U.S. Government established the Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS), an organization charged with unifying the vast network of 
organizations that play a role in ensuring the internal security of that country, 
including the FBI and the CIA (United States Department of Homeland Security, 
2004; see also United States Department of Justice, 2003). In Australia, similar 
moves are afoot, with intentions to establish an organization similar to the DHS, and a
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number of calls have been made to improve the procedures and processes for sharing 
sensitive information amongst Australia’s defence agencies, particularly those with an 
intelligence-related function. Despite the good intentions of these responses, they also 
risk an opportunity lost. As implied earlier, there is a mild suggestion within such 
responses that problematic non-disclosure of classified information will be solved if 
formal rules and procedures are better defined, designed, and followed (Erickson, 
1979). Such a suggestion arguably underplays the psychological processes involved 
in the phenomenon.
Contemporary defence science in Australia is also yet to adequately address 
the issue of problematic non-disclosure of classified information. In general, defence 
science has tended to steer away from asking personnel when and why they might not 
do ‘as they are supposed to’ particularly when classified information is the issue at 
hand (Bok, 1984). Of course there are some exceptions here such as those attempts to 
explain why personnel might leak classified information (e.g., Sarbin, Carney & 
Eoyang, 1994). There have also been many internal studies of ADF personnel which 
have focused, in part or in full, on the extent to which classified information is 
disclosed (see Warne, Agostino et al., 2003 for a review) and these have helped 
identify instances of adequate and inadequate disclosure. However, their descriptive 
nature preclude them from identifying the factors that actually cause disclosure 
outcomes it to be adequate or inadequate. What is required is an examination of the 
phenomenon from a psychological perspective. The aim of this thesis to take a 
modest first step toward fulfilling that requirement.
A brief overview of the psychology of disclosure
While the factors affecting non-disclosure of classified information remain 
under-theorized and under-researched, the psychological study of other forms of 
disclosure behaviour has spanned many decades. The result has been a broad an in- 
depth understanding of the psychological processes likely to be involved in the 
revelation or withholding of concealed information from one person to another. 
Despite recent attempts to provide an integrative analysis of disclosure behaviour (see 
Corcoran & Spencer, 2000), the psychological study of disclosure and non-disclosure 
must be seen as a heterogeneous field of enquiry, spanning various phenomena
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including secrecy and secret societies, self-disclosure, confidentiality, and whistle­
blowing. The work is divergent in its disciplinary background, core concerns, and 
theoretical underpinnings. All in all, this makes disclosure behaviour a field that is 
phenomenon-driven field rather than theory-driven (see Smithson & Foddy, 1999). 
However, and at the risk of oversimplification, two broad traditions can be identified.
In the first tradition, disclosure and non-disclosure are viewed as behaviours 
driven by group affiliation. The central idea here is that people’s group affiliations 
provide a kind of psychological foundation to facilitate either (i) their willingness to 
disclose to other group members, and/or (ii) their willingness to withhold information 
from ‘outsiders’. A number of mechanisms have been advanced in this respect with 
most converging on the idea that group affiliation provides information about the 
trustworthiness and shared goals of the potential recipient. Thus, the primary 
hypothesis is that people’s disclosures and non-disclosures follow the contours of 
their perceived group affiliations. A good example is provided by Hargie, Dickson, 
and Rainey (2002) who found that the amount of personal information disclosed 
between youths in Northern Ireland was related to whether the recipient was of the 
same religion. Another body of work in this area examines, not so much how existing 
group affiliations influence one’s disclosures and non-disclosures, but how people 
may use disclosure and non-disclosure to establish or reinforce a sense of group 
affiliation. This is well illustrated by work examining ‘disclosure reciprocity’ (e.g., 
Moon, 2000) where disclosing is thought to constitute a display of trustworthiness and 
the desire to establish a relationship. This idea is also central to theory and research 
on ‘secret societies’ (Bellman, 1981; B. H. Erickson, 1981; MacKenzie, 1967; 
Simmel, 1906) where non-disclosure constitutes a group norm that defines who is an 
insider and who is not.
In the second tradition, disclosure and non-disclosure are argued to be driven 
by perceptions of risk. The main idea here is that the expected consequences of 
disclosing and not disclosing shape one’s decision-making. Again, a subdivision is 
evident according to whether the expected consequences are seen to drive the 
individual to either disclose or not disclose. With respect to the former, it is held that 
as the perceived risks associated with continued concealment of the information 
increase, the more likely people will be to breach the norms or rules that mandate its
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concealment and decide to disclose. This notion dominates work which has addressed 
breaches of confidentiality (e.g., Lindenthal, Amaranto, Jordan, and Wepman; 1984) 
and is also evident in the literature regarding whistle-blowing (e.g., Rothschild & 
Miethe, 1999). With respect to the latter, it is thought that disclosing information is 
inherently risky and that as fears relating to the consequences of disclosing increase, 
the more likely people are to withhold the information. This idea dominates analyses 
of self-disclosure (i.e., the disclosure of personal information; Hendrick, 1987;
Jourard, 1971) and is discussed in sociological analyses of secrecy. Despite the fact 
that it is rarely conceived of in this way, the underlying theme running through this 
literature is an assumption that people make decisions about whether or not to disclose 
based on their preferences, much in the spirit of subjective expected utility theory 
(Savage, 1954; von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1944). Changes in the degree of 
disclosure behaviour or the nature of one’s disclosure decision are seen to be due to 
variations in the utility of disclosing relative to not disclosing.
As stated above, the aim of this thesis is to examine how both group affiliation 
and risk are likely to affect the disclosure of classified information by ADF personnel, 
and that the groups of interest are the Services of the ADF. In so doing, we hope to 
gain some insight into the psychological factors underpinning the problematic non­
disclosure of classified information in this particular context. In the following section 
a summary of the individual thesis chapters is presented.
Overview of the chapters
The aim of Chapter 2 is to set the scene for a psychological analysis of the 
disclosure of classified information in the ADF. To this end, the chapter begins by 
reviewing of the official rules that govern access to classified information in this 
organization. These rules constitute the formal organizational blueprint vis-ä-vis the 
disclosure of classified information and hence also underpin our ‘commonsense’ view 
of how classified information comes to be disclosed and not disclosed amongst ADF 
personnel. The main premise here is that classified information comes to be known 
by those who have a ‘need to know’ pending the possession of an adequate level 
security clearance, and not known by those who do not fulfil either or both of these 
conditions. It will be argued that this formal model does not provide an adequate
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explanatory framework for understanding actual disclosure outcomes. As part of this 
argument, the fundamental assumption that another’s ‘need to know’ can be 
impartially determined is challenged and the need to understand the disclosure and 
non-disclosure of classified information as a psychologically mediated activity is 
articulated.
As alluded to above, the discipline of psychology has long had an interest in 
the factors affecting the extent to which people disclose information. To the extent 
that this interest constitutes a field of psychological enquiry (see Wagner & Berger, 
1985), it is one that is ‘phenomenon-driven’ rather than ‘theory-driven’. Specifically, 
the psychological study of disclosure and non-disclosure comprises attempts to clarify 
the psychological processes underlying various social phenomena, primarily self­
disclosure, confidentiality, whistle-blowing, and other forms of secrecy. This 
literature is reviewed in Chapter 3 with an eye for how it might contribute toward 
gaining an understanding of the psychological factors involved in the problematic 
non-disclosure of classified information in the ADF. Attention converges on two 
broad factors, the notions of risk and group affiliation.
The first empirical component of the thesis is presented in Chapter 4. The aim 
of this chapter is to gain an insight into whether ADF personnel will breach official 
rules to avert problematic non-disclosure and if so, when and for whom? In other 
words, we seek to determine when and for whom the prospect of problematic non­
disclosure will ‘override’ the formal rules mandating non-disclosure of classified 
information and, by implication, when it will not. Two studies are presented in this 
chapter. The first study constitutes a pilot involving a sample of civilian defence 
scientists while the second (Study 1) is a refinement of the pilot involving a larger 
sample of ADF officers drawn from various strategic-level organizations within the 
ADF. While interesting differences emerge between these populations, the results of 
both studies point to the importance of risk and Service affiliation as factors shaping 
disclosure outcomes in the domain of national security. More importantly, the results 
of Study 1 suggest that social identification processes may be the psychological 
mediator of Service affiliation in this respect.
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We examine the idea that social identification processes might underpin 
disclosure and non-disclosure outcomes more closely in Chapter 5 with a review of 
the social identity perspective. This perspective is comprised of social identity theory 
(Tajfel & Turner, 1979; see also Tajfel & Turner, 1986) and self-categorization theory 
(Turner, 1985; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987; see also Turner, 
1982). Over the past few years, the social identity perspective has made significant 
contributions in explaining the psychological processes involved in issues of 
importance to organizations notably trust, communication, and cooperation. These 
contributions are reviewed with an eye to how social identification processes might 
therefore be involved in non-disclosure of classified information in the ADF. Two 
preliminary hypotheses are formulated. The first is derived from the idea that group 
affiliation can be threatened by the presence of other groups and lead to a process of 
competition for positive ingroup distinctiveness (Tajfel, 1978; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). 
The second is drawn from the idea that prosocial perceptions and behaviours follow 
the contours of salient ingroup-outgroup memberships (Turner et al., 1987).
Both these hypotheses receive empirical attention in Chapter 6 in separate 
scenario-based experimental studies. Unlike Study 1 which focuses on an entrustment 
relationship between the source and the potential discloser of classified information 
and the conditions where it will likely be breached, these studies focus more fully on 
the relationship between the potential discloser and potential recipient of classified 
information. The chapter begins by investigating the extent to which the achievement 
and/or maintenance of positive Service distinctiveness is related to disclosure 
outcomes (Study 2). This hypothesis is set in context by the ongoing debate in 
modem military and defence circles concerning the ideology of ‘Jointness’ and the 
extent to which it constitutes an identity threat to Service identity. Following this, we 
examine the extent to which disclosure outcomes follow the contours of salient 
ingroup-outgroup memberships (Study 3). Here, we explore whether the extent to 
which ADF personnel are willing to disclose classified information can be varied by 
changing the criterion for ingroup membership.
The concept of risk has enjoyed a long history in the theoretical literature, 
primarily within the field of decision-making. In Chapter 7, we review the theoretical 
perspectives relating to decision-making under risk, confining our focus to three
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particularly influential theories that have held sway at one time or another. These are 
subjective expected utility theory (Savage, 1954; von Neumann & Morgenstern,
1944); prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979); and regret-theory (Bell, 1982; 
Loomes & Sugden, 1982). On the basis of these theories, we cast the potential 
discloser of classified information as a decision-maker under risk. This demands we 
answer a more fundamental question vis-ä-vis problematic non-disclosure of classified 
information in the ADF: risk of what? To help answer this question, we turn to the 
sociological literature on secrecy. The chapter concludes with an articulation of what 
comes to be termed the guardedness hypothesis of problematic non-disclosure.
The guardedness hypothesis is tested in Chapter 8 in the final two empirical 
studies. First, in Study 5, our aim is to empirically validate the argument that the 
disclosure of classified information both within and across Service boundaries is 
perceived by ADF personnel to be associated with many classes of risk. In this study, 
we also seek to gain an insight into how one’s level of confidence toward these risks 
is affects their confidence about being able to determine another’s ‘need to know’. In 
Study 6, we employ a final scenario-based experimental design to test the causal 
nature of these associations. Specifically, and building upon ideas presented in the 
field of organizational decision-making, we manipulate levels of risk by varying the 
extent to which ADF personnel perceive they have control over how the disclosed 
information may be used. In the final chapter, Chapter 9, we provide an integration of 
the work conducted in the thesis. To this end, the empirical work is drawn together to 
offer a social-psychological account of problematic non-disclosure of classified 
information in the ADF.
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Chapter 2
Can disclosure be treated as a rational normative act?
Introduction
In the previous chapter, the research issue was defined and an overview of the 
thesis and its chapters was presented. In doing so, the question guiding this thesis was 
posed: why might ADF personnel not disclose classified information to one another, 
despite knowing that non-disclosure could have negative, even disastrous outcomes? 
This kind of question has been asked many times in the wake of major organizational 
failures, most recently the failure of the US intelligence community to forestall the 
September 11 terrorist attacks. Traditionally, the question has been answered in a 
way which assumes that complex organizations can avoid the perils of problematic 
non-disclosure if formal rules and procedures are better designed, defined and 
followed, and if better use is made of information technologies designed to facilitate 
information-sharing. Little attention however, has been paid to the psychological 
factors that might underpin problematic non-disclosure, save the occasional reference 
to vague constructs such as “personal factors” and “organizational culture” (United 
States House Committee, 2002).
The aim of this chapter is to set the scene for a psychological analysis of 
disclosure and non-disclosure in the context of the ADF. More specifically, the scene 
is to be set with reference to the disclosure and non-disclosure of officially secret (i.e., 
‘classified’) information amongst members of this organization. At first blush, 
arguing for a psychological analysis to be brought to bear on the disclosure of 
classified information in the ADF may seem misplaced. Access to classified 
information in this organization (and indeed all modem defence forces) is governed 
by a set of official rules and it is these rules that constitute our commonsense view of 
the mechanism underpinning disclosure outcomes, rather than human psychological 
processes. However, this commonsense view is inadequate insofar as providing an 
explanatory framework for understanding disclosure outcomes. It ignores the fact that 
all organizational decision-making including the decision to disclose or withhold 
classified information is mediated psychologically. It is only through a recognition of
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this that we can begin to explain why disclosure outcomes do not always accord with 
the letter and/or the spirit of what is prescribed by an organization’s formal rules.
In the wake of September 11, 2001 and other debates that have issues of “who 
knew what?” and “why wasn’t it passed on?” as their core theme (e.g., Ellsberg, 2003; 
Marr & Wilkinson, 2003), interest in the organizational control of information and 
knowledge has enjoyed a recent revival. Against this broad backdrop, the chapter 
begins with a review of the official rules and procedures governing access to 
classified information in the ADF, what we term ‘the formal model’. This idea that 
organizational outcomes can be predicted on the basis of a set of official rules and 
procedures is central to the rational approach to organizational analysis. Therefore, a 
brief and critical review of this approach follows, before our attention turns more 
specifically to the limitations of the formal model. It is argued that despite overtones 
of objectivity and rationality, the operation of the formal model rests on psychological 
processes of judgement and attribution. As a result, problematic non-disclosure in 
ADF must be examined through a psychological lens.
The formal model
In an increasingly competitive global economy, the need for organizations to 
protect their most valuable information is paramount. No longer prepared to rely 
solely on the goodwill of their employees, many organizations have set in place 
‘information management’ policies designed to ensure that the ‘right’ people (and 
only the right people) come to know certain information at certain times (see 
Gunasekaran, Khalil, & Rahman, 2003). For many organizations, these policies are 
better described as systems of ‘information control’ (Wilsnack, 1980). They include 
explicit regulations which define what information needs to be protected and from 
whom, how it must (and must not) be shared, and the punishments that await those 
whose behaviour breaks the rules. Rather than resting on the implicit expectation that 
trade secrets and the like must not be disclosed to ‘outsiders’, these policies are often 
legally binding and forbid any such discussions taking place (Bok, 1984).
Organizational control over ‘who knows what’ arguably reaches its peak in 
government bureaucracies. Within the past decade or two, there has been a steady
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stream of literature devoted to the practice of information control by governments, 
either in general (e.g., Aftergood, 2000; Demac, 1984; Doyle, 2000; Moynihan, 1998; 
Stevenson, 1980) or written in response to specific and usually disastrous events (e.g., 
Marr & Wilkinson, 2003). Without doubt, the exemplar of information control by 
government is the modem defence organization, particularly as it relates to matters of 
intelligence. Interestingly however, defence organizations have been spared much of 
the negative commentary that has pervaded accounts of information control in other 
spheres of government, particularly within the executive (Bok, 1984; for a recent 
exception, see Aftergood, 2000). One of the primary reasons for this is that 
information control in defence and military organizations is perceived by the general 
population to be a legitimate form of government secrecy (Bok, 1984). It need hardly 
be explained why information relating to a nation’s defence arrangements must be 
controlled and restricted from the view of ‘outsiders’. Control over this type of 
information is fundamental to ensuring a nation’s security and minimizing the grave 
risks that are inevitably faced by a nation’s military personnel in ‘operational’ 
contexts.
In Australia, the disclosure of classified information is governed by a set of 
formal rules that apply not only to ADF personnel, but to all personnel employed 
across the wider ADO. This set of rules is underpinned by the notion of ‘national 
security’. In Australia, national security is formally defined as:-
The protection of the Commonwealth and the people of Australia from any actual 
or threatened action, by any agency, organization or individual, foreign or 
otherwise, which are designed to influence, intimidate, or undermine the defence 
of the nation, or its international relations. (Australian Department of Defence, 
1998, Glossary, p.l 1).
More specifically, national security refers to the protection of Australia’s interests 
from a range of potentially harmful activities. These may include espionage (i.e., 
spying), politically motivated violence, attacks on Australia’s defence system, the 
undermining of its defence plans and operations, and damage to its international 
relations (Australian Attorney-General’s Department, 2000). It is this notion that is 
core to the definition o f ‘classified’ information:-
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Official information or matter in any form or of any nature that requires 
protection against unauthorised disclosure in the interests of national security, 
and that has been so designated (Australian Department of Defence, 1998, 
Glossary, p. 4)2.
Strictly speaking, classified information is more correctly known as national 
security information which can be distinguished from non-national security 
information (Australian Attorney-General’s Department, 2000). Where unauthorised 
disclosure of national security information is thought to present a risk to national 
security, unauthorized disclosure of non-national security information is associated 
with “lesser” harm, such as that to Australian individuals, groups, commercial entities 
and the like. The use of the category titles ‘national’ and ‘non-national security 
information’ stems from a confusion that arises from the fact that both types of 
information undergo a classification process when produced, meaning that both are in 
a sense ‘classified’. However, the term ‘classified information’ is routinely used to 
refer to national security information.
The actual process whereby information becomes ‘classified’ involves the 
assignment of one of four hierarchically arranged classifications that prescribe the 
extent to which the information is to be protected. From the lowest to the highest, 
these classifications are: RESTRICTED, CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET and TOP 
SECRET. Where information that receives a TOP SECRET classification demands 
the utmost protection, that which receives a RESTRICTED classification requires 
only some protection by comparison. The particular classification assigned is that 
which is judged by the information’s originator (i.e., the person responsible for 
preparing the information) to be commensurate with the degree o f damage to 
Australia’s national security that may result from unauthorised disclosure of the 
information. Classifications and commensurate degrees of damage to national 
security are shown in Table 2.1.
2. The term “unauthorised disclosure” is defined more fully later in this chapter. At this point, it is 
sufficient to say that it refers to disclosure of classified information to those who are deemed by 
way o f official policy to be inappropriate recipients of such information.
16
Table 2.1
Information classifications in the Australian Defence Organization
Classification Unauthorised disclosure could...
RESTRICTED Possibly be harmful to national security
CONFIDENTIAL Cause damage to national security
SECRET Cause serious damage to national security
TOP SECRET Cause exceptionally grave damage to national security
(Source: Australian Attorney-General’s Department, 2000)
According to the official rules, an individual is authorised to access to 
classified information if they satisfy two criteria. First, the intended recipient must 
possess an adequate level security clearance. In the Australian Defence Organisation 
(ADO), a security clearance is an official advice that an individual is considered 
suitable to have access to classified information up to a specified level (Australian 
Department of Defence, 1998). An adequate-level clearance is one that is 
commensurate with, or of a higher level than the information’s designated 
classification. For example, to be eligible to access SECRET information, the 
intended recipient must hold either a SECRET or a TOP-SECRET clearance. Via this 
mechanism (amongst others), highly classified information comes to receive greater 
protection than less classified information since the granting of higher-level security 
clearances involves significantly more scrutiny of the individual (in the form of 
background checks and the like) than does the granting of lower-level clearances.
In addition to an adequate level security clearance, authorised access to 
classified information is dependent upon the intended recipient possessing a ‘need to 
know’. In the ADO, ‘need to know’ is defined as:
A criterion used in security procedures that requires the custodians of classified 
information to establish, prior to disclosure, that the intended recipient must have 
access to the information to perform his/her official duties (Australian 
Department of Defence, 1998, Glossary, p. 11).
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The ‘need to know’ criteria thus restricts the basis for accessing classified information 
to official necessity. In so doing, it excludes all other circumstantial arguments for 
gaining access to classified information, regardless of whether the intended recipient 
possesses an adequate level security clearance. For instance, the condition excludes 
circumstances where access to classified information would be convenient for the 
intended recipient, where the intended recipient believes that they may have a need to 
know the information at a later point in time and so on. Together, the two criteria 
constitute the primary mechanism through which the ADO (and modem defence 
organizations generally) seek to limit the disclosure of classified information amongst 
the personnel to the absolute minimum, that is, to those for whom it is officially 
necessary.
In summary then, the disclosure of classified information in the ADF context 
is governed by a set of official rules that apply to all ADO personnel. These are the 
rules governing access to classified information. They state that the intended recipient 
must possess both an adequate level security clearance and a ‘need to know’ in order 
to have access to classified information. Further, these rules seek to ensure that only 
appropriate persons access classified information and to prevent inappropriate 
disclosure of such information, either by accident or by intention (Australian 
Department of Defence, 1991). The idea that organizational outcomes including 
decision-making can be predicted on the basis of official rules such as these is central 
to the rational approach to organizational analysis. Therefore, a brief and critical 
review of this approach is in order at this point.
Rational organizational analysis: A brief review
The assumption that organizational phenomena can be understood and 
predicted on the basis of official mles and procedures lies at the heart of the rational 
approach to organizational analysis (Hall, 1977; Scott, 1992). As implied by 
Thompson’s (1967) quote below, the central tenet of rational analysis is the notion 
that organizational phenomena, including human behaviour and decision-making, are 
(or can be) deliberately and objectively planned and executed (Argyris, 1960; Bennis, 
1959; Erickson, 1979; Hall, 1977; Thompson, 1967):
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The rational model of an organization results in everything being functional -  
making a positive, indeed an optimum, contribution to the overall result. All 
resources are appropriate resources, and their allocation fits a master plan. All 
action is appropriate action, and its outcomes are predictable, (p. 6).
Consequently, the theoretical and empirical focus of the rational approach is 
squarely on processes of organizational control (Hall, 1977; Scott, 1992). Dimensions 
of organizational structure are considered to be the fundamental control mechanisms, 
circumscribing human behaviour and decision-making so as to ensure that personnel 
behave in ‘calculated ways’ (Hall, 1977). Essentially, the perspective sees personnel 
as instruments that are shaped by rules, roles and regulations, and whose efforts can 
be channelled directly into accomplishing explicitly articulated goals (Gouldner,
1959; March & Simon, 1958; Scott, 1992). With this ‘certainty-oriented’ posture, 
formal organizational structure is regarded as the ultimate determinant of behaviour.
It is widely accepted that Max Weber’s (1946) thoughts on bureaucracy 
provide the theoretical roots of the perspective (Hall, 1977; Haralambos & Heald, 
1985; Scott, 1992). According to Weber, the bureaucracy is “rational action in an 
institutionalised form” (Haralambos & Heald, 1985, p. 280). Weber lists a number of 
characteristics that, together, comprise the ‘ideal-type’ bureaucracy. Generally 
speaking, the following five characteristics are considered to be the core elements (see 
Haralambos & Heald, 1985; Scott, 1992). First, the bureaucratic mode of 
administration involves the distribution of regular tasks and activities as official 
duties. In this way, complex tasks such as providing a system of taxation or planning 
civil infrastructure are broken down amongst personnel with clearly defined spheres 
of competence and responsibility. Second, the ideal-type bureaucracy is organized 
along hierarchical lines and possesses a graded authority structure. Hence, an 
administrative ‘chain of command’ is established that orders a system of super- and 
subordination. Third, bureaucratic administration involves a strict separation of 
private and official income and property whilst, and fourth, personnel occupying 
bureaucratic office are selected of the basis of their technical expertise, rather than 
kinship or inheritance. Finally, and particularly relevant to our interest in the formal 
model of access to classified information, bureaucratic operations are governed by a 
consistent (i.e., fixed) set of abstract and impersonal rules.
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In all organizations, a system of administration capable of coordinating the 
activities of elements (e.g., individuals, groups, departments) toward, and in line with 
prescribed organizational goals is critical. Weber saw bureaucracy as a mode of 
organization that sought this coordination through having officials perform their 
duties in accordance with “calculable rules” (Weber, 1946, p. 215), that is, rules and 
procedures which can be applied in a seemingly impartial or ‘computable’ way. In 
the ideal-type bureaucracy, such rules are applied with impersonal formality, or in 
Weber’s words “without regard for persons” (Weber, 1946, p. 215). He saw these 
rules and their impersonal application as underpinning the technical superiority of 
bureaucracy over all other modes of human organization - as the reason why only this 
mode of organization can effectively and indefinitely coordinate the actions of a large 
number of people toward a common goal:
[Bureaucracy] develops the more perfectly the more bureaucracy is 
‘dehumanized’, the more completely it succeeds in eliminating from official 
business love, hatred, and all purely personal, irrational, and emotional elements 
which escape calculation. This is the specific nature of bureaucracy and it is 
appraised as its special virtue (Weber, 1946, p.216).
For Weber (1946), the discharge of bureaucratic business according to calculable and 
impersonal rules secure an objectivity where “rules, means, ends, and a matter-of- 
factness dominate” (p. 244)3.
Yet, the rational approach has long been viewed as providing an incomplete 
and inaccurate framework upon which to understand and predict organizational 
phenomena (Erickson, 1979; Hall, 1977; March & Simon, 1958). Specifically, it is 
widely accepted that norms of rationality are incapable of providing absolute 
standards, and that organizational conduct and social relations which deviate from the 
formal plan are inevitable (Blau & Scott, 1962; Hall, 1977). Tsoukas (1998) for 
instance, argues that:
3. It is important to note that while Weber analysed rational bureaucracy and how it arose, he did not 
advocate this form of human organization.
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Organized contexts cannot rely on calculable rules alone. Weber’s linear 
logic.. .can be seen at best as a ceteris paribus argument for the development of 
formal organization. We have seen enough in the last hundred years to make us 
have serious doubts about whether formal organizations can really function 
effectively as programmable machines (p. 48)
By ignoring or seeking to eliminate rather than incorporate factors which 
cannot be controlled or accurately predicted by organizational structure, the rational 
approach represents what are essentially “organizations without people” (Bennis,
1959. p. 263). The emphasis is on rules and regulations and not actual human 
behaviour or decision-making. In short, structure is embraced, action is ignored and 
very little organizational variance is eventually explained (Hall, 1977; Scott, 1992; 
Thompson, 1967). The upshot is that the rational approach does not contain sufficient 
specification of the psychological processes underpinning organizational behaviour 
(Katz & Kahn, 1966). The social and organizational context capable of shaping these 
processes having been excluded from the analytical framework from the very 
beginning.
Subsequent theoretical reasoning in organization theory shifted the interpretive 
framework from the rules and regulations of the formal blueprint to specification of 
these psychological processes and their contextual determinants (e.g., Katz & Kahn, 
1966; March & Simon, 1958, Blau & Scott, 1962). In doing so, it has argued that 
human action takes place in interactive and open-ended contexts and “is always a 
local matter.. .whose features cannot be fully anticipated” (Tsoukas, 2001, p. 9).
From this more ‘open-systems’ perspective, social relations between an organization’s 
personnel are not taken to be ‘disembedded’ or ‘decontextualized’ by formal rules and 
any ‘deviance’ such as that represented by problematic non-disclosure of classified 
information is argued to have psychological correlates, reflecting not random but 
patterned and adaptive responses to “problematic situations” (Thompson, 1967, p. 7). 
On this note, it would seem pertinent to return to the formal model and offer a more 
specific critique of its ability to provide an adequate explanatory framework for 
understanding disclosure outcomes in the ADF.
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A critique of the formal model
The formal model outlined at the beginning of this chapter lays down a set of 
official rules to be employed by ADF personnel in determining whether or not to 
allow others access to classified information. In doing so, it constitutes our 
commonsense view of the mechanism underpinning disclosure outcomes in this 
organizational context. That is, we intuitively feel that classified information comes 
to be known by those who have a ‘need to know’ pending they are sufficiently 
‘cleared’, and not known by those who do not satisfy either (or both) of these criteria. 
This level of understanding may be all that is required when disclosure outcomes 
accord with the formal organizational blueprint, that is, when there is a general 
consensus amongst members of the organization that disclosure outcomes reflect what 
is ‘right’ according to the formal model. However, and as alluded to in the previous 
section, we begin to encounter problems with this level of understanding once we 
move away from ideal outcomes and toward those where there is discord and 
disagreement as to what is ‘right’ in this respect, such as cases of problematic non­
disclosure.
W e can illustrate this using a simple 2 x 2  matrix in which the outcome of a 
particular disclosure decision (i.e., to disclose or withhold classified information) is 
matched against the outcome which is ‘right’ or ‘appropriate’ according to the formal 
model (see Figure 2.1). In a given disclosure situation, an individual may decide to 
either disclose (D) or not disclose (ND) classified information, where the latter option 
may include other courses of action such as delaying a decision or passing it up the 
chain of command. Furthermore, in a given disclosure situation, one of these 
alternatives is the ‘appropriate’ one according to the prescriptions of the formal 
model. That is, the formal model would have one disclose (D) or not disclose (ND) 
the information. Hence, we have four possible disclosure outcomes: (i) appropriate 
disclosure - disclosing when one should; (ii) inappropriate disclosure - disclosing 
when one should not; (iii) inappropriate non-disclosure - not disclosing when one 
should disclose; and (iv) appropriate non-disclosure - not disclosing when one should 
not disclose.
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Actual decision
D ND
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decision
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disclosure non-disclosure
Inappropriate Appropriate
disclosure non-disclosure
Figure 2.1 A  basic framework of disclosure outcomes.
An explanation of appropriate disclosure and appropriate non-disclosure can 
be derived from the formal model in its ‘natural’ form without any trouble. In the 
case of the former outcome, one would infer that the intended recipient had a ‘need to 
know’ and was sufficiently cleared, whereas in the case of the latter, the intended 
recipient must not have met one or both of these conditions. To explain inappropriate 
disclosure (e.g., ‘leaks’ of classified information) however, additional factors must be 
introduced. For obvious reasons, military and defence organizations have long been 
interested in these factors and they are discussed more fully in Chapter 4. Likewise, 
additional factors are needed to explain inappropriate non-disclosure, what we have 
termed ‘problematic non-disclosure’. Regardless of whether it is problematic or not, 
the formal model can only explain non-disclosure by inferring the absence of either a 
‘need to know’ or an adequate-level security clearance. Yet, inappropriate non­
disclosure by definition implies the fulfilment of these conditions. That is, it suggests 
that the intended recipient had, at the very least, a ‘need to know’ the information to 
perform their official duties and would (or should, by virtue of this ‘need to know’) 
have possessed an adequate-level security clearance. It would be hard to maintain, for 
instance, that officials from the FBI, CIA, and NSA did not possess a need to know 
certain information that each other had collected before September 11, 2001.
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The problem with the explanatory capacity of the formal model vis-ä-vis 
inappropriate (i.e., problematic) non-disclosure stems from a fundamental assumption 
that underpins the use of formal criteria in organizational decision-making. This 
assumption is that the formal criteria upon which organizational decisions are made 
are impartially determinable. That is, the criteria and extent to which they are 
fulfilled exist as ‘states in Nature’ that can be accurately determined or ‘fixed’ at any 
given point in time. The formal model governing access to classified information 
appears to have impartially computable or ‘rational’ properties (Lowry, 1972).
Indeed, this is clearly the case with respect to the adequacy of the intended recipient’s 
security clearance - it is either objectively adequate or inadequate for accessing the 
relevant information. However, things are less clear regarding the impartiality of the 
second criteria, whether or not the intended recipient has a ‘need to know’.
On the surface, another’s ‘need to know’ classified information appears to be 
an impartially computable criterion. That is, it seems intuitive to see the information 
as inherently necessary or unnecessary for the intended recipient to perform their 
official duties. However, on closer inspection, the argument that ‘need to know’ lies 
within the domain of organizational rationality cannot be maintained. The reason for 
this is that despite its rational and objective overtones, another’s ‘need to know’ is not 
an inherent quality of information per se. Instead, it is a psychological process of 
perception and judgment as to what another needs so as to achieve certain ends at a 
given place and time. Indeed, because these processes relate to potential changes in 
the ‘knowledge state’ of another person (i.e., how disclosing will change what they 
know), the determination of ‘need to know’ constitutes a psychological process about 
a psychological process in another. Hence, the intended recipient’s ‘need to know’ 
exists not only as a perception in the eye of the custodian of classified information, 
but also as a judgment and attribution made by latter about the former.
As a psychologically mediated process, the determination of another’s ‘need to 
know’ is likely to be shaped by forces and factors that shape psychological processes 
more generally, such as the prevailing social context and social norms (see Turner, 
1991; Turner et al., 1987). This ‘shaping’ of need to know is well illustrated by 
situations in which one’s need to know is contested, that is, circumstances where 
people disagree as to whether or not a given individual or group has a need to know
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certain information. Clearly, if another’s ‘need to know’ were impartially 
computable, scope for these kinds of disagreement would not exist. Yet such 
disagreements are evident with respect to the breakdown of the US intelligence 
community prior to September 11, 2001. For example, intelligence analysts were 
often denied access to classified information from intelligence collectors. Whereas 
the analysts perceived themselves to have a ‘need to know’, collectors often 
disagreed, not so much because the information did not relate to the analysts’ work 
duties, but because the collectors viewed the analysts as not needing to know other 
things that might be inferred from the information, such as how it was collected and 
by whom. Of course, these disagreements must be understood in their local context. 
However, they illustrate a fundamentally important point - that the determination of 
‘need to know’ is far from a rational, normative act and is likely to vary according to 
the factors which are psychological salient in the mind of the potential discloser of 
classified information at a given time.
Summary and the way ahead
Our commonsense understanding of how classified information comes to be 
disclosed across the ADF is founded on norms of rationality. Access to classified 
information is governed by formal rules assumed to be interpreted and applied with 
the same objectivity that Weber outlined a century ago. It is further assumed that 
their applicability and interpretation remains consistent across all contexts. On this 
basis that we derive an ‘official expectation’ that the disclosure and non-disclosure of 
classified information in the ADF follows a gradient that is objectively ‘right’. Yet, 
such ideas are clearly problematic. Official rules like as those outlined above, provide 
no explanation of when or why disclosure outcomes will not accord with the letter or 
spirit of official policy. What is needed to understand problematic non-disclosure of 
classified information is a recognition that disclosure behaviour is a psychologically 
mediated activity. Just as researchers have sought to bring into play psychological 
explanations for why military and defence personnel disclose classified information 
when they should not (see Sarbin et al., 1994), so too must the same attention be 
brought to bear to help explain why such personnel will not disclose classified 
information when, at least in the eyes of some, they should. In the chapter that 
follows, we review the contribution that psychology has made in understanding
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human disclosure behaviour in an effort to identify the factors that may be important 
in this respect.
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Chapter 3
Risk and affiliation:
The psychology of disclosure
Introduction
In Chapter 2, the scene was set for a psychological analysis of disclosure and 
non-disclosure as it applies to classified information in the ADF. In doing so, it was 
argued that the official rules governing access to classified information (what we 
termed the formal model) does not provide an adequate explanatory framework for 
understanding actual disclosure outcomes. Rather than being the ‘rational’ output of 
objectively determinable decision-making criteria, disclosure outcomes are the result 
of psychologically mediated processes and as such will not always accord with what 
is envisaged by the organization’s formal blueprint. In order to understand the when 
and why of problematic non-disclosure, we must view the phenomenon through a 
psychological lens. The task now is to identify the broad psychological factors that 
are likely to impact on ADF personnel’s decisions to disclose classified information. 
The aim of this chapter is to review the progress that has already been made vis-ä-vis 
the psychology of disclosure phenomena.
There are a number of social phenomena which involve people disclosing 
information to (or alternatively, concealing it from) one another. Although varying in 
the extent to which they have attracted empirical and/or theoretical attention from 
psychologists, the literatures concerning self-disclosure, confidentiality, whistle­
blowing, and secrecy are all of relevance here. Compared to the large volume of work 
dealing with the psychology of self-disclosure, relatively little is known about the 
factors affecting an individual’s willingness to disclose confidential information or to 
‘blow the whistle’. Nonetheless, each of these literatures is important and in this 
chapter they are reviewed and their contribution to the current research problem is 
outlined. We begin by proposing a basic model of disclosure as a social process. The 
purpose of this is twofold. First, such a model will provide a standard backdrop 
against which each of the four phenomena outlined above can be discussed. Second,
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it provides a basic framework against which to discuss the factors that may play a role 
in determining disclosure outcomes as they relate to classified information in the 
ADF.
Disclosure as a three-party process: A conceptual model
In proposing a basic model of disclosure behaviour, it is important that it 
represent those parties capable of influencing disclosure outcomes. To this end, a 
model of disclosure is proposed in which three parties are represented: (i) the 
‘potential discloser’, (ii) the ‘source’, and (iii) the ‘potential recipient’. The potential 
discloser is, quite simply, the entity who may disclose or not disclose the information 
of concern. For example, the potential disclosers of interest in this thesis are ADF 
personnel and the information of concern is classified information. The source is the 
entity who has provided the potential discloser with the information. As will be seen 
later in the chapter, the nature of the source can vary considerably. For instance, the 
source may comprise an individual, a group, or an organization and they may have 
provided the information to the potential discloser either directly or indirectly. The 
potential recipient is the entity to which the potential discloser may or may not 
disclose the information. Like the source, the characteristics of the potential recipient 
may vary widely. They too may be an individual, group, or organization who has 
explicitly requested the information or who is being considered by the potential 
discloser as a possible target for a ‘spontaneous’ (i.e., non-requested) disclosure.
Clearly, the potential discloser lies at the heart of the model and this is 
depicted in Figure 3.1. The unbroken arrow between the source and the potential 
discloser indicates that the latter has been provided with the information or knowledge 
by the source. In other words, entrustment or ‘first-phase’ disclosure has already 
taken place. The broken arrow between the potential discloser and the potential 
recipient indicates that the former is yet to disclose the knowledge or information to 
the latter and may ultimately decide not to do so.
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Potential Potential
Source
discioser recipient
Figure 3.1 A  model of disclosure as a three-party process.
In this way, the model represents the potential discloser’s decision as part of a broader 
social process, rather than as a decision confined to an individual in isolation. This 
‘process perspective’ is important in that it allows consideration of factors other than 
those relating to the characteristics of the potential discioser per se (e.g., personality 
factors). More specifically, situating the potential discloser’s decision within a 
broader social context promotes the idea that disclosure outcomes can be influenced 
by the relationship that the potential discioser has with both the source and the 
potential recipient. The relationship that has received the most attention in the 
psychological literature is that between the potential discioser and the potential 
recipient as it relates to the phenomenon of self-disclosure.
Self-disclosure: The interplay of risk and trust
The term ‘self-disclosure’ refers to an individual’s revelation of personal 
information (e.g., thoughts, feelings, past experiences) to another or others (Hendrick, 
1987; Jourard, 1971). Because self-disclosure relates to the revelation of personal 
information, the ‘potential discioser’ and the ‘source’ are one and the same individual. 
Hence, self-disclosure represents a compression of the three-party process presented 
above into one involving two parties, as depicted in Figure 3.2.
Figure 3.2 Self disclosure as a two-party process.
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The self-disclosure literature is vast, spanning work conducted in both clinical 
(e.g., psychotherapy) and non-clinical (e.g., friendships, family relationships) settings 
(Yovetich & Drigotas, 1999). In clinical settings, self-disclosure serves to bring 
information concerning the client’s troubles to the fore (Färber, 2003). It is widely 
agreed that the extent to which a client ‘self-discloses’ is positively related to 
constructive therapeutic outcomes and hence self-disclosure is considered a vital 
element of psychotherapy (Hill, Gelso, & Mohr, 2000; see Färber & Hall, 2002 for a 
review). In non-clinical settings, self-disclosure is also considered a positive and 
beneficial process. For instance, the disclosure of personal information is thought to 
be critical in promoting psychological growth and facilitating one’s ability to establish 
and maintain close and intimate friendships (Derlega, Metts, Petronio, & Margulis, 
1993; Hargie et al., 2002; Miller & Boon, 2000).
The importance of self-disclosure for the efficacy of clinical and non-clinical 
outcomes has meant that the factors affecting people’s willingness to self-disclose 
have attracted considerable research attention. Generally speaking, these factors fall 
into one of two broad categories: (a) individual difference (i.e., personality) factors, or 
(b) ‘relational’ factors. The former category is comprised of a diverse range of 
personality and individual-differences variables including attachment style 
(Mikulincer & Nachshon, 1991; Pistole, 1993; Vrij; Paterson, Nunkoosing, Soukara,
& Oosterwegel, 2003), locus o f control (Wheeless, Erickson, & Behrens, 1986) and 
shame-proneness (Färber & Hall, 2002). To illustrate, Pistole (1993) found that 
people with a ‘secure’ attachment style (i.e., those comfortable with close 
relationships) were more comfortable with the disclosure of personal information than 
those with an ‘avoidant’ or ‘anxious/ambivalent’ attachment style. Wheeless et al., 
(1986) on the other hand, found that people with an ‘external’ locus of control (i.e., a 
belief that they cannot control the rewards they receive) were more willing to disclose 
personal information than those with an ‘internal’ locus of control (i.e., a belief that 
they can control these rewards).
By way of contrast, the second category is comprised of factors specific to the 
relationship between the potential self-discloser and the potential recipient. One that 
has attracted a great deal of attention in clinical settings is the ‘therapeutic alliance’,
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that is, the extent to which the client and the therapist share an emotional bond and 
common goals (Färber, 2003). Generally, as the therapeutic alliance grows ‘stronger’, 
clients become more willing to disclose personal information to clinicians (Färber & 
Hall, 2002). A second relational factor that has attracted a great deal of attention is 
‘disclosure reciprocity’. The idea here is that an individual’s willingness to self- 
disclose varies according to whether the potential recipient has, or is expected to 
disclose in return (Hill & Stull, 1982; Moon, 2000). However, discussions of self­
disclosure have been dominated by a more general factor, one that is conceived of as 
both a relational and a personality factor. This is the concept of trust.
Despite continual debates regarding the meaning of trust (Kramer, 1999; 
Lewicki & Bunker, 1995), a widely accepted definition proposed by Mayer et al.,
1995) defines trust as one’s willingness to be vulnerable in some way to another (see 
also Bigley & Pearce, 1998; Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt, & Camerer, 1998). More 
specifically, Mayer et al., (1995) define trust as:
.. .the willingness of a party to be vulnerable to the actions of another party 
based on the expectation that the other will perform a particular action 
important to the trustor, irrespective of the ability to monitor or control that 
other party (p. 712)
This definition reflects a core assumption held by most trust researchers that risk is a 
necessary precondition for trust (Dasgupta, 1988; Doney, Cannon, & Mullen, 1998; 
Lewis & Weigert, 1985). The term ‘risk’ refers to a type of uncertainty that includes 
the prospect of loss (i.e., hazard or danger; Smithson, 1994), and in the context of 
trust relates to the uncertainty and vulnerability vis-ä-vis the actions of the ‘trustee’ 
(Doney et al., 1998). Numerous studies have sought to establish trust as an antecedent 
to self-disclosure by emphasising the fundamental role of risk (Petronio & Bantz, 
1991; Vrij, Nunkoosing, Paterson, Oosterwegel, & Soukara, 2002). For example, in 
disclosing personal information people risk rejection by the recipient of the 
information, and thereby embarrassment, shame, social isolation and betrayal, if the 
recipient discloses the information to others (Petronio & Bantz, 1991; see also 
Petronio, Reeder, Hecht & Mon’t Ros-Mendoza, 1996). Because of such risks, the 
potential discloser’s beliefs about the trustworthiness of the potential recipient is
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considered to be a major factor influencing whether self-disclosure takes place. These 
ideas can be set against the basic disclosure framework as shown in Figure 3.3.
trustworthiness
Figure 3.3 Self-disclosure as mediated by perceived risk and trustworthiness
As suggested above, trust has been viewed in two ways in discussions of self­
disclosure, as either an individual-difference factor or a relational factor. The former 
conception of trust is known as generalized trust, a concept which can be traced back 
to Rotter (1967). Rotter believed that on the basis of their early experiences, people 
develop beliefs about the trustworthiness of others and that this generalizes over time 
into a relatively stable personality trait (Kramer, 1999; Lewicki & Bunker, 1995). At 
first blush, a direct association between generalized trust and self-disclosure appears 
intuitive (Wheeless & Grotz, 1977). Indeed, Corcoran (1988) and more recently 
Steele (1991) offer support for this idea. Corcoran (1988) investigated the extent to 
which one’s willingness to self-disclose correlated with their scores on Rotter’s 
(1967) Interpersonal Trust Scale (ITS), a commonly used measure of generalized 
trust. Willingness to self-disclose was assessed in terms of one’s responses to a 
number of personal and potentially embarrassing questions. Results showed that 
those who scored low on the ITS were generally less willing to respond than those 
who scored highly. Similarly, Steele (1991) found that scores on the ITS correlated 
positively with self-reports of the amount of self-disclosure to significant others. 
However, these studies stand against a backdrop of early research in which this 
relationship failed to materialise. MacDonald, Kessel, and Fuller (1972) for example, 
compared two measures of generalized trust as predictors of self-disclosure, the ITS 
and a measure based on participants’ choices in a ‘Prisoner’s Dilemma’ matrix, and 
found that only the latter predicted self-disclosure (see also Cash, Stack and Luna; 
1975; McAllister & Kiesler, 1975; Vondracek & Marshall, 1971).
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Efforts to link trust and self-disclosure have been more successful when trust 
is conceptualised as a relational factor, so-called individualized trust. Rather than 
reflecting personality, individualized trust is relationship specific trust. That is, it 
refers to the truster’s beliefs about the intentions of a specific trustee (Foubert & 
Sholley, 1996). Research by Wheeless and Grotz (1977) compared individualized and 
generalized trust as predictors of various aspects of self-disclosure including (i) the 
intention to self-disclose, (ii) the amount disclosed, (iii) its honesty and accuracy, and 
(iv) its ‘depth’ or intimacy. Participants in this study were asked to think about a 
specific recipient of personal information (e.g., ‘mother’, ‘father’, ‘co-worker’) and 
then completed an instrument measuring their level of generalized and individualized 
trust, and the aspects outlined above. Results indicated that individualized trust was 
positively related to a many dimensions of self-disclosure, specifically, the conscious 
intention to disclose, the amount of information disclosed, and its overall depth. In 
contrast, generalized trust failed to predict any of these dimensions. After replicating 
this, Wheeless (1978) concluded “the relationship of disclosure and trust is more 
probably a ‘state’ rather than a ‘trait’ phenomenon” (p. 153).
While these findings indicate a positive association between individualized 
trust and a willingness to disclose personal information, they do so in the context of 
the laboratory (see also Foubert & Sholley, 1996). Recent research has sought to 
investigate the impact of trust on self-disclosure in ‘real-world’ contexts. One of the 
most frequently examined contexts in this respect is that pertaining to positive HIV 
diagnoses (Charbonneau, Maheux and Beland, 1999; DeMatteo et al., 2002; Levy et 
ah, 1999; Sauka & Lie, 2000). Again, the risks associated with disclosing this 
information (e.g., rejection, stigma, prejudice, threats to physical safety, and so on) 
mean that the perceived trustworthiness of the potential recipient remains a key factor. 
To this end, Charbonneau et ah, (1999) found that one of the main reasons why HIV­
positive persons chose not to disclose this information to their dentists was that they 
considered them to be untrustworthy, that is, they believed there was a risk their 
dentists would disclose the information to others (see also Sauka & Lie, 2000). A 
similar theme emerges in work examining the disclosure of other types of sensitive 
information. For instance, Boon and Miller (1999) found that trust was a key factor in 
the decision of homosexual men to disclose their homosexuality to their mothers (see 
also Miller & Boon, 2000; Ponse, 1976), while Petronio et al., (1996) found that
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sexually abused children only disclosed information about their abuse to trusted 
confidants.
Summary and implications
Clearly, the self-disclosure literature is limited in its capacity to provide an 
understanding of the factors likely to affect the disclosure of classified information. 
For one, it relates to the revelation of personal information rather than officially secret 
information. Despite the tendency for defence personnel to sometimes claim a sense 
of “ownership” over officially secret information (United States House Committee, 
2002) the two forms of disclosure obviously cannot be equated. Secondly, self­
disclosure is process confined to two parties - the potential discloser and the potential 
recipient - since the former is also the source. Yet, the potential discloser of classified 
information is not necessarily its source. Defence personnel are frequently provided 
with classified information by other parties who may be individuals, groups, or other 
organizations.
Having said that, the work outlined above does offer important psychological 
points that may arguably apply to the disclosure of classified information in defence 
organizations and which may have potential in an analysis of problematic non­
disclosure in this domain. Specifically, the relationship between risk, trust, and 
disclosure that is made salient in the self-disclosure literature is also likely to be 
relevant to disclosure of classified information in defence settings. This is because 
risk is embedded within the disclosure of classified information just as it is within the 
disclosure of personal information. In other words, just as the disclosure of personal 
information entails the prospect of loss, so too may disclosing classified information. 
In the case of the latter however, the loss may pertain to national security and, at 
times, the lives of military personnel. Hence, it is reasonable to assume that the 
perceived trustworthiness of the potential recipient of classified information will be 
salient in the mind of its potential discloser, particularly when the risk is great. In 
order to build on this basic hypothesis, it is necessary to turn to literature regarding 
other disclosure phenomena in which is a separate source of information is present.
To that end, we now review those psychological analyses relevant to the operation of 
confidentiality.
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Confidentiality: Competing consequences
Confidentiality refers to the ethical and/or legal requirement of some persons 
(e.g., professionals such as doctors, psychologists, bankers) to respect their client’s 
right to privacy (Bok, 1984; Jacques & Folen, 1998; Taylor & Adelman, 1989). To 
this end, it comprises a set of principles that mandate non-disclosure of information 
entrusted by one’s clients (e.g., medical and financial records) to third parties, 
regardless of whether it has been sourced from the client directly or from one’s 
professional colleagues. However, a distinction is made between two types of 
confidentiality (Watkins, 1989). The first type, absolute confidentiality, mandates 
non-disclosure under all circumstances. The second and more familiar type, relative 
confidentiality, mandates non-disclosure up to a point beyond which the professional 
is obligated to disclose, that is, to commit a ‘breach’ of client confidentiality.
Confidentiality is a ‘cornerstone’ construct in professional contexts (Watkins, 
1989). In assuring clients that the information they disclose to professionals will not 
be disclosed further, it signifies a trust between the two parties which promotes the 
client’s sharing of information and intention to remain in the relationship (Hook & 
Cleveland, 1999; Watkins, 1989). Ford, Millstein, Halpem-Felsher, and Irwin (1997) 
recently reported empirical support for this idea in a study that examined the impact 
of physicians assurances about confidentiality on adolescents’ willingness of to 
disclose sensitive information (e.g., substance abuse, sexual orientation). In this 
study, participants listened to a taped depiction of a medical visit in which a physician 
gave an assurance of either absolute or relative confidentiality, or made no mention of 
confidentiality whatsoever. Those who listened to the physician give an assurance of 
confidentiality (either relative or absolute) indicated a greater willingness to disclose 
information to the physician than those in the condition where confidentiality was not 
raised (see also Nowell & Spruill, 1993). Despite its demonstrable benefits to client 
outcomes, the actual operation of confidentiality has proven to be particularly 
troublesome.
Central to these troubles are the increasing demands placed on professionals 
to disclose confidential information to third parties such as employers, police, credit 
agencies, and insurance companies (Bok, 1984; Bollas & Sundelson, 1995; Gellman,
35
1986; Lindenthal et al., 1984; Lindenthal & Thomas, 1980). The anxiety generated by 
these pressures is compounded by the many lawsuits that have been successfully 
waged against professionals for inappropriate non-disclosure of confidential 
information. The most famous is arguably Tarasoff vs. The Regents University of 
California where in 1969, a young university student, Tatiana Tarasoff, was murdered 
by an obsessed and schizophrenic admirer, Prosenjit Proddar, two months after he 
informed his therapist of his intention to do so (see Simone & Fulero, 2001). While 
the therapist advised the police of Proddar’s intention, Tarasoff herself was not 
warned, a decision made in the interests of confidentiality. The court found the 
therapist liable for failing to warn Tarasoff and sanctioned severe penalties for non­
disclosure of confidential information when one’s clients are likely to pose a risk to 
others. The Tarasoff case is widely regarded by psychological clinicians as the 
beginning of the erosion of confidentiality (Bok, 1984; Vandecreek & Knapp, 2001).
Clearly, the management of client-confidentiality involves the recognition and 
resolution of ‘disclosure dilemmas’. On one side of the dilemma, confidentiality 
exists as a highly-valued principle of professional practice, securing positive 
outcomes for the client and pressuring professionals to keep client information 
concealed. Any decision to disclose is likely to be seen by the client as a betrayal of 
trust, which may have been difficult to obtain and virtually impossible to restore 
(Hook & Cleveland, 1999). On the other side, the professional faces increasing 
pressures to disclose confidential information and any decision to not to do may risk 
Tarasoff-type consequences. On both sides, the professional faces sanctions if they 
can be shown through legal or ethical processes to have ‘got it wrong’. The 
complexities of confidentiality as a process can be depicted using the conceptual 
framework outlined earlier, as shown in Figure 3.4.
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Figure 3.4 Confidentiality as a three-party disclosure dilemma.
Rather than examining how professionals resolve these dilemmas, the bulk of 
the psychological literature on confidentiality seeks to identify their causes. Two 
broad themes have emerged from this work. This first is that formal rules prescribing 
appropriate disclosure of confidential information lack the specificity needed to avoid 
these dilemmas (Hook & Cleveland, 1999; Jacques & Folen, 1998). For instance, 
regulations stating that one must disclose when harm is likely to befall others 
generally leave it to the clinician to define “harm” and “likely” for themselves (Hook 
& Cleveland, 1999; see also Knowles & McMahon, 1995). The second theme is that 
these formal rules are incompatible with real-world demands associated with the 
practice of so called “confidence work” (Barbour, 1994, p. 148). This is particularly 
true in clinical settings where the increasing number o f interdependent professionals 
involved mean that disclosure boundaries are constantly revised and re-negotiated, as 
suggested by Barbour (1994) below:
Even where restrictions, regulations or guidelines exist, they cannot hope to 
cover all eventualities or permutations involved in the complex web of 
relationships and circumstances surrounding work with HIV seropositive 
individuals...Similarly, such guidelines cannot cover all staff working or 
associated with the complex organizations in which ‘confidentiality’ is located, 
which ensures that its realisation, if ever possible, is problematic (p. 147).
Against this backdrop, a small number of researchers have examined the 
process whereby confidentiality dilemmas are resolved. In one study, Lindenthal and 
Thomas (1980) presented clinicians (in this case, medical internists, psychologists and 
psychiatrists) with a series of vignettes depicting a client involved in various activities 
that posed a risk to social order. Relatively ‘low-risk’ vignettes depicted the client
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involved in activities like shoplifting and reckless driving, whereas relatively ‘high- 
risk’ vignettes depicted pyromania, rape, and murder. Clinicians were required to 
respond to each vignette by stating what they would do if this was a client in their 
care. Specifically, whether they would (a) disclose knowledge of the client’s 
involvement to others (i.e., breach confidentiality) or (b) not disclose this knowledge 
(i.e., maintain confidentiality). Results indicated that as the risk posed to social order 
grew progressively more severe, clinicians’ willingness to breach confidentiality 
increased. Specifically, when non-disclosure had low-risk consequences clinicians 
preferred maintaining confidentiality, whereas when it had high-risk consequences 
they preferred its breach. When the risk associated with non-disclosure of the 
confidential information was moderate, clinicians were left largely undecided as to 
what to do. In follow-up research, Lindenthal et al., (1984) included vignettes in 
which the client posed a risk to themselves (e.g., suicidal ideations). Again, clinicians 
were presented with the vignettes and asked to indicate the course of action they 
would follow. As before, clinicians were most willing to disclose when non­
disclosure posed a major risk to social order (e.g., a client who threatened to plant a 
bomb) but were less willing to disclose when the client posed a risk to themselves, 
that is, when they reported suicidal ideations or behaviour. Lindenthal et ah, (1984) 
argued that non-disclosure was preferred under these circumstances because 
disclosing would betray the client’s trust, do little to prevent their actual suicide, and 
deter the client from seeking help in the future (see also Lindenthal, Jordan, Lentz, & 
Thomas, 1988).
More recently, Knowles and McMahon (1995) examined public perceptions 
about psychologists’ obligations to disclose confidential information. Participants in 
this study were presented with statements describing situations where a psychologist 
might disclose confidential information (e.g., to save a life, to prevent a murder). 
Following this, they were asked to respond to each statement by indicating what they 
thought a psychologist would and should do in that particular situation. Results 
indicated a close concordance between these two issues, and reflected the pattern 
found by Lindenthal and his colleagues. Specifically, participants believed that non­
disclosure is paramount when the client poses a minor risk to others (e.g., illegal drug 
use, theft) but that disclosure is paramount when the client poses a major risk to others
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(e.g., murder). Interestingly, the only situation that participants remained undecided 
about related to a client taking part in treason or the sabotage of national interests.
This ‘situational fluidity’ with which confidentiality dilemmas are resolved is 
neatly captured in an ethnographic study of AIDS care workers by Barbour (1994). 
These workers reported continual pressures to disclose information about the HIV 
status of their clients by social workers, paediatricians, and midwives, which were 
always refused on the grounds of preserving confidentiality. Yet, workers often tried 
to disclose this information to people they knew to be close to the client (e.g., past 
sexual partners) without committing an explicit breach of confidentiality. In these 
situations, the risks associated with non-disclosure, particularly secondary HIV 
infection, dominated workers’ thinking.
Summary and implications
From the work outlined above, it is clear that risk is a central theme in the 
psychological literature concerning the management of confidentiality, as it is in the 
self-disclosure literature. With respect to self-disclosure, risk relates primarily to the 
possible consequences of a decision to disclose, for example, being rejected or 
betrayed. However, in the confidentiality literature, risk relates primarily to the 
possible consequences of not disclosing, that is, of maintaining confidentiality. The 
argument here is that as the risk associated with non-disclosure grows progressively 
more severe, the likelihood of breaching the formal conditions of confidentiality (i.e., 
disclosing) also increase. As a result, the confidentiality literature provides a neatly 
encapsulated study of when people might breach formal rules in order to avoid 
problematic non-disclosure (e.g., Tarasoff-type situations). Obviously, it would be of 
great value to know if  and when ADF personnel are likely to ‘override’ official rules 
governing disclosure of classified information in order to avoid problematic non­
disclosure. As alluded to above, knowing when people might takes steps to avoid 
problematic non-disclosure can also reveal when they might not.
For now, a parallel can be drawn between the practice of confidentiality and 
the ‘appropriate’ disclosure of classified information in defence organizations. For 
both, formal rules prescribing what is appropriate exist and are reinforced by the
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prospect of punishment for their breach. As discussed above, those pertaining to 
confidential information are widely believed to lack the specificity needed to avoid 
disclosure dilemmas and to be incompatible with ‘real-world’ demands. As yet, no 
commensurate argument has been forthcoming vis-ä-vis the rules pertaining to 
classified information however the context surrounding the disclosure of classified 
information is similar in many ways to that which nurtures confidentiality dilemmas. 
Like ‘confidence work’, military activities (particularly operations) take place in a 
context characterised by high degrees of uncertainty and unpredictability. Indeed, the 
breakdown of the ‘certainty’ associated with the bi-polarity of the Cold War has 
meant that the activities which military forces must now perform (e.g., peace-keeping, 
stabilising failed states) are more diffuse and less predictable in nature than ever 
before (Dorman et ah, 1998). Furthermore, and as with confidence work, the solution 
of these problems demands that military personnel must work in a more 
interdependent fashion than before, increasing the potential for one’s decisions to 
affect, and be affected by, the decisions of others. As is outlined in the confidentiality 
literature, such factors can limit the extent to which actual disclosure outcomes mirror 
a formal blueprint.
While the confidentiality literature reviewed above provides some insight into 
how risk may motivate people to breach official rules so as to avoid problematic non­
disclosure, it offers little detail about who one will breach for in this respect. This 
idea has been investigated, however, in the context of a third disclosure phenomenon 
known as ‘whistle-blowing’.
‘Blowing the whistle’: Prosocial disclosure
Whistle-blowing is “the disclosure by organization members (former or 
current) of illegal, immoral or illegitimate practices under the control of their 
employers, to persons or organizations that may be able to effect action” (Near & 
Miceli, 1985, p. 4). As with confidentiality, two types of whistle-blowing are 
distinguished: internal and external (Near & Miceli, 1985, 1996). Internal whistle­
blowing, the more common type (Rothschild & Miethe, 1999), refers to circumstances 
where the disclosure is made to other members of the organization. For example, the 
catastrophic loss of the space shuttle Challenger occurred months after a NASA
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engineer disclosed information about the potential problems with the “O-Rings” on 
the vehicle’s booster rockets to management (see Greenberger, Miceli, & Cohen,
1987; Miceli & Near, 1988). The failure of internal whistle-blowing to invoke 
corrective action is frequently cited as the main cause of the second type, external 
whistle-blowing (Near & Miceli, 1996; Rothschild & Miethe, 1999), that is, where the 
disclosure is made to parties outside the organization, such as the media or regulatory 
bodies. Clearly, the consequences of having an organization’s wrongdoings exposed 
to an external audience are likely to be worse than those of disclosures that are kept 
‘in-house’ (Greenberger et al., 1987; Near & Miceli, 1996). For instance, external 
whistle-blowing often decreases public trust in the organization and undermines the 
organization’s authority structure (Greenberger et ah, 1987). Further, despite the fact 
that both internal and external whistle-blowers often experience organizational 
retaliation (Near & Miceli, 1986, 1996; Rothschild & Miethe, 1999), external whistle­
blowers are generally subject to more severe retaliation (see Greenberger et ah, 1987). 
For example, when Kermit Vandivier, an engineer at the BF Goodrich company, told 
the FBI that his employer had falsified test results concerning the safety of its aircraft 
brakes, he was repeatedly threatened by the organization and told to ‘keep quiet’ (see 
Vandivier, 1972).
It is clear, particularly when threats of organizational retaliation are involved, 
that whistle-blowing is not primarily confined to the whistle-blower and the recipient 
as some have implied (e.g., Gundlach, Douglas & Martinko, 2003). Instead, whistle­
blowing must be conceived of as a phenomenon that also involves other parties 
capable of influencing the potential discloser in their decision making, including 
members of one’s work group and the organization’s management. For example, co­
workers may fear that disclosure of illegal management activities would put their jobs 
at risk, and they may therefore discourage whistle-blowing through group norms 
(Greenberger et al., 1987). Of course, the extent to which these parties act as true 
‘sources’ of the relevant information varies (Gundlach et al., 2003). In some cases, 
these parties entrust the potential whistle-blower with the information directly, while 
in others, the whistle-blower may simply happen across the information unbeknownst 
to others. Either way, third parties such as management and co-workers are able to 
exert considerable influence over the potential whistle-blower’s decision and therefore
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must be included in any conceptualisation of the phenomenon, as depicted in Figure 
3.5.
Potential Potential
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Figure 3.5 Whistle-blowing as a three-party process.
Efforts to determine the psychological factors affecting a decision to ‘blow the 
whistle’ have turned up, to some extent, ideas evident in the confidentiality literature. 
Specifically, the potential whistle-blower is conceived of as someone who ‘weighs 
up’ the risks associated with disclosure (e.g., management retaliation, loss of job) and 
non-disclosure (e.g., possible harm befalling others; see Dozier & Miceli, 1985; 
Greenberger et al., 1987; Gundlach et. al., 2003). However, unlike the work relating 
to confidentiality, researchers of whistle-blowing have framed this process within a 
broader social context which, they argue, helps explain why whistle-blowing occurs 
despite the risk of severe retaliation. Specifically, whistle-blowing is conceived of as 
a type of prosocial behaviour (Brief & Motowildo, 1986; Dozier, & Miceli, 1985; 
Gundlach et al., 2003; Miceli, Dozier, & Near, 1991; Miceli & Near, 1988; Street, 
1995).
Prosocial behaviour is behaviour intended to benefit others such as helping, 
sharing, donating and volunteering (Brief & Motowildo, 1986). Hence, prosocial 
behaviour is similar to altruism, yet whereas altruism is behaviour in which the actor 
does not expect to receive material or social rewards themselves, the concept of 
prosocial behaviour allows for some degree of self-interest on the part of actor 
(Dozier & Miceli, 1985). With this in mind, research interest in the psychological 
factors affecting people’s willingness to blow the whistle has focused largely on 
individual difference factors that would appear to be logical predictors of prosocial
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behaviour. In other words, the psychology of whistle-blowing represents, by and 
large, the search for the archetypal ‘whistle-blower’ personality.
In this vein, Brabeck (1984) argued that willingness to blow the whistle will 
likely be related to level of ‘moral reasoning’. To investigate this, Brabeck measured 
people’s level of moral reasoning, classifying them as either ‘conventional’ in this 
respect (i.e., only concerned with seeking approval and respecting authority) or 
‘principled’ (i.e., concerned with safeguarding the rights of all). Participants in this 
study were then exposed to a serious error in an article they were led to believe was 
about to be published by an authority figure, in this case, a professor. A decision to 
inform the investigators of the error was taken as a measure of one’s willingness to 
blow the whistle. As hypothesized, results indicated that those with the higher 
‘principled’ level of moral reasoning were more willing to disclose the error than their 
conventional counterparts. While this scenario represents what can only be described 
as a ‘mild’ version of whistle-blowing (the whistle-blower faced no prospect of 
retaliation by the professor) similar results are reported by Jos, Tompkins, and Hays 
(1989) who examined the personalities of actual whistle-blowers. In this research, 
whistle-blowers were found to be more committed to ideas of universal morality and 
social responsibility and less committed to relativistic claims about moral rules, than 
non-whistle-blowers. Yet, inferring causality is clearly problematic. It is possible, for 
instance, that whistle-blowers began to portray themselves in this light only after they 
engaged in such whistle-blowing activity.
Other research has failed to associate personality factors with whistle-blowing. 
Rothschild and Miethe (1999) for instance, took a number of individual difference 
measures from both internal and external whistle-blowers, as well as ‘non-observers’ 
(i.e., those who had not observed misconduct) and ‘silent’ observers (i.e., those who 
had observed misconduct but decided against disclosing it). Results showed no 
difference between the groups on measures of social responsibility and beliefs about 
altruism and only a slight but non-significant trend for whistle-blowers to score higher 
than non-whistle-blowers in terms of commitment to universalistic values. Rothschild 
and Miethe (1999) concluded that whistle-blowing is better understood as a dynamic 
form of worker resistance than an outcome of dispositional characteristics.
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Miceli et al., (1991) also casts doubt on the idea of a model whistle-blower 
personality. In this study, participants completed a scale measuring their level of 
moral development and were then asked (at a much later point in time) to take part in 
a job applicant selection task. The task involved rank-ordering three hypothetical job 
applicants, one of which was clearly the most superior applicant. While performing 
this task, participants were informed that, in the past, the study had failed to yield 
good results and to be publishable, participants should ‘fudge’ their rankings by rating 
a less suitable applicant as the preferred candidate. Participants were then left alone 
to complete the task before a confederate of the experimenters entered (under the 
guise of an ‘ethics inspector’) and asked participants to write down anything they had 
been asked to do during the study which they considered to be objectionable. A 
decision to blow the whistle was taken as a ‘yes’ response to this question and a 
subsequent description of the “fudging” request. Curiously, results indicated that as 
the participant’s level of moral development increased, willingness to blow the 
whistle decreased.
Summary and implications
As outlined above, whistle-blowing is widely considered to be a form of 
prosocial behaviour. That is, it is viewed as behaviour that is intended to benefit 
others, whether they be other members of the wrongdoing organization, particular 
social groups, or the broader society. Despite the fact that this prosocial perspective 
has translated, by and large, into an inconclusive search for the typical whistle-blower 
personality, the idea of disclosure as prosocial behaviour is relevant to the disclosure 
of classified information in the ADF, albeit in two different ways.
First, the disclosure of classified information in military organizations like the 
ADF may, at times, actually constitute whistle-blowing. Despite being a ‘legitimate’ 
form of information control, the classification system employed by defence 
organizations has concealed activities which are immoral, illegitimate, or illegal, such 
as U.S. military research concerning the effects of radiation exposure on military 
personnel (Aftergood, 2000). Further, history has shown that defence personnel will 
disclose such information on occasions, despite formal and informal pressures not to 
do so, for example, when Daniel Ellsberg disclosed the ‘Pentagon Papers’ to the New
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York Times in 1971 (see Ellsberg, 2003). The aim of this thesis, however, is to 
understand the psychological factors affecting the disclosure of classified information 
as it routinely occurs, not when it manifests as whistle-blowing. To this end, the idea 
of disclosure as prosocial behaviour is relevant in a second way.
With its ‘prosociaT focus, the whistle-blowing literature makes salient the idea 
that disclosure and non-disclosure outcomes can reflect interpersonal or intergroup 
cooperation. While the emergence and sustainment of cooperation is paramount to 
the effectiveness of defence organizations like the ADF, appropriate disclosure and 
non-disclosure of classified information is a critical, if not the most critical form of 
cooperation in the modem military organizations. A lack of cooperation in this 
respect effectively denies the organization the ability to achieve its goals, and opens 
the way for disaster, as has been discussed in the first two chapters. Conceiving of 
disclosure outcomes in the ADF as reflecting cooperation (or non-cooperation) opens 
the way for new light to be shed on the research issue. Yet, the whistle-blowing 
literature fails to provide an adequate account of the psychology of disclosure as a 
cooperative activity because researchers in the area have remained fixated on factors 
‘within’ the whistle-blower, that is, personality factors. The cost has been a neglect of 
factors relating to the whistle-blower’s relationship with both the organization and the 
potential recipient of the information. While some relational terms including ‘loyalty’ 
and ‘commitment’ have received brief mention (e.g., Near & Miceli, 1996; Street, 
1995), we must look further afield to find a deeper appreciation of how the potential 
discloser’s relationship with the source and potential recipient is likely to impact on 
their decision-making. To this end, we next consider the literature devoted to the 
concept of secrecy, within which the potential discloser’s affiliations and group 
memberships come to the fore.
Secrecy: The role of group affiliation
A century ago, Georg Simmel laid the foundations of social-scientific interest 
in secrecy. All interpersonal and intergroup relationships, Simmel (1906) argued, are 
characterized by a “ratio of secrecy” (p. 462), without which certain ends cannot be 
achieved (see also Simmel, 1950). Since Simmel’s writings, secrecy has attracted 
scholarly attention from within psychology (Fine & Holyfield, 1996; Shlien, 1984)
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sociology (Bellman, 1981; Shils, 1956) and anthropology (Merten, 1999; Tefft, 1980) 
and has thus been discussed with respect to individuals, groups, organizations, and 
entire societies. Despite the multidisciplinary interest, all definitions of secrecy share 
the same core, that is, the intentional or ‘calculated’ concealment of information (Bok, 
1984; Erickson, 1979; Kelly, 2002; Redlinger & Johnson, 1980; Tefft, 1980;
Wilsnack, 1980). Of course, there are variations on this theme, particularly when the 
aim has been to distinguish secrecy from privacy. For example, Warren and Laslett 
(1977) separate the two according to content, viewing secrecy as a strategy for 
concealing illegal/deviant activities and privacy for concealing moral/legitimate 
activities. Alternatively, Shils (1956) focuses on the consequences of disclosing that 
which is concealed, defining secrecy as compulsory concealment “reinforced by the 
prospect of sanctions for disclosure” (p. 26) and privacy as voluntary concealment 
where the discloser remains immune from sanctions (see also Kelly & Carter, 2001).
By focusing on the content of what is being concealed or the consequences of 
its disclosure, these definitions downplay the existence of secrecy as a general social 
process. Clearly, secrecy conceals moral and legitimate activities as well immoral 
and deviant ones. Further, disclosing is an inherent part of the practice of secrecy not 
its logical opposite, or as Bellman (1981) suggests “[t]o tell a secret is to do secrecy. 
The methods used in that accomplishment are in part constitutive of the phenomenon” 
(p. 8). Bellman (1981) offers a ‘neutral’ view of secrecy designed to capture the 
phenomenon more generally, defining secrecy as the process by which concealed 
information is managed or controlled.
Clearly, secrecy overlaps with the other phenomena discussed above. Self­
disclosure, confidentiality, and whistle-blowing all involve intentional concealment 
and disclosure of information. Indeed, discussions of these phenomena draw heavily 
on the terms “secrecy” and “secret”. Self-disclosure is seen as the revelation of one’s 
‘personal secrets’ (Kelly & Carter, 2001; Vrij et al., 2002), confidentiality is often 
termed ‘professional secrecy’ (Bok, 1984), and whistle-blowing involves the airing of 
an organization’s ‘dirty secrets’ (see Messick, 1999). However, other secrecy 
phenomena have also captured the interest of those working from a psychological 
framework including organizational and family secrecy, and so-called ‘secret- 
societies’, that is, groups in which participants are linked via secret activities (B. H.
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Erickson, 1981). Many factors thought to affect disclosure outcomes vis-ä-vis these 
phenomena have been discussed in the preceding pages. Analyses of organizational 
secrecy and of secret societies, for instance, draw attention to how the trustworthiness 
of the potential recipient impacts on people’s willingness to disclose (Erickson, 1979; 
B. H. Erickson, 1981; Ponse, 1976). Additionally, notions of disclosure reciprocity 
and prosocial behaviour are implicated in analyses of organizational secrecy. For 
example, in their study of a voluntary mushroom-collecting society, Fine and 
Holyfield (1996) found that members often disclosed information about their secret 
picking spots on the expectation that the recipient would reciprocate at some later 
point in time. Similarly, Galnoor (1975) claims that obligations of reciprocity 
constitute “the unwritten rules” (p. 40) of government secrecy, but provides little data 
in support of this claims. Despite the overlap, discussions of family and 
organizational secrecy and of secret societies draw attention to another factor that 
receives only scant attention in the literatures discussed earlier - the potential 
discloser’s affiliations and group memberships.
Vangelisti and Caughlin (1997) examined how a sense of affiliation with both 
family members and the potential recipient influenced people’s willingness to disclose 
family secrets. In this study, participants were instructed to recall and describe a 
family secret and to rate the likelihood of disclosing it to: (a) their girl/boyfriend, (b) 
their best friend, (c) a friend, (d) a co-worker/classmate, or (e) an acquaintance. They 
were then asked to rate their level of satisfaction with their family relationships and 
the extent to which they were ‘psychologically close’ to the potential recipient.
Results indicated that those who were unlikely to disclose the family secret had 
stronger family relations than those who were moderately or highly likely to disclose 
the secret. Further, those highly likely to disclose rated themselves as psychologically 
closer to the potential recipient than those unlikely to disclose. The idea that a sense 
of affiliation underpins non-disclosure is also evident in accounts of secret societies 
(see MacKenzie, 1967 for a review). B. H. Erickson (1981) for example, analysed the 
structure of six secret societies including the Auschwitz and Norwegian underground, 
the Chinese White Lotus sect, the Lupollo crime family, and the San Antonio and 
Cheltenham illegal drug markets. Results showed that non-disclosure of information 
within these societies reflected intergroup divisions that existed prior to the society’s 
inception. These “relational cleavages” (B. H. Erickson, 1981, p. 196) manifest as
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separate branches of the society, representing members’ perceptions about who were 
the most trustworthy members.
While these studies focus on affiliation and disclosure outcomes in families 
and secret-societies, other research has examined the impact of affiliation and group 
membership on organizational disclosure outcomes. For example, in a study of how 
police officers regulate their disclosures to news reporters, Ericson (1989) found that 
officers categorized reporters into one of two groups: inner-circle or outer-circle. 
Inner-circle reporters were those sympathetic to the police and willing to publish only 
‘positive’ stories, and were therefore considered ‘part of the team’. Outer-circle 
reporters in contrast, were not sympathetic to the police and were most interested in 
exposing police impropriety and mismanagement, thereby constituting a clear ‘out­
group’. Not surprisingly, Ericson (1989) found that secret information flowed along 
the contours of this categorization - toward inner-circle and away from outer-circle 
reporters. In this vein, Wetzel and Wright-Buckley (1988) sought to determine 
whether disclosure reciprocity could be achieved in the context of a bi-racial therapy 
setting. In this study, a sample of African-American women were placed in a 
situation where they could talk to, but not see, the therapist. Half were shown a 
photograph depicting the therapist as a white female while the other half were shown 
a photograph depicting the therapist as a black female. Results indicated that 
participants were more willing to reciprocate disclosures when they believed she was 
a fellow African-American than when they believed she was white (see also Poston, 
Craine, & Atkinson, 1991; Rotenberg, 1986). While not organizational in nature, 
Hargie et al., (2002) report a similar theme in a study of self-disclosure amongst 
Catholic and Protestant youths. Here, participants rated their willingness to disclose 
various items of personal information to: (a) strangers of the same religion, (b) 
strangers of the other religion, (c) a friend of the same religion, and (d) a friend of the 
other religion. Results showed that while friends were more likely to be disclosed to 
than strangers, co-religionists were preferred as potential recipients over ‘other- 
religionists’.
According to Yovetich and Drigotas (1999) the idea of affiliation as it applies 
to disclosure outcomes is better thought of as ‘relative intimacy’. They asked people 
to list ten others with whom they were personally acquainted (e.g., casual friends,
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romantic partners, relatives, and so on) and to rate the level of intimacy they shared 
with each. They were then asked to imagine that the person at the top of the list had 
disclosed secret information to them, and to rate their likelihood of disclosing this 
information to each of the other people on the list. This process was repeated for the 
second person listed, and so on, until each of the acquaintances had taken on the role 
of the source. Results showed that participants were more likely to disclose ‘upward’ 
(i.e., from a lower- to a higher-level intimate) than ‘downward’ (i.e., from a higher- to 
a lower-level intimate) leading Yovetich and Drigotas (1999) to conclude that “[i]t is 
not simply a matter of being close to the target but of being closer” (p. 1146).
Ho wever, a large and influential body of work in social psychology has 
conceived of the mechanism underlying people’s group affiliations in terms o f ‘social 
identification’ processes (Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Turner, 1991; Turner et ah, 1987). 
One of the core ideas here is that people derive a ‘social identity’ from the groups and 
categories to which they belong (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Specifically, a social 
identity is understood as a self-definition in social rather than personal terms, for 
example, ‘we pilots’ or ‘we soldiers’ (Onorato & Turner, 2002, 2001; Turner et ah, 
1987). Over the past three decades, a large body of work has shown that people seek 
to promote the interests of those groups and categories from which they draw a valued 
social identity or ‘sense of self (e.g., Ellemers, 2001; Ellemers, de Gilder, & van den 
Heuvel, 1998; van Knippenberg & Sleebos, 1999). Moreover, research has shown 
consistently that people tend to perceive others with whom they share a sense of 
social identity (‘ingroup members’) more positively than those with whom they do not 
(‘outgroup members). For instance, ingroup members are generally perceived as 
more trustworthy and likeable than outgroup members (Brewer, 1981; Kramer, 2001). 
With this broader theoretical tradition in mind, the argument put forward by Yovetich 
and Drigotas (1999) can be redefined in terms of social identification processes. That 
is, the ‘relative intimacy’ with which one perceives the potential recipient of one’s 
secrets reflects the extent to which they share a salient social identity, that is, the 
extent to which they are perceived as either an ingroup or an outgroup members.
Indeed, work to this end has been recently conducted by Dovidio et al., (1997). 
These authors argued that self-disclosure (amongst other things) is likely to follow the 
contours laid down by one’s social identities. As a result, they hypothesized that
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people should be willing to disclose secret information about themselves to those 
previously categorized as outgroup members in situations where these individuals can 
be ‘recategorized’ as ingroup members. To test this idea, Dovidio et al., (1997) had 
people work together as members of two three-person groups (A and B). They then 
manipulated participants’ view of the situation in a way that enhanced either a sense 
of inclusiveness or divisiveness. In the inclusiveness condition, participants were 
seated at a hexagonal table in an interspersed manner (i.e., AB AB AB), were given a 
new ‘one group’ name and received other instructions that emphasized a sense of 
common identity. In the divisiveness condition, participants sat on opposite sides of 
the table (i.e., AAABBB) and no mention was made of any common identity. 
Subsequently, the experimenters placed participants into dyads composed of either 
two original group members (i.e., AA, BB) or two separate group members (i.e., AB, 
BA), and provided them with a list of discussion topics, asking which topics they 
would be most willing to discuss with their dyad partner. Upon ostensibly choosing a 
moderately intimate topic (“What are you most afraid of?”) participants took part in a 
five-minute taped discussion with each other, after which the experimenters coded the 
discussion for the amount or depth of intimate information disclosed. Results 
supported the hypothesis in that the inclusive one-group representation reduced the 
extent to which participants favoured members of their original group in terms of their 
self-disclosures. Dovidio et al., (1997) thus concluded that by changing who people 
perceive as ‘ingroup members’ (those sharing a social identity), one can change the 
overall pattern of self-disclosure.
Summary and implications
Secrecy, the process by which restricted or concealed information is controlled 
(Bellman, 1981), encompasses those phenomena which have been discussed so far 
and a number of others, notably family and organizational secrecy and secret 
societies. To some degree, the factors thought to underpin disclosure outcomes in 
these contexts mirror those discussed earlier. For example, trust is a salient 
consideration for the potential discloser in each of these phenomena, either with 
respect to the source, the potential recipient, or both. Yet, the secrecy literatures 
discussed above draw attention to a broader factor thought to affect disclosure 
outcomes. This factor is the potential discloser’s affiliations and group memberships
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and can be represented as shown in Figure 3.6. Indeed, this factor may be capable of 
providing a more sophisticated understanding of when and why the potential discloser 
will uphold the trust of the source or when and why they will place trust in a given 
recipient (Yamagishi, Foddy, Makimura, Matuda, & Platow, 2003; see also Brewer, 
1981; Williams, 2002).
group affiliation
perceived
trustworthinessPotential Potential
Source
discloser recipient
Figure 3.6 Secrecy as moderated by group affiliation.
For now however, we can propose a general hypothesis that disclosure 
outcomes will follow the contours of those affiliations and group memberships that 
are psychologically significant to the potential discloser, and that this ‘psychological 
significance’ will likely involve a sense of shared social identity. Our question now 
concerns the extent to which these ideas are likely to be relevant to disclosure 
outcomes in the ADF as they apply to classified information.
We can go some way toward arguing for their relevance by drawing attention 
to the strong sense of affiliation, allegiance and shared group membership that is a 
hallmark of military life, particularly with respect to one’s chosen Service. The three 
Services of the ADF possess strong and distinctive cultures and histories, reinforced 
by training and Service enculturation programs. One could conclude therefore, that 
any general hypothesis about disclosure outcomes vis-ä-vis classified information 
following the contours affiliation and shared group membership must be made with 
regard to personnel’s Service.
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General summary and conclusions
Psychology has made considerable progress toward understanding the factors 
affecting human disclosure behaviour as it relates to particular social phenomena. For 
the moment, these phenomena do not include the disclosure of classified information 
in contemporary military/defence organizations. However they do include broadly 
comparable phenomena such as confidentiality and, more generally, secrecy. They 
also include other phenomena in which the potential discloser of information is 
central, notably self-disclosure and whistle-blowing. If we are to accept human 
disclosure behaviour as a field of psychological enquiry then (see Wagner & Berger, 
1985), it is one that is heterogenous to the core and primarily ‘phenomenon-driven’ 
rather than ‘theory-driven’. This chapter has reviewed these contributions and 
assessed their relevance insofar as helping us gain an understanding of the psychology 
that underpins the disclosure and non-disclosure of classified information in 
contemporary defence contexts.
On the basis of this review, it is possible to distil two broad factors that are 
likely to be implicated in the disclosure of classified information in some way. The 
first of these is risk, that is, the prospect of loss (Smithson, 1994). The idea that 
disclosure outcomes can be shaped by the potential discloser’s perceptions of risk is 
present in both discussions of self-disclosure and about the practice of confidentiality. 
The dominant theme in the self-disclosure literature is that disclosure of personal 
information is risky and thus necessitates the placement of trust in the potential 
recipient. The dominant theme in the confidentiality literature however is that non­
disclosure of confidential information is risky by virtue of possible ‘Tarasoff-type’ 
consequences, and that these risks place a strain on the trust between the potential 
discloser and the source (i.e., the client). While both themes offer useful starting 
points for an analysis of the psychology underpinning problematic non-disclosure of 
classified information, it is the work conducted with regard to confidentiality that is 
particularly helpful here. This work explicitly examines when perceived risks will 
and will not lead people (in this case, professionals) to ‘override’ official rules 
mandating the non-disclosure of information, hence it addresses the issue of 
problematic non-disclosure directly. In so doing, it provides both a conceptual and 
methodological ‘template’ for an initial exploratory investigation of when perceived
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risks will and will not lead ADF personnel to override the formal rules mandating the 
non-disclosure of classified information.
The second factor that can be distilled from the review above is the notion of 
affiliation or, more generally, shared group membership. The idea that disclosure 
outcomes follow the contours of one’s group affiliations is particularly salient in the 
literature examining the practice of secrecy in families, organizations, and secret 
societies. Being phenomenon- rather than theory-driven however, little insight has 
been forthcoming as to how, psychologically speaking, disclosure outcomes are 
mediated by an individual’s affiliations and shared group memberships. We have 
suggested that the concept of identification may be particularly useful in this respect. 
Again, this work provides a useful starting point from which to investigate disclosure 
outcomes with respect to classified information in the ADF. Specifically, we can add 
this factor to the plan outlined above, so as to examine not only when perceived risks 
will and will not lead ADF personnel to override the formal rules mandating non­
disclosure, but for whom such disclosures will be made and for whom they will not.
An argument could be made for the presence of a third general factor from the 
review above, that is, trust. Clearly, trust is a significant determinant of disclosure 
outcomes across each of the phenomena discussed above, and is relevant to the 
potential discloser’s relationship with both the source and the potential recipient. In 
that respect, trust emerges as a kind of ‘master variable’ of human disclosure 
behaviour. Having said that, trust is also understood within these literatures as an 
outcome variable, that is, a product of affiliation and that which is necessitated by the 
presence of risk. In this light, trust exists as more of a ‘second-order’ factor than a 
master variable. This by no means should imply that the role of trust will not be 
attended to within the context of this thesis. However in terms of setting up a broad 
conceptual framework, the emphasis is better placed on the fundamental factors of 
risk and affiliation. Our empirical investigation into the role of these factors in 
shaping disclosure outcomes in the ADF context begins in the next chapter.
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Chapter 4
The issue of breach behaviour: 
If, when, and for whom?
Introduction
As was argued in the previous chapters, an adequate understanding of 
problematic non-disclosure as it might apply to classified information in a modem 
military setting requires we approach the problem from a psychological perspective. 
So far, psychology has made considerable progress toward understanding the factors 
underpinning other disclosure phenomena and this progress was reviewed in Chapter 
3. Self-disclosure, breaches of confidentiality, whistle-blowing, and various forms of 
secrecy have received the most attention in this respect. At one level, these 
phenomena appear relatively distinct from one another. Yet, at another they share a 
common core in that each involves an individual faced with a decision to either 
disclose or withhold concealed information. That is, an individual takes the position 
of the ‘potential discloser’. From the review, two broad factors emerged as 
potentially relevant to an analysis of problematic non-disclosure vis-ä-vis classified 
information. The first is risk as it relates to the consequences of both disclosing and 
not disclosing. The second is the potential discloser’s affiliations or, more generally, 
their group memberships.
The aim of this chapter is to investigate in an initial study how these factors 
influence the disclosure and non-disclosure of classified information amongst ADF 
personnel. As alluded to earlier, a good starting point in this respect would be to 
determine if and when the consequences associated with non-disclosure will (and will 
not) lead ADF personnel to breach the official rules regarding access to classified 
information. Put another way, when will personnel commit a breach of national 
security to avoid problematic non-disclosure and when will they not? Clearly, this 
mirrors the work examining how professionals ‘weigh-up’ the risks before deciding 
whether to breach client-confidentiality (Lindenthal et al, 1984; Lindenthal & 
Thomas, 1980). However, we seek to extend this idea by investigating not only when
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ADF personnel will and will not override official rules to avert problematic non­
disclosure but fo r whom they will do so. In other words, will the potential discloser’s 
affiliations, particularly with their chosen Service, make any difference in this regard?
By examining if, when and for whom ADF personnel will breach national 
security to avoid problematic non-disclosure, the notions of ‘organizational betrayal’ 
and ‘leaks’ of classified information become relevant. The chapter begins with a brief 
review of the literature relating to these concepts before moving on to the empirical 
work. Two studies are presented in this chapter. The first is a pilot study involving a 
sample of civilian defence scientists governed by the same rules relating to the 
disclosure of classified information as their ADF counterparts. The second study 
(Study 1) is a refinement of the pilot that involves a larger sample of ADF personnel. 
Both employ a scenario-based methodology to manipulate the expected consequences 
o f non-disclosure. In Study 1, these consequences are harm to either an ADF 
colleague, an ADF Service, or the ADF globally. In this order, we see these 
consequences as constituting a continuum of increasing risk that will dictate the extent 
to which ADF personnel will be prepared to breach national security. However, a 
number o f ‘variants’ are made to this basic template, one of which is whether the non­
disclosure will harm one’s own Service or another Service.
Leaks and organizational betrayals
As implied above, a breach of national security involving the ‘unauthorised’ 
disclosure o f classified information can be viewed as an organizational betrayal 
(Sarbin et al., 1994). Recently, Elangovan and Shapiro (1998; see also Jones & 
Burdette, 1994; Morris & Moberg, 1994) defined the notion of organizational betrayal 
as:
[A] voluntary violation of mutually known pivotal expectations of the trustor by 
the trusted party (trustee) which has the potential to threaten the well-being of the 
trustor” (p. 548).
According to these authors, two types of organizational betrayal can be discerned. 
The first, accidental betrayal, refers to violations of trust that take place without the 
trustee intending to do so (e.g., a member of staff inadvertently emails employee
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records to organizational members at large). The second and more frequent type, 
opportunistic betrayal, refers to violations of trust that occur with the intent of the 
trustee, but in response to particular situational demands (e.g., a captured soldier 
discloses the whereabouts of his unit colleagues to avoid torture). While most 
breaches of national security are accidental in nature (see Rumsfeld, 2002), we are 
concerned here with when and to whom ADF personnel will intentionally breach 
national security to avoid problematic non-disclosure. Hence, only the concept of 
opportunistic betrayal is relevant to the current discussion.
Of course, defence organizations like the ADF have long been interested in the 
factors leading personnel to intentionally betray national security via the unauthorised 
disclosure (‘leaking’) of classified information. This interest has tended to focus on 
personal characteristics of the potential discloser thought to be logical predictors of 
such behaviour. According to the conventional military wisdom, defence personnel 
engage in the unauthorised disclosure of classified information for one of four 
reasons, either: (i) money, (ii) ideology, (iii) compromise (e.g., blackmail), or (iv) 
ego-enhancement (Levchenko, 1988; Taylor & Snow, 1997)4. Clearly then, the 
military conceives of such disclosures as instances of organizational deviance, as 
illustrated by the current U.S. Secretary of Defense below:
I have spoken publicly and privately, countless times, about the dangers of 
leaking classified information. It is wrong. It is against the law. It costs the 
lives of Americans. It diminishes our country’s chance for success. (Rumsfeld,
2002, p. 1).
However, in conceiving of opportunistic betrayal more generally, Elangovan 
and Shapiro (1998) argue that a number of factors act as ‘situational moderators’ of 
the attractiveness of a decision to betray an organizational trust. Two factors are 
considered particularly important in this respect. First, whether or not an individual 
can expect to experience severe punishment for the betrayal and second, whether or 
not the individual can expect to be identified as the betrayer. According to Elangovan 
and Shapiro (1998), the ‘right opportunity’ for opportunistic betrayal is when the 
probabilities of being severely punished and of being identified are low.
3. The acronym ‘MICE’ is often used to summarise these factors (see Levchenko, 1988)
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It is plausible that these factors may also influence the extent to which ADF 
personnel will be prepared to breach national security in the face of problematic non­
disclosure. Yet in such situations, the identifiability of the potential discloser as a 
“betrayer” is likely to ‘cut both ways’. In other words, one could be identified as a 
betrayer if they decide to disclose (i.e., by virtue of committing a breach of national 
security) and if they decide to not disclose (i.e., by those harmed by non-disclosure).
In the former situation, one’s expectations of being identified and of being punished 
are likely to be confounded to some degree. Put simply, one could expect to be 
identified as a betrayer in this respect through being punished for breaching national 
security since such punishments often manifest publicly (e.g., through loss of job or of 
one’s security clearance). As such, it would be difficult to separate out the effects of 
expected identifiability and expected punishment in this situation. Yet, the prospect 
of being identified as a ‘non-discloser’ does not confound with expected punishment 
for no punishment is forthcoming in this situation (i.e., no breach of national security 
has been committed). Thus, expectations of being identified as a betrayer in this 
respect constitutes a form of risk independent of expected punishment.
In summary, an investigation of how risk (as it relates to consequences of non­
disclosure) and group affiliation influence the disclosure of classified information 
brings forth a number questions: (1) Will prospective breaches of national security 
follow the continuum of the increasing risk (i.e., as non-disclosure harms a colleague, 
a Service, and the ADF, respectively); (2) Will it matter whether the Service harmed 
is one’s own or not; and (3) Will the prospect of being punished or identified as a 
‘non-discloser’ make any difference in this respect?
Clearly, there are sensitivities associated with asking military personnel if, 
when and for whom they are likely to commit a breach national security by disclosing 
classified information in a manner contrary to official rules. For one, this is an illegal 
behaviour that, as outlined above, is often considered to be an instance of deviance of 
the highest order. To some degree, this may be less so when the disclosure can be 
shown to have been brought about by problematic circumstances, as is the interest in 
this chapter. However, even in this context, participants are likely to be sensitive to 
whether they perceive their responses to be anonymous and the researcher to be
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trustworthy and of legitimate intent. As a result, it would be necessary to obtain a 
number of official permissions to conduct the research from senior ADF officers 
including the respective Service Chiefs and the Vice-Chief of the Defence Force 
(VCDF). It would also be necessary to provide a number of verbal and written 
assurances to these individuals and to potential participants about the intent of the 
researcher.
To that end, it was considered appropriate for a pilot study to be conducted 
first so as to refine the research methodology and design before embarking on a major 
study involving ADF personnel. Therefore, the initial investigation involved a more 
convenient sample of personnel belonging to the Defence Science and Technology 
Organisation (DSTO), a research and development organization within Australia’s 
Department of Defence. Importantly, DSTO personnel are bound by the same official 
rules and policies governing access to classified information as their ADF 
counterparts.
Pilot study
Sixty-seven defence scientists belonging to DSTO were asked to take part in 
the pilot study. Of these, the majority (n = 47) were men aged in their early thirties 
with most (n = 56) being employed at or above the middle-management level. 
Participants had been employed within the Department of Defence for an average of 
nine years4 5.
Participants were informed that they would be taking part in pilot research that 
related to “information-sharing” in the work context. To this end, they were each 
asked to read three short scenarios that involved their hypothetical entrustment with 
‘work-relevant’ information in some way. The first two scenarios detailed their 
entrustment with this information by a friend and by their workgroup, respectively. 
Here, participants were asked to simply imagine that the respective source had 
provided them with this information and trusted them not to disclose the information 
any further. In these scenarios no reference was made to the information being
4. Ethics approval for all studies reported in this thesis was obtained from the Australian National
University Human Research Ethics Committee.
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“classified”. Instead, these scenarios served two specific purposes. The first was to 
provide an initial ‘filler’ task that would avoid participants being confronted from the 
very beginning with a scenario relating to their entrustment with, and prospective 
handling of, classified information. In other words, starting with two unclassified 
scenarios would likely ‘ease’ participants more comfortably into the research issue at 
hand. The second purpose was to broaden the empirical scope of the research 
somewhat, that is, to provide a means by which some insight could be gained into 
whether the factors affecting disclosure of classified information also affected the 
disclosure of work-relevant but unclassified information. As alluded to above, it was 
the third scenario that detailed participants’ entrustment with classified information. 
Here, participants were asked to imagine that, as part of their normal DSTO duties, 
they had been unofficially requested to provide classified information to another part 
of DSTO.
Each scenario provided the backdrop to a number of ‘disclosure dilemmas’ 
that were formed using two factors. The first was the consequence o f disclosing the 
entrusted information. For example, in the personal trust scenario, disclosing the 
information would permanently damage the relationship with the friend who had 
entrusted the information. In the workgroup scenario, disclosing would constitute a 
breach of the workgroup’s confidence leading to an informal reprimand and a possible 
downgrading of one’s immediate career prospects. In the national security scenario 
(i.e., where participants had been entrusted with classified information), a decision to 
disclose constituted a breach of national security. Nested within this scenario was a 
variant relating to the prospect of formal punishment for the breach. That is, 
participants could either expect the breach of national security to lead or not lead to a 
process where they would be formally punished.
The second factor was the consequence o f not disclosing the entrusted 
information. As outlined earlier, to test when these consequences may motivate one 
to disclose, they were manipulated across three broad levels, in this case: (1) harm 
befalling a colleague (i.e., a colleague makes a poor work decision) (2) harm befalling 
a Division (i.e., a costly disruption to a major Divisional project), and (3) harm 
befalling DSTO as a whole (i.e., DSTO is compromised in its ability to achieve key 
goals) with this continuum assumed to represent levels of increasing risk. To test for
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whom one might disclose, a number of variants were nested within these 
consequences relating to the participant’s group/organizational affiliations. 
Specifically, the colleague harmed by non-disclosure was said to be either from the 
participant’s workgroup or another workgroup, while the Division harmed was said to 
be either the participant’s own or another Division. Also nested was a variant relating 
to the participant’s identifiability as a ‘non-discloser’. That is, participants could or 
could not expect to be identified by those harmed by non-disclosure if they chose not 
to disclose the information. After reading each disclosure dilemma, participants were 
asked whether they would or would not disclose the entrusted information5 6.
Results indicated that for the personal trust scenario, the proportion of 
participants deciding to disclose partially conformed to what was expected. While the 
proportion of participants breaking the personal trust was greatest at the highest level 
of risk, that is, when non-disclosure threatened to harm DSTO globally (59%), there 
was no difference between the proportions disclosing for the sake of a colleague and 
for a Division, suggesting that this differentiation was not particularly meaningful for 
these participants. In all cases however, participants were more willing to breach the 
friend’s trust when non-disclosure would harm an affiliated element compared to an 
unaffiliated one. That is, participants were more willing to breach the trust in order to 
avoid harm befalling a colleague from their own Group (49%) compared to one from 
another Group (34%), and to avoid harm befalling their own Division (49%) 
compared to another Division (34%). There were also some unexpected results.
First, the prospect of being identified as a non-discloser did not lead to an increase in 
the number of participants disclosing as expected. Indeed, if anything, identifiability 
as a non-discloser resulted in a net decrease in the proportion of participants deciding 
to disclose. Second, and as mentioned above, despite the fact that the number of 
participants breaching the personal trust was greatest when non-disclosure threatened 
to harm DSTO globally, this remained less at than 60%. In other words, over 40% of 
participants indicated that they would not breach the trust of a friend in order to avert 
a major top-level failure from taking place within their organization. This pattern was 
reflected to some degree in the responses to the workgroup confidence scenario.
5. The pilot study and Study 1 contained a number of items measuring other variables. Only
measures relating to the aims of this thesis are set out here.
60
Again, participants were far more willing to breach the workgroup confidence were 
non-disclosure would harm their own Division (41%) compared to when it would 
harm another Division (17%). However here, only 31% of participants indicated that 
they would breach the group confidence to prevent a major top-level failure within 
DSTO.
However, in the national security scenario, the number of participants 
indicating that they would commit a breach of national security under any of the 
conditions was either zero or very low. No participants indicated an intention to 
commit a breach of national security when non-disclosure threatened to harm a 
colleague’s career, regardless of the colleague’s shared or unshared group 
membership and of whether participants could expect their breach to lead to formal 
punishment or not. Four participants indicated an intention to breach national security 
when non-disclosure threatened to harm a Division, three of which when the breach 
would not attract formal punishment and only one for a Division other than the 
participant’s own. When non-disclosure would harm DSTO globally, two participants 
indicated an intention to breach national security when such a breach attracted formal 
punishment, while five indicated they would do so when they could expect to evade 
formal punishment.
Implications
While the results of the pilot study are vaguely suggestive of the expected 
pattern in that the number of disclosures (i) increased as the consequences of non­
disclosure grew more severe, (ii) favoured one’s Divisional affiliation, and (iii) were 
positively influenced by an expected lack of punishment, the low frequencies 
obviously work against drawing any firm conclusions about this scenario. There are a 
number of possible reasons for the zero or near-zero disclosure rates observed across 
the dilemmas of the national security scenario. First, the very low proportions may be 
indicative of participants’ desire to behave in a socially desirable way, that is, to not 
breach national security under any circumstances. Second, participants may not have 
had sufficient trust in the experimenter’s assurance of anonymity, hindering their 
willingness to make a honest response. A series of questions as to whether one would 
intend to breach national security under this or that circumstance is a rather unusual
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event outside of a formal security clearance briefing. Third, it is possible that the 
national security scenario made salient ‘real-world’ consequences that may stem from 
a breach of national security (e.g., jeopardising a planned ADF deployment). Fourth, 
the relative lack of operational experience amongst the participants (i.e., as civilians) 
may have encouraged a strict ‘by-the book’ approach to the resolution of these 
dilemmas. On this, despite the fact that DSTO personnel are routinely required to 
manage the receipt and dissemination of classified information, they are not routinely 
required to manage the complex array of consequences and dependencies which 
characterise the modem military environment, both on and off the battlefield.
In summary, the pilot study provided a valuable pre-test before embarking on 
a investigation involving a larger sample of ADF personnel. Generally speaking, 
disclosure proportions followed the contours of risk, increasing as the harm associated 
with non-disclosure grew progressively more severe. Further, results suggested that 
disclosure intentions may be moderated to some degree by the potential discloser’s 
organizational affiliations, opening the way for including measures of identification 
with organizational groups and categories as predictors of prospective disclosure 
behaviour. Indeed, it could be argued that the affiliation which ADF personnel have 
with their chosen Service is likely to moderate disclosure intentions to a greater extent 
than that which Defence scientists have with their particular Division. Despite the 
low frequency of prospective disclosures in the national security scenario, the trend 
here suggests that the prospect of formal punishment may yet play a important role in 
shaping disclosure outcomes in an ADF setting. In contrast, the prospect of being 
identified as a non-discloser does not appear to warrant further attention as it relates to 
prospective breach behaviour. The lack of an effect for identifiability may be due to 
participants simply deferring responsibility for the harm caused by non-disclosure 
back to the original source of concealment, whether that be one’s friend, one’s 
workgroup or national security policy.
Hypotheses for Study 1
The question now is whether our expectations hold in an investigation of 
whether ADF personnel would disclose (i.e., breach national security) in order to
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avoid problematic non-disclosure, and if so, when and for whom? Formally, we 
expect the following:-
H l: As the consequences of non-disclosure grow progressively more severe:
- the perceived importance of disclosing will increase.
- the perceived importance of not disclosing will decrease, and
- the proportion of ADF personnel deciding to disclose will increase.
H2: These expectations will be moderated by a ‘Service-loyalty’ effect in that:
- the perceived importance of disclosing will be higher.
- the perceived importance of not disclosing will be lower, and
- the proportion of ADF personnel deciding to disclose will be greater
when non-disclosure will harm one’s own Service compared to another Service.
HI and H2 can be depicted graphically as a step-function disclosure gradient 
as shown in Figure 4.1. This hypothesized gradient with its expectation of ‘Service- 
loyalty’ (H2) can be contrasted with that gradient consistent with the doctrine of 
Jointness (dashed line), that is, a gradient in which Service boundaries do not impact 
on disclosure outcomes.
(Joint disclosure 
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Figure 4.1 Overview of Study 1 hypotheses as a disclosure gradient.
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H3: These expectations will be moderated by a formal punishment effect in that:
- the perceived importance of disclosing will be higher.
- the perceived importance of not disclosing will be lower, and
- the proportion of ADF personnel deciding to disclose will be greater
when formal punishment for disclosing is not expected compared to when it is 
expected.
As mentioned in Chapter 3, identification has emerged as a variable of major 
interest for organizational theorists working from a psychological perspective (e.g., 
Ashforth & Mael, 1989; Dutton, Dukerich, & Harquail, 1994; Haslam, 2004; Hogg & 
Terry, 2000). Organizational identification is defined in various ways, however the 
core of most definitions is the idea that, under certain circumstances, individuals come 
to perceive themselves to be ‘at one’ with their organization or some component of it 
(Ashforth & Mael, 1989; Mael & Ashforth, 1992). Specifically, the extent to which 
an individual identifies with various organizational categories has been considered a 
critical antecedent of their actual organizational behaviour (Haslam, 2004; Haslam, 
Eggins & Reynolds, 2003). Central to this work is the argument that the 
psychological processes bound up with the various organizational identities of 
employees underpin important organizational outcomes, including cooperation, 
communication, motivation, and so on (Haslam, 2004; Tyler & Blader, 2000). In 
light of this progress, measures of organizational identification relevant to the ADF 
context will be included in Study 1 as potential predictors of prospective disclosure 
behaviour.
Overall, measures of organizational identification are expected to be reliable 
predictors of prospective breach behaviour to the extent that they are related to the 
element harmed by non-disclosure. Thus, specific hypotheses can be devised for each 
element harmed by non-disclosure, as follows:
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Disclosing for a colleague from another work area
Under certain conditions, an individual who identifies with a particular social 
group may behave positively toward members of other social groups if they perceive 
those other groups as sharing a superordinate goal or purpose (Haslam, 2004; Haslam 
et al., 2003). For example, members of a volunteer tree-planting group may behave 
positively toward other groups concerned with, say, the health of waterways or the 
reduction of air pollution, because they see these others to have a common goal, in 
this case, to preserve the environment. Clearly, this process depends on the absence 
of factors that may mitigate against the perception of a shared goal such as real or 
perceived competition. In assuming that such factors are unlikely to characterise the 
relationship between the work areas of a single military Headquarters, it is 
hypothesised that:
H4(a): When non-disclosure would harm a colleague from another work-area,
identification with one’s work area will predict a decision to disclose.
Disclosing for another service
Based on the process above, it follows that when non-disclosure would harm 
another Service, prospective breaches of national security could be expected to the 
extent that ADF personnel identify with their own Service. However, this is not the 
only identification category that may be relevant to inter-Service disclosure of this 
sort. Each Service belongs to the superordinate categories ‘ADF’ and ‘Joint’, yet the 
latter might be best described as an organizational ideology of “Jointness” (see 
Beaumont, 1993; Behm et al., 2001). Thus, we expect that:
H4(b): When non-disclosure would harm another Service, identification with multiple 
loci will predict a decision to disclose. These are (i) one’s own Service, (ii) 
the ADF, and (iii) Jointness.
Disclosing for one ’s own Service
Straightforwardly, it can be hypothesized that:
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H4(c): Identification with one’s Service will predict a decision to disclose when 
non-disclosure would harm one’s Service.
Disclosing for the ADF
Also straightforwardly, it can be expected that:
H4(d): Identification with the ADF will predict a decision to disclose when non­
disclosure would harm the ADF.
The hypotheses above refer to prospective disclosures that constitute a breach 
of national security. However, and following the pilot study, two additional scenarios 
are to be included in Study 1 - a personal trust and a workgroup confidence scenario, 
in which work-relevant but unclassified information is at hand. As explained earlier, 
these additional scenarios serve two functions: (1) to give ADF personnel a sense of 
the broader research issue in a way that avoids them being initially confronted with a 
scenario relating to their entrustment with, and prospective handling of, classified 
information, and (2) to broaden the scope of the research issue in order to provide a 
basis for comparing the factors affecting disclosure intentions across classified and 
unclassified contexts. Therefore, the hypotheses outlined above apply also to the 
prospect of breaching a personal trust and a workgroup confidence, except H3 which 
specifically relates to the prospect of being formally punished for breaching national 
security.
Study 1 
Method
Participants and design
Two-hundred and thirty-one commissioned ADF personnel participated in 
Study 1. This comprised 94 RAAF, 71 RAN, and 65 ARA officers (1 did not identify 
their Service). Participants were drawn from a number of organizations including 
Army, Navy and Air Force Headquarters (AHQ, NHQ, AFHQ), the Defence Materiel 
Organization (DMO) and Ministerial and Strategic Services Branch. The majority
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(87%) were men aged between 35 and 44 years. Most (63%) were of Major- 
equivalent rank or below, with around a quarter (26%) of Lieutenant Colonel- 
equivalent rank and the remainder (11%) of Colonel-equivalent rank or above. 
Participants had spent an average of 20 years in the ADF and most (70%) held a TOP 
SECRET security clearance.
Participants read three information entrustment scenarios: (1) a personal trust 
scenario; (2) a workgroup confidence scenario; and (3) a national security scenario, 
where only the latter involved the entrustment of classified information. Participants 
responded to each under three conditions representing different ‘elements’ that would 
be harmed by non-disclosure, either: (1) a colleague; (2) a Service, or; (3) the ADF 
globally, and this was manipulated within-participants. For each scenario, a decision 
to disclose constituted a breach of the entrustment relationship. Within the cells of 
this 3 x 3  design were a number of nested variants (labels shown in italics). Nested 
within the national security scenario were two variants whereby disclosing either 
would or would not lead to an official process that revealed a crime had been 
committed {punishment/no punishment). Nested in the condition where non­
disclosure harmed a Service were two variants whereby non-disclosure harmed either 
the participant’s own or another Service. This yielded 16 disclosure dilemmas as 
illustrated in Figure 4.2.
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Figure 4.2 Overview of Study 1 design
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Materials and procedure
The 3 entrustment scenarios read as follows:
1. Personal trust scenario
In the course of your normal working week you meet regularly with an ADF 
friend to informally discuss strategic-level Defence projects. On this particular 
occasion, your friend shares with you some information outlining upcoming 
changes to the funding of certain projects. These changes would immediately 
interrupt a number of major projects with important force structure and capability 
implications. Your friend informs you that this information is reliable and trusts 
you not to provide the information to others.
2. Workgroup confidence scenario
In the course of your normal work duties you are involved in the development 
and management of a range of strategic-level Defence projects. On this 
particular occasion your work area provides you with some information outlining 
upcoming changes to the structure and staffing of certain projects. These 
changes would immediately interrupt a number of major projects with important 
force structure and capability implications. Your work area informs you this 
information is reliable and you are directed not to provide the information to 
others outside your work area.
3. National security scenario
In the course of your normal work duties you are privy to classified information 
about ADF activities. Upon receipt of official requests you provide this 
information to other areas of the ADF. On this particular occasion, for reasons 
beyond your control, no time is available for an official request to be made and 
instead you have been asked to provide the information unofficially. Assume 
that providing the information unofficially would not adversely affect any current 
or planned ADF operation.
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For each scenario respectively, the consequences of disclosing read as follows 
(bracketed terms indicate wording used in different conditions):
Providing the information to others will permanently damage the valued 
relationship you have established with your ADF friend who has trusted you not 
to disclose the information.
Providing the information to others outside your work area will break the 
confidence it has established. This will result in you receiving an informal 
reprimand which will not be explicitly referred to on your annual report, but may 
affect your immediate career advancement prospects.
Providing the information unofficially will constitute a breach of national 
security [and will/but will not] lead to an investigation that will reveal prima 
facie commission of an offence under the Crimes Act.
For each scenario respectively, the consequences of not disclosing read as follows 
(bracketed terms indicate the wording used in different conditions):
Not providing the information to [others/others outside your work area/those 
making the unofficial request] will cause an ADF colleague from another work 
area within your Headquarters to make a bad decision that will unfairly limit 
their career advancements prospects.
Not providing the information to [others/others outside your work area/those 
making the unofficial request] will result in a significant and costly disruption to 
the implementation of a major project belonging to [your/another] Service.
Not providing the information to [others/others outside your work area/those 
making the unofficial request] will lead to a situation in which certain strategic 
and operational areas of the ADF will be severely compromised in their ability to 
achieve key goals, and will likely lead to an increased risk of casualties to ADF 
personnel.
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Study questionnaires (see Appendix A) were distributed with a covering letter 
copied on Defence Department (DSTO) letterhead. This letter informed participants 
that the study was part of a research program investigating how strategic-level ADF 
personnel make decisions about disclosing information within the strategic Defence 
enterprise. It also informed participants that the research was part of a PhD program 
being conducted at the Australian National University, that their participation was on 
a voluntary basis, and that all responses would be anonymous and confidential.
Dependent Measures
For each dilemma, participants were asked to respond to three questions. The 
first asked participants to rate how important they believed it was for the particular 
entrustment relationship to be maintained (i.e., the perceived importance of not 
disclosing). This was measured using the following item (all bracketed phrases 
indicate wording used across the 3 scenarios respectively):
In this dilemma, how important do you think it is to [maintain the trust o f your 
ADF friend who provided you with the information?/maintain the confidence 
established by your work area?/only provide the information to those making an 
official request?].
The second question asked participants to rate how important they believed it 
was for the information to be disclosed. This was measured using the following item:
In this dilemma, how important do you think it is to provide the information to 
[others?/others outside your work area?/those making the unofficial request?].
For both Questions 1 and 2, participants responded on 7-point Likert-type scales 
ranging from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very important). The third question asked participants 
to tick whether they would or would not disclose the entrusted information. This was 
measured using the following item:
I [would/would not] provide the information to [others/others outside my work 
area/those making the unofficial request].
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Along the lines proposed by Doosje, Ellemers, and Spears (1995), the extent to 
which participants identified with: (a) their work area, (b) their Service, (c) the ADF, 
and (d) Jointness, was measured with the following 3 items: (1) “I identify with [my 
work area/my Service/the ADF as a whole/Joint areas”]; (2) “I feel strong ties with 
the personnel of [my work area/my Service/the ADF as a whole/Joint personnel”]; (3) 
“I am committed to the aims of [my work area/my Service/the ADF as a whole/Joint 
aims”]. For each, responses were made on 7-point scales ranging from 1 (not at all) to 
7 (a great deal).
Finally, demographic information including age, sex, rank, length of ADF 
tenure, and level of security-clearance level was collected. Participants were thanked 
for their participation and invited to make comments.
Results
Data reduction
A high degree of inter-item reliability was present between the items used to 
measure participants’ identification with the four organizational foci. Therefore, they 
were collapsed to create four aggregate scales measuring participants’ identification 
with: (1) their work-area (a=.83); (2) their Service (a=.80); (3) Jointness (a=.90); and 
(4) the ADF (cc=. 86).
Means and inter-correlations between the four identification scales are shown 
in Table 4.1. A relatively high degree of inter-correlation was observed between the 
scales measuring participants’ identification with Jointness and with the ADF. Given 
their mean differences, and that these scales were differentially related to participants’ 
identification with their Work area and their Service, it was decided that each was 
sufficiently discriminative with respect to the other. Thus, no further data reduction 
was performed.
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Table 4.1
Means and inter-correlations for identification scales.
Scale Mean 1 2 3 4
1. Work Area 5.70 — .57** .65** .40**
2. Service 5.91 — 46** .61**
3. Jointness 5.09 — .75**
4. ADF 5.37 —
* *  p<.0\
Personal trust & workgroup confidence scenarios 
Analysis o f variance (ANOVA)
Means for the perceived importance of disclosing and not disclosing in the 
personal trust and workgroup confidence scenarios are summarised in Table 4.2. In 
both scenarios, the trend follows the hypothesized pattern, that is, as the consequences 
of non-disclosure grow progressively more severe, the perceived importance of 
disclosing increases, of not disclosing decreases, and there is a favouritism toward 
one’s own Service vis-a-vis another Service. Means for the perceived importance of 
disclosing are generally higher in the personal trust scenario while those for the 
perceived importance of not disclosing are generally higher in the workgroup 
confidence scenario.
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Table 4.2
Means and standard deviations for key dependent measures: Personal trust and 
workgroup confidence scenarios
Perceived importance of...
Element harmed by non-disclosure
Colleague Other Service Own Service ADF
Personal trust
Disclosing 4.23a 4.57b 5.00c 6.35d
( 1 . 8 5 ) ( 1 . 8 8 ) ( 1 . 8 0 ) ( 1 .3 1 )
Not disclosing 5.48a 5.35a 5.17b 4.13c
( 1 .6 0 ) ( 1 .6 1 ) ( 1 .7 1 ) ( 2 .2 7 )
Workgroup confidence
Disclosing 3.99a 4.07a 4.17a 5.98b
( 1 . 8 2 ) ( 1 .9 3 ) ( 1 .9 3 ) ( 1 .5 6 )
Not disclosing 5.73a 5.66a 5.63a 4.57b
( 1 .3 1 ) ( 1 .4 2 ) ( 1 .4 7 ) ( 2 . 15 )
Standard deviations shown in brackets.
Means not sharing subscripts differ significantly at p<.01 or less.
For both scenarios, scores on these items were submitted to a one-way within- 
subjects analysis of variance (ANOVA) comparing the four elements that could be 
harmed by non-disclosure (i.e., colleague, another Service, own Service, and ADF).
In the personal trust scenario, a main effect was observed on the perceived importance 
of disclosing (F(2,690) — 164.16,/?<.001, r|2= 0.42). Planned comparisons revealed that 
the perceived importance of disclosing was significantly higher when non-disclosure 
would harm the ADF compared to one’s own Service (F( 1,230)= 187.62,/K.001), 
one’s own Service compared to another Service (^(1,230) = 52.13,/?<.001), and another 
Service compared to a colleague CF(i,230) = 8.85,/?<.01). A main effect was also 
observed on the perceived importance of not disclosing (F(3,69o> = 81.92,/?<.001, r|2 = 
0.26). Planned comparisons showed that the perceived importance of not disclosing 
was significantly lower when non-disclosure would harm the ADF compared to one’s 
own Service (F(i,230) = 85.85,/?<.001) and one’s own Service compared to another 
Service (F(i,230)= 20.7,p<.001). Thus, support was found for both HI and H2 in this 
scenario.
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In the workgroup confidence scenario, a main effect was observed on the 
perceived importance of disclosing (F(3j690) = 177.85,/K.001, r\2= 0.44). Planned 
comparisons revealed that the perceived importance of disclosing was significantly 
higher when non-disclosure would harm the ADF compared to all other conditions, 
with no other significant differences. A main effect was also observed on the 
perceived importance of not disclosing (F(3)690) = 81.21,/K.001, rf = 0.26). Planned 
comparisons revealed that the perceived importance of not disclosing was 
significantly lower when non-disclosure would harm the ADF, again compared to all 
other conditions and with no other significant differences. Thus, only a marginal 
degree of support was found for HI in this scenario and no support for H2.
Confidence intervals
The proportion (i.e., percentage) of participants indicating they would disclose 
across each of the dilemmas in the personal trust and workgroup confidence scenarios 
is shown in Figure 4.3. Proportions generally followed the hypothesized pattern, that 
is, an increase in the proportion disclosing as the consequences of non-disclosure 
grow progressively more severe, and higher proportions disclosing when non­
disclosure will harm one’s own Service compared to when it will harm another 
Service.
In the personal trust scenario, the proportion disclosing was significantly 
higher when non-disclosure would harm the ADF compared to when it would harm 
one’s own Service (D=.32; CI0.95 = [.382, .256]), another Service (D=.43; CI0.95 = 
[.352, .484]), and a colleague (D= 48; CI0.95 = [.411, .546])6 7. Additionally, the 
proportion disclosing was significantly higher when non-disclosure would harm one’s 
own Service compared to another Service (D=.l 1; CI0.95 = [.055, .142]) and a 
colleague (D=.16; CI0.95 = [T03, .227]), with no other significant differences. With 
respect to disclosure proportions, support was found for HI and H2 in this scenario.
6. Confidence intervals for the difference between proportions (D) were calculated using the formulae
outlined by Newcombe (1998).
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Figure 4.3 Prospective disclosure proportions: Personal trust & workgroup 
confidence scenarios.
In the workgroup confidence scenario, the proportion disclosing was 
significantly higher when non-disclosure would harm the ADF compared to when it 
would harm one’s own Service (D=.48; CI0.95 = [.539, .409]), another Service (D=.55; 
CI0.95 = [-474, .604]) and a colleague (D=.56; CI0.95 = [.471, .605]). Further, the 
proportion disclosing was significantly greater when non-disclosure would harm one’s 
own Service compared to when it would harm another Service (D=.07; CI0.95 = [.027, 
.106]), with no other significant differences. Thus while only marginal support was 
found for HI, strong support was found for H2 in this scenario.
Logistic regression
Logistic regression analysis was performed on a decision to disclose with the 
four identification scales acting as predictors. Rather than testing a full model with all 
four scales treated as one set of predictors, each identification scale was entered and
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assessed independently. Table 4.3 shows regression statistics for each of the four 
scales across the dilemmas of the personal trust and workgroup confidence scenarios.
For the personal trust scenario, identification with the ADF acted as a 
significant predictor of a decision to disclose when non-disclosure would harm 
another Service, with no other significant associations observed. Thus, of the 
identification hypotheses, only partial support was found for H4(a) in this scenario. 
For the workgroup confidence scenario, identification with one’s Service and with the 
ADF acted as a significant predictors of a decision to disclose when non-disclosure 
would harm another Service, with no other significant associations observed. Thus, 
partial support was found for H4(b). Further, identification with both one’s Service 
and the ADF acted as a significant predictor of a decision to disclose when non­
disclosure would harm one’s own Service. Thus, support was found for H4(c) in this 
scenario.
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Table 4.3
Logistic regression analysis: Personal trust and workgroup confidence scenarios
Element harmed by non-disclosure
Colleague Other Service Own Service ADF
Personal trust
Scale B SEB ß B SEB ß B SEB ß B SEB ß
Work-area -0.17 0.12 2.08 0.16 0.12 1.78 0.04 0.11 0.09 0.00 0.17 0.00
Service -0.04 0.14 0.08 0.27 0.15 3.41 0.16 0.14 1.34 0.07 0.19 0.12
Jointness -0.06 0.13 0.20 0.22 0.13 2.65 0.01 0.13 0.00 0.27 0.18 2.23
ADF -0.03 0.11 0.07 0.45 0.13 12.51*** 0.18 0.11 2.33 0.25 0.16 2.46
Workgroup confidence
B SEB B B SEB ß B SEB ß B SEB ß
Work-area -0.04 0.13 0.08 0.20 0.15 1.80 0.13 0.13 1.03 -0.12 0.15 0.65
Service 0.20 0.17 1.34 0.63 0.21 9.09** 0.50 0.18 7.92** -0.11 0.17 0.39
Jointness -0.13 0.15 0.84 0.13 0.17 0.57 -0.12 0.14 0.68 -0.02 0.16 0.01
ADF 0.22 0.14 2.52 0.71 0.18 16.28*** 0.29 0.13 5.02* 0.12 0.13 0.86
> < .05; * > < .01; * * > < .001.
National security scenario 
Analysis o f variance (ANOVA)
Means for the perceived importance of disclosing and not disclosing in the 
national security scenario are summarised in Table 4.4. The trend in these means 
reflects the hypothesized patterns, that is, as the consequences o f non-disclosure grow 
progressively more severe, the perceived importance of disclosing increases, the 
perceived importance of not disclosing decreases, and there is a favouritism toward 
one’s own Service vis-a-vis another Service. Further, the perceived importance of
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disclosing is generally higher in the no punishment condition while that of not 
disclosing is higher in the punishment condition. Compared to the previous scenarios, 
the perceived importance of disclosing is generally lower in the national security 
scenario while the perceived importance of not disclosing is generally higher.
Table 4.4
Means and standard deviations for key dependent measures; National security 
scenario.
Element harmed by non-disclosure
Perceived importance of... Colleague Other Service Own Service ADF
Punishment
Disclosing 2.75
( 1 .7 9 )
3.02
( 1 .9 1 )
3.36
( 2 .0 6 )
5.32
( 1 .9 0 )
Not disclosing 6.35
( 1 .0 1 )
6.13
( 1 .4 0 )
6.12
( 1 .3 7 )
5.21
( 2 .0 5 )
No punishment
Disclosing 3.24
( 1 .9 6 )
3.59
( 2 .0 1 )
4.00
( 2 .0 1 )
5.43
( 1 .9 1 )
Not disclosing 5.96
( 1 . 3 6 )
5.82
( 1 .5 2 )
5.74
( 1 .5 4 )
5.12
( 2 .0 1 )
Note: Standard deviations shown in brackets.
Scores on these items were submitted to a 2 (punishment/no punishment) x 4 
(element harmed by non-disclosure: colleague/own-Service/other-Service/ADF) 
mixed within/between-subjects ANOVA.
There was a main effect for the element harmed by non-disclosure on the 
perceived importance of disclosing to the unofficial request = 204.65 /?<.001,
rf = 0.47). Planned comparisons revealed that estimated marginal means on this item 
differed as hypothesized. Specifically, the perceived importance of disclosing was 
significantly higher when non-disclosure would harm the ADF (M=5.37) compared to 
one’s own Service (M=3.67; i,229) = 222.55,/?<.001), one’s own Service compared 
to another Service (M -3.29; F(i>229)= 24.34,/?<.001), and another Service compared 
to a colleague (M=2.98; F( 1,229) = 14.02, p<.001). Thus, support was forthcoming for
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both HI and H2 for this scenario. This effect was qualified by a significant 
interaction with participants’ expectations regarding whether or not they would be 
formally punished for disclosing (F^^si) = 2.57,/?<.05). Further analysis revealed 
that the perceived importance of disclosing to the unofficial request was greater in the 
no punishment condition than in the punishment condition across all levels of the 
within-subjects factor except where non-disclosure would harm the ADF. Thus, 
qualified support was also found for H3 in this scenario. This interaction is shown in 
Figure 4.4.
2.5
Other Service Own ServiceColleague
Element harmed by non-disclosure
—X— Punishment
• No punishment
Figure 4.4 Perceived importance of disclosing as a function of element harmed by 
non-disclosure and consequence of breaching national security.
There was also a main effect for the element harmed by non-disclosure on the 
perceived importance of not disclosing CF(3,687) = 51.65,/?<.001, r\2= 0.18). Planned 
comparisons revealed that the perceived importance of not disclosing was 
significantly lower when non-disclosure would harm the ADF (M=5.17) compared to 
when it would harm another one’s own service (M= 5.94; F( 1,229) = 59.37/K.001), and 
when non-disclosure would harm another Service (M=5.98) compared to when it
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would harm a colleague (Af= 6.16; F( 1,229) =8.15 /?<.01), with no other significant 
differences evident. These results provided mixed support for HI but no support for 
H2.
A final main effect was observed for the between-subjects factor {punishment/ 
no punishment) on the perceived importance of disclosing (Ty 1,229)= 4.14,/?<.05, r | 2 =  
0.02). As hypothesized, estimated marginal means on this item were higher when 
participants expected a decision to disclose to not lead to formal punishment (M = 
4.06) compared to when formal punishment could be expected (M= 3.61), supporting 
H3.
Confidence intervals
The proportion (i.e., percentage) of participants indicating that they would 
disclose across each of the dilemmas in the national security scenario is shown in 
Figure 4.5. The trends generally follow the hypothesized patterns, with a higher rate 
of disclosing in the no punishment compared to the punishment condition and a steady 
increase in the proportion of participants deciding to disclose as the consequences of 
non-disclosure grow progressively more severe. Further, disclosure proportions are 
higher for when non-disclosure will harm one’s own Service compared to when it will 
harm another Service.
For both the punishment and no punishment conditions, the proportion of 
participants disclosing when non-disclosure would harm the ADF was significantly 
higher that disclosing when it would harm one’s own Service (D=.35; CI0.95 = [.262, 
.435]; D=.31; CI0.95 = [-209, .391] respectively). Further, the proportion disclosing 
when non-disclosure would harm one’s own Service was greater than that when it 
would harm another Service in both the punishment (D=.03) and no punishment 
conditions (D=.06), however the difference only reached significance in the latter 
condition (CI0.95 = [-003, .127]). Finally, the proportion disclosing when non­
disclosure would harm another Service was significantly higher than that disclosing 
when the harm would befall a colleague in both the punishment (D= 09; CI0.95 =
[.027, .148]) and no punishment (D=. 11; CI0.95 = [.039, .185]) conditions. Thus, 
support was found for both HI and H2.
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Figure 4.5 Prospective disclosure proportions: National security scenario
The higher rate of disclosing in the no punishment condition compared to the 
punishment condition was significant for those dilemmas where non-disclosure would 
harm a colleague (D=. 11; CI0.95 = [.015, .191]), another Service (D=.13; CI0.95 =
[.027, .242]), and one’s own service (D=.26; CI0.95 = [.052, .278]). While more 
participants decided to disclose in the no-punishment condition when non-disclosure 
would harm the ADF (D=.12), the difference between conditions was not significant 
(CI0.95 = [-.237, -.012]), reflecting the pattern shown in Figure 4.5. Thus, qualified 
support was found for H3.
Logistic Regression
Logistic regression analysis was performed on a decision to disclose (i.e., 
breach national security) with the four identification scales acting as predictors.
Again, rather than testing a full model with all four identification scales treated as one 
set of predictors, each identification scale was entered and assessed independently of 
the others. Tables 4.5 shows the regression statistics for each of the four scales across
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the dilemmas of the national security scenario for both the punishment and no 
punishment conditions. Identification with the ADF acted as a significant predictor of 
a decision to disclose when non-disclosure would harm another Service, yet only in 
the punishment condition, with no other significant associations evident. Thus, only 
marginal support was found for H4(b) of all the identification hypotheses.
Table 4.5
Logistic regression analysis: National security scenario
Element harmed by non-disclosure
Colleague Other Service Own Service ADF
Scale B SEB ß B SEB
Punishment 
ß B SEB ß B SEB ß
Work-area 0.16 0.34 0.23 0.42 0.29 2.11 0.58 0.30 3.79 0.34 0.17 3.77
Service 0.29 0.41 0.49 0.48 0.32 2.21 0.37 0.28 1.69 0.17 0.18 0.91
Jointness -0.19 0.31 0.37 0.01 0.28 0.00 -0.09 0.22 0.16 0.01 0.18 0.00
ADF 0.12 0.31 0.16 0.60 0.29 4.32* 0.24 0.22 1.16 0.18 0.16 1.33
No punishment
Scale B SEB ß B SEB ß B SEB ß B SEB ß
Work-area -0.19 0.20 0.83 -0.04 0.18 0.05 -0.33 0.17 3.62 -0.28 0.19 2.10
Service -0.38 0.28 1.93 -0.19 0.23 0.62 -0.15 0.23 0.44 -0.35 0.24 2.08
Jointness -0.27 0.25 1.71 -0.19 0.21 0.83 -0.37 0.21 3.33 -0.23 0.21 1.20
ADF -0.02 0.22 0.01 0.03 0.18 0.03 0.01 0.17 0.00 -0.25 0.18 1.97
* p<. 05
Discussion
Our first hypothesis (HI) was that the proportion of participants indicating that 
they would breach the conditions of entrustment would increase as the consequences 
of non-disclosure grew progressively more severe. To test this, we manipulated the 
locus of harm associated with non-disclosure of the information. Specifically, non-
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disclosure harmed either a colleague, a Service, or the ADF globally. We reasoned 
that in this order, these consequences represented a continuum along which the effects 
of non-disclosure would be perceived to grow progressively more severe. In the 
national security scenario, the findings showed that the perceived importance of 
disclosing the classified information increased, and of not disclosing decreased, with 
each step along the continuum. Further, results showed that the proportion of 
participants deciding to disclose followed the hypothesized pattern. As a result, we 
found support for H1.
Partial support for HI was also forthcoming in the workgroup confidence and 
personal trust scenarios. Here, participants generally perceived the maintenance of 
the entrustment to be less important and disclosing to be more important, each step 
along the continuum and again rates of prospective breach behaviour generally 
followed the hypothesized pattern. Yet, these latter forms of entrustment appeared to 
evoke a somewhat less discriminating response from participants than did the national 
security scenario. While the proportion disclosing was greatest when non-disclosure 
threatened to harm the ADF, there was a tendency to equate the colleague and the 
other Service as loci of harm on the two perceived importance variables and 
indications of prospective breach behaviour (this trend was also evident in pilot 
study). This suggests that participants were more discriminating in their decision­
making about when they might breach national security compared to when they might 
breach less formal types of entrustment.
Interestingly, the proportion of participants indicating they would disclose to 
avoid harm befalling the ADF never reached 100% in any of the three scenarios. This 
is particularly surprising given that this consequence also invoked the risk of ADF 
casualties. Specifically, when disclosing would constitute a breach of national 
security and lead to a process of formal punishment, only around half the participants 
sampled indicated they would disclose to avoid such consequences. This increased to 
two-thirds when the threat of punishment was lifted. While disclosure proportions in 
this condition were somewhat higher in the personal trust (86%) and workgroup 
confidence (78%) scenarios, it cannot be concluded that the threat of a major 
organizational failure (which in this case includes the risk of casualties) is sufficient to 
guarantee disclosure of entrusted information, classified or otherwise. In other
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words, there is likely to remain a component that will not breach any form of trust 
under any circumstances. A sense of ‘flexibility’ about when disclosure is and is not 
justified according to the official rules was neatly captured by another participant:
Only ‘pecker-heads’ retain information for purely ‘security clearance’ reasons.
Only fools release information to everyone with a need (read ‘desire’) to know.
(participant 19).
Our second hypothesis (H2) was that when non-disclosure would have a 
negative impact on a Service, participants’ disclosure behaviour would be moderated 
according to whether they were affiliated with that Service or not. That is, we 
hypothesised a ‘Service-loyalty effect’ whereby participants would favour their own 
Service over another Service in terms of their willingness to breach national security 
and their perceptions about the importance of doing so. While participants did indeed 
perceive the importance of disclosing to avoid harm befalling their own Service to be 
greater than that for another Service, this was not the case with respect to their 
perceptions about the importance of not disclosing. That is, the perceived importance 
of maintaining national security remained steady across the own/other Service factor 
while that of disclosing varied according to the Service affected, suggesting that the 
apparent willingness of participants to breach national security is not inversely rated 
to their beliefs about the need to maintain national security as a whole. This partial 
level of support for H2 also extended to the proportions of participants indicating that 
they would disclose the information to the unofficial request. Specifically, no 
Service-loyalty effect was evident in terms of participants’ prospective breaches of 
national security when participants could expect to receive formal punishment. When 
there was an expectation that one would evade formal punishment, the proportion of 
participants disclosing for their own Service was greater than that disclosing for 
another Service, however the difference in the proportions here was low (D=.06). 
Thus, we might conclude that if Service-loyalty is present in the context of 
problematic non-disclosure of classified information, it remains weak and is likely to 
be quashed by expectations of being formally punished. Hence, only partial support 
can be claimed here for H2.
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Stronger support for H2 was forthcoming in the personal trust scenario. Here, 
significant differences between own/other Service conditions in the hypothesized 
direction emerged on both the perceived importance of disclosing and not disclosing. 
Further, there was a larger (D=.l 1) difference between the proportion deciding to 
disclose for the benefit of their own Service and another Service. In the workgroup 
confidence scenario however, the Service-loyalty effect emerged only in terms of 
participants’ decisions to disclose (D=.06), not on their perceptions of how important 
it is to disclose and not disclose. It is possible that this reflects the formal and 
directive nature of the entrustment instructions in the workgroup confidence scenario.
Our third hypothesis (H3) was that the proportion of participants deciding to 
breach national security would be greater when they could expect to evade formal 
punishment compared to when formal punishment was expected. To this end, we 
manipulated whether a decision to disclose the classified information to an unofficial 
request would or would not lead to a formal process that revealed a criminal offence 
had been committed. The findings showed that the proportion of participants 
disclosing was significantly greater when they could expect to evade formal 
punishment for all dilemmas except where non-disclosure harmed the ADF and 
threatened casualties. More specifically, when the prospect of formal punishment was 
lifted, the proportion of participants deciding to breach national security increased by 
around 100% for each of these dilemmas. That the expected punishment 
manipulation had no significant impact on disclosure proportions when non-disclosure 
harmed the ADF and threatened casualties suggests that personal consequences 
associated with one’s breach behaviour are superseded and/or rendered largely 
irrelevant when non-disclosure will have potentially catastrophic consequences. 
However, and as mentioned above, this reasoning is only relevant to those participants 
who decide to disclose and accept the potential costs of doing so - other factors are 
needed to explain why not all participants disclose in the face of such a potential 
disaster. The effect of the manipulation was also evident in participants’ ratings of the 
importance of disclosing to the unofficial request. That is, the perceived importance 
of disclosing was higher when punishment was not expected compared to when it 
was. However, this was not the case with respect to the perceived importance of not 
disclosing (i.e., maintaining national security) which did not vary across the 
manipulation. This is consistent with our earlier finding that the perceived importance
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of not breaching national security policy did not vary across the own/other Service 
manipulation. This further supports the idea that breach behaviour in the domain of 
national security that is brought about by situational demands does not necessarily 
involve changes in the discloser’s beliefs about the importance of maintaining 
national security policy. Overall, strong support was found for H3.
Our final set of hypotheses, H4(a)-(d), concerned the predictive ability of 
participant identification with various organizational groups and categories. 
Specifically, measures of organizational identification were expected to be reliable 
predictors of prospective breach behaviour to the extent that they were related to the 
element harmed by non-disclosure. H4(a) held that identification with one’s work 
area would predict participants’ decision to breach conditions of entrustment when 
harm would befall a colleague from another work area. However, we found no 
support for this hypothesis. Specifically, results indicated that this level of 
identification did not predict disclosing in any scenario. One possibility for this lack 
of association may stem from the perceived nature of the relations between work- 
areas in the ADF. Specifically, it is possible that intergroup relations in this context 
are characterised more by competition than cooperation. Accordingly, participants 
may not perceive (or value) any sense of ‘us’ which encompasses their own and other 
work-areas. A second possibility is that such conditions were present, but were not of 
sufficient magnitude to motivate participants to incur the personal costs associated 
with disclosing, leaving good intentions on the part of the potential discloser just that.
H4(b) held that a number of identification measures would reliably predict a 
decision to disclose when non-disclosure would harm another Service. These 
included participants’ identification with the ADF, their own Service, and the notion 
of Jointness. Findings confirmed the first of these associations in that identification 
with the ADF reliably predicted disclosures for another Service, not only in the 
national security scenario (when punishment could be expected) but also in the 
personal trust and workgroup confidence scenarios. One possible reason why this 
association emerged only in the punishment and not the no-punishment condition is 
that identification with an organization may become increasingly important when one 
must show (i.e., justify) that what appears to be anti-organizational behaviour on their 
part is actually pro-organizational behaviour. Identification with one’s Service also
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reliably predicted prospective breach behaviour for another Service in the workgroup 
confidence domain. Given the focus of this scenario on members of one’s immediate 
workgroup, it is possible that identification with one’s Service was more relevant in 
this domain than in the other two domains. However, identification with Jointness did 
not reliably predict disclosing when non-disclosure would harm another Service in 
any of the scenarios. This is intriguing given that the ideology of Jointness relates 
explicitly to inter-Service cooperation and is organizationally superordinate like the 
category ‘ADF’. Why did identification with the ADF prove to be a successful 
predictor of inter-Service disclosure but not identification with Jointness? Part of the 
answer may lie in the content of these specific identifications and how they differ.
One issue that has gained attention in this respect concerns the impact of Jointness on 
the distinctiveness of the Services. It has been argued that the Jointness ideology may 
undermine the distinctiveness of the individual Services by eroding traditional single 
Service roles, values, and traditions (Trainor, 1993-4; see also Cropsey, 1993; Fautua, 
2000). Hence, is possible that Jointness constitutes, at least for some participants, a 
threat to the distinctiveness of their Service, a claim which cannot be plausibly upheld 
with respect to the ‘ADF’ category. In short, only partial support can be claimed for 
H4(b).
H4(c) maintained that participants’ identification with their own Service 
would predict prospective breach behaviour when non-disclosure threatened their 
Service. Findings showed that this was indeed the case in the workgroup confidence 
scenario, but not in the personal trust or national security scenarios. As was suggested 
above, it is possible that the focus of the workgroup confidence scenario on one’s 
immediate workgroup meant that participants’ identification with their Service was 
more relevant to their responses in this domain than in the other domains. Thus, only 
marginal support can be claimed for H4(c).
Finally, H4(d) held that participants’ identification with the ADF would 
predict their prospective breach behaviour when non-disclosure threatened the ADF 
globally. Findings showed however, that this association was not present in any of 
the entrustment scenarios. One explanation for this may lie in the severity of the 
consequences of this condition, specifically, the prospect of non-disclosure increasing 
the risk of ADF casualties. It is possible that the extent to which one identifies with
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an organization is largely irrelevant to their behaviour in the face of catastrophe that 
may involve the loss of life. That is, problematic non-disclosure of such a magnitude 
calls for a particular response (i.e., disclosing) irrespective of one’s identification with 
the organization. Another possibility is that such behaviour does draw on identity- 
related concerns but not those deriving from organizational categories and groups, for 
example, one’s identification with humanity. Another possibility is that Service 
identity rather than ADF identity remains the most salient amongst this particular 
sample of ADF personnel. As one participant remarked at the end of the 
questionnaire: “I am Army first, ADF second” (participant 100).
Some final insights can also be gained vis-ä-vis the extent to which the factors 
affecting the disclosure of classified information also affect the disclosure of work­
relevant but unclassified information. For one, rates of prospective disclosure 
behaviour were generally highest in the personal trust domain and lowest in the 
domain of national security. Furthermore, participants appeared to be more 
discriminating in their decision-making when their disclosures would constitute a 
breach of national security compared to when it would constitute a breach of personal 
trust or a work group confidence. Rates of disclosure in the national security scenario 
were lower when non-disclosure would harm a colleague compared to a Service, and 
these latter rates were lower than those when non-disclosure would harm the ADF at 
large. However, in the two unclassified scenarios, less difference was evident in this 
regard especially when disclosing would harm a colleague and a Service. Having said 
this, participants appeared to be more discriminating in these two scenarios with 
respect to a particular issue, that is, the extent to which they would favour their own 
Service over another Service in terms of their prospective disclosure behaviour.
General summary and conclusions
This chapter marks the beginning of our empirical investigation into the 
factors unpinning the disclosure of classified information in the ADF. Specifically, 
we sought to address, in relatively broad detail, the question of when and for whom 
ADF personnel will breach the formal rules in order to avert problematic non­
disclosure of classified information. The path taken to answer this question was 
largely exploratory in nature. It was guided, for the most part, by the disclosure
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literature reviewed in Chapter 3. It was also theoretically pluralistic in nature, in that 
our hypotheses were not bound by one explanatory framework, but were drawn from 
many.
In its essence then, Study 1 is a demonstration of how breach behaviour in the 
domain of national security varies within a set of broad scope conditions. When non­
disclosure would likely bring about catastrophe, little room exists for anything other 
than breaches of national security. However, when it has relatively local 
consequences, only a small proportion of personnel will breach national security. 
Furthermore, when one can expect with all certainty to be punished, they will breach 
national security to a far less extent than when they can expect any such disclosures to 
remain, at least formally, unobserved.
Yet, it is when non-disclosure would have what might be termed ‘mid-range’ 
consequences for the Services that the most important results emerge. Here, the 
proportion of participants deciding to disclose lies mid way between that when non­
disclosure ensures catastrophe and that when non-disclosure will have relatively local 
consequences. However, the importance of these results stems from two interrelated 
reasons. The first is that it is in this realm where the bulk of actual disclosure activity 
involving classified information is likely to occur. That is, the disclosure of classified 
information will more frequently have mid-level and Service-relevant consequences, 
than it will have consequences that are catastrophic for the organization as a whole or 
for one particular member. The second reason is that ‘appropriate’ disclosure of 
classified information across Service boundaries is simply critical to the effectiveness 
of the ADF in both war and peacetime, a fact that underlies the organizational 
ideology and doctrine of Jointness and a fact which is at odds with the observation of 
a robust Service-loyalty effect, that is, a tendency to favour one’s own Service over 
another in prospective disclosure behaviour.
What do these results mean for the remainder of the research program? Our 
goal must now be to move beyond exploratory research as to when and for whom 
ADF personnel will breach national security so as to avoid problematic non­
disclosure. Specifically, we must move toward a more focused and theoretical 
understanding of the psychology that underpins the disclosure of classified
89
information in the ADF. In this respect, we must examine the Service-loyalty effect 
and the emphasis it places on the inter-Service context within which the disclosure of 
classified information takes place. Accordingly, a tighter focus on intergroup 
theories, such as social identity (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) and self-categorization 
(Turner, 1985; Turner et al., 1987) theories is appropriate to bring to the research 
issue at this point, thus going beyond the general notion of organizational 
identification discussed so far. At one level, the measures of identification included in 
Study 1 can be seen to have yielded mixed findings with respect to predicting 
prospective breach behaviour. However, they also provided the first glimpse of 
theoretical insight into the psychological processes that may underpin the disclosure 
of classified information in this context. Taken together, this mix of findings 
necessitates further analysis from a theoretical framework that is both relevant to an 
intergroup context and appreciative of the psychological processes underpinning 
organizational identity. This is provided by what has become known as the ‘social 
identity perspective’, a broad theoretical framework comprised of social identity 
theory and self-categorization theory.
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Chapter 5
The social identity perspective:
Two HYPOTHESES OF PROBLEMATIC NON-DISCLOSURE
Introduction
The aim of Chapter 4 was to gain an initial and broad insight into the 
psychology underlying problematic non-disclosure of classified information in an 
ADF setting. Informed by the work dealing with problematic non-disclosure in the 
domain of confidentiality, we posed a set of simple questions that centred around the 
factors of risk and group affiliation. Will ADF personnel breach the formal rules 
regarding access to classified information in order to avert negative consequences 
associated with non-disclosure? If so, when and for whom? To this end, we 
manipulated the element harmed by non-disclosure across three levels: a colleague, a 
Service, and the ADF globally (where the latter included the risk of ADF casualties). 
We also manipulated whether the Service harmed was the participant’s own or not, 
and whether participants could expect any breach of national security to lead them to 
be formally punished or not.
The findings of Study 1 produced the broad insights desired, insights that in 
many but not all respects accorded with what was expected. Results showed that as 
the harm associated with non-disclosure moved from relatively local to relatively 
global levels, personnel became increasingly more willing to breach national security 
by disclosing the information in an unofficial capacity. Furthermore, they were 
significantly more willing to do so when they could expect their breach to not lead to 
formal punishment compared to when formal punishment was an inevitability. While 
these findings speak to the moderating role of risk, perhaps the most important finding 
at this point is that which speaks to the moderating role of group affiliation. Here, we 
found that ADF personnel were more willing to commit breaches (at least 
prospectively) when non-disclosure would harm their own Service compared to when 
it would harm another Service. Indeed, perceptions of the importance of disclosing 
followed the pattern of what we have termed ‘Service-loyalty’. Albeit in the unusual
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circumstances created in Study 1, the suggestion that problematic non-disclosure of 
classified information in the ADF might surface around its Service boundaries is 
particularly important for two reasons. First, it sits uncomfortably with the dominant 
ideology of Jointness, an ideology that promotes cooperation amongst the Services 
and seeks to ensure that Service boundaries, in and of themselves, do not impede the 
realisation of the ADF’s capability. Second, the Service-loyalty effect, along with the 
findings suggesting that people’s identifications might be involved in their disclosure 
behaviour, draws attention to a theoretical perspective that may be useful in gaining a 
deeper understanding of the psychology of problematic non-disclosure as it might 
apply to classified information in an ADF context -  the social identity perspective.
The social identity perspective is comprised of the hypotheses and arguments 
of social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) and self-categorization theory 
(Turner, 1985; Turner et al., 1987). Fundamental to the perspective as a whole is the 
idea that people perceive and respond to the social world in a qualitatively different 
way when they view themselves as members of a group than as individuals (Turner, 
1999; Turner & Haslam, 2001). One’s group memberships include, of course, those 
of organizational categories and groups (Ashforth & Mael, 1989) and for that reason 
the perspective has been influential in providing an understanding of not only the 
psychological foundations of issues like prejudice and stereotyping (see McGarty, 
Yzerbyt, & Spears; 2002, Oakes, Haslam, & Turner, 1994) but also of many 
organizational phenomena such as leadership, negotiation, and motivation (Haslam, 
2004; Hogg & Terry, 2000). The social identity perspective is of particular relevance 
here because it originates from work seeking to explain the psychological processes 
involved in a phenomenon that bears a remarkable resemblance to what we have 
termed the ‘Service-loyalty effect’. Specifically, the social identity perspective grew 
from a period of intense theoretical and empirical work that provided a psychological 
explanation of ingroup favouritism, that is, the tendency for people to favour their 
own group over other groups in some way, whether that be in terms of their 
behaviours, perceptions, or attitudes (Turner, 1981a).
The aim of this chapter is to review the social identity perspective with 
particular regard as to how it might explain the psychology of problematic non­
disclosure in the ADF context. More specifically, the original focus of the perspective
92
on the psychology of ingroup favouritism suggests that it may be well placed to 
explain when problematic non-disclosure is likely to surface around Service 
boundaries. The chapter begins therefore by reviewing the social identity explanation 
of ingroup group favouritism, work that has been conducted largely within the 
tradition of social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Subsequently, a brief 
review is made of the relevant concepts and ideas reconceptualized by self­
categorization theory (Turner, 1985; Turner et al., 1987). We then devise two general 
hypotheses of non-disclosure that draw upon these social identity processes.
Ingroup favouritism: A social identity perspective
Ingroup favouritism7 8, the tendency for people to favour their own group over 
some relevant comparison group, is one of the most robust findings across social 
psychological literature (Jetten, Spears, & Manstead, 1999; Mullen, Brown, & Smith, 
1992). As alluded to above, results reported in both the pilot study and Study 1 can be 
seen as instances of ingroup favouritism. With respect to Study 1, ADF personnel 
were Service-loyal in both their disclosure intentions and perceptions in each 
entrustment domain regardless of whether a decision to disclose breached a friend’s 
trust, a workplace confidence, or national security policy. Strictly speaking, ingroup 
favouritism expressed in behavioural terms (or prospective behaviour) is known as 
intergroup discrimination. That which manifests as people’s perceptions or attitudes 
(e.g., believing that one’s group is of a higher status than another) is known as 
intergroup differentiation (Turner, 1981a). Clearly, both these concepts are 
intertwined and central to many phenomena, most notably social conflict. While the 
focus of social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) has tended to remain on 
intergroup relations and social conflict in stratified societies, the theory began as an 
attempt to explain the emergence of ingroup favouritism in what cam to be known as 
the ‘minimal group’ studies. Indeed, it is this analysis that constitutes the theory’s 
‘psychological core’ (Turner, 1999).
7. The terms ingroup favouritism and ingroup bias are often used synonymously, a practice which has 
led to some confusion (see Turner & Reynolds, 2001). For our purposes, only the former term is
used.
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The minimal group studies
The broad aim of the minimal groups studies was to determine whether social 
categorization, that is, the cognitive act of categorizing people into different groups, 
was sufficient to evoke ingroup favouritism, or more accurately, intergroup 
discrimination (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). These studies typically had two phases (for 
an overview see Tajfel, 1970). The first phase served to isolate social categorization 
from other variables usually associated with intergroup discrimination, such as a 
conflict of interest or previous intergroup hostility. To this end, participants were 
categorized into two groups on the basis of some trivial criteria, for example, whether 
they preferred the paintings of Klee or Kandinsky or whether they were “under-” or 
“over-estimators” in terms of their ability to estimate the number of dots on a 
projected screen. Participants were not told of the group identity of each other, nor 
were they permitted to interact with each other. As a result, the groups were thought 
to be ‘psychologically minimal’, existing only as a social categorizations within the 
minds of participants.
The second phase assessed the impact of this social categorization on 
intergroup behaviour. In isolation, each participant was set a task that required them 
to distribute an amount of money between two other participants. These recipients 
were identified only by an arbitrary code number and their group membership (e.g., 
‘Member No. 74 of Klee group’). One recipient was always a member of the group to 
which the participant also belonged (the ‘ingroup’ member) while the other was a 
member of the alternative group (the ‘outgroup’ member). The actual distribution 
decision was to be made in accordance with a set of matrices of which their were 
various distribution ‘strategies’ embedded within. For instance, the distribution could 
represent: (i) the greatest common benefit to the two recipients (Maximum Joint 
Payoff); (ii) the greatest benefit to the ingroup member (Maximum Ingroup Profit); 
(iii) the greatest difference between the benefit awarded to the two recipients in favour 
of the ‘ingroup’ member (Maximum Difference); or (iv) an equal benefit being 
awarded to the two recipients (Fairness).
The highly reliable finding of the minimal group studies was one of ingroup 
favouritism, that is, participants awarded greater amounts of money to members of
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their own group than to members of the alternative group (Tajfel, 1970; Turner,
1978a, 1999; see also Turner & Bourhis, 1996). Yet, when they had a choice between 
maximising the amount awarded to ingroup members (Maximum Ingroup Profit) and 
maximising the difference in what was awarded to the two recipients in favour of the 
ingroup member (Maximum Difference), it was the latter strategy that was favoured 
(Turner, 1975, 1978a). Put simply, when given the chance, participants adopted a 
strategy of deliberate discrimination against outgroup members, even though doing so 
lessened the amount of money awarded to ingroup members (Turner, 1975, 1981a). 
Hence, relative ingroup favouritism was perceived to be more important than absolute 
ingroup favouritism, or as Turner (1978b) stated, participants wanted to see their 
group “wz>z rather than gain” (p. 102).
Tajfel and colleagues argued that the intergroup discrimination observed in the 
minimal group paradigm reflected, at a fundamental level, participant acceptance or 
‘internalization’ of the social categorization provided as an aspect of their self-concept 
(Tajfel, 1972; Tajfel, Flament, Billig, & Bundy, 1971; see also Turner, 1978a). Doing 
so, they maintained, brought psychological structure and meaning to an otherwise 
barren social context. Furthermore, acceptance of the experimenter-imposed 
categorization also provided participants with an identity (defined in group rather than 
personal terms) that could make a positive contribution to the participant’s view of 
themselves. In the context of the minimal group situation, self-enhancement was 
possible on only one dimension, that is, the relative distribution of money between 
ingroup and outgroup members (Turner, 1978).
Positive social identity: A cognitive-motivational analysis
Amongst other things, social identity theory holds that an individual’s view of 
him- or herself is constituted, in part, by their membership of certain social groups or 
categories (Tajfel, 1978). More specifically, an individual’s social identity is defined 
as “the individual’s knowledge that he [or she] belongs to certain social groups 
together with some emotional and value significance to him [or her] of this group 
membership” (Tajfel, 1972, p. 31). As mentioned in Chapter 4, social identities in the 
ADF may form around various organizational groupings and categories, for instance, 
one’s Service (e.g., ‘we soldiers, sailors, airmen’), one’s work-area (e.g., ‘we pilots’)
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or one’s membership of the ADF at large (‘we ADF personnel’). Hence, the concept 
of social identity is different to that of personal identity, that is, a self-definition based 
on the knowledge one has of themselves as an individual with idiosyncratic attributes, 
qualities and traits (see Turner, 1982). Put another way, a social identity is a ‘we’ 
definition of oneself, rather than a ‘me’ definition of oneself.
Just as people are presumed to want to be evaluated positively as unique 
individuals (see Festinger, 1954), social identity theory maintains that people also 
have an inherent psychological desire to be evaluated positively in terms of their 
group memberships (Tajfel, 1978; Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Turner, 1999). Put another 
way, people have a need for positive regard in terms of their social identities. Hence, 
when an individual feels as though a particular social identity contributes positively to 
how they view themselves, they could be expected to do things that maintain and/or 
enhance this situation. For example, Army personnel who perceive that their 
membership of the Army makes a positive contribution to ‘who they are’ could be 
expected to remain a member of the Army for some time, and work to protect and 
promote its interests. Alternatively, when an individual feels as though a particular 
social identity makes a negative contribution to their self-definition, social identity 
theory holds that they could be expected to do things to alleviate this situation. For 
example, if our Army personnel felt ashamed of belonging to the Army or perceived it 
to reflect low status, they may leave the Army (if possible), engage in various types of 
activities designed to promote a positive change (e.g., mount a campaign to increase 
the respectability of the Army), or cognitively reinterpret attributes of the Army so 
that negative features become positive features (e.g., strict discipline builds character 
and leadership ability; Tajfel, 1978; Tajfel & Turner, 1979).
Whether the aim is creation, maintenance, or enhancement of a positive social 
identity, social identity theory holds that the process is comparative in nature (Tajfel, 
1978; Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Turner, 1975; Turner & Brown, 1978). Specifically, a 
positive social identity is gained through a process of favourable comparison of one’s 
own group (i.e., from which the social identity is derived) against other relevant 
groups, as suggested by Tajfel (1978) below:
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The characteristics of one’s group as a whole (such as its status, its richness or 
poverty, its skin colour, or its ability to reach its aim) achieve most of their 
significance in relation to perceived differences from other groups and the value 
connotations of these differences...the definition of a group (national, racial or 
any other) makes no sense unless there are other groups around (p. 66).
The theory holds that the relevance of another group for comparison in this respect 
varies according to the social context. That is, favourable comparisons against a 
particular group may be very important under some circumstances and less important 
under others. For example, in some situations, establishing or maintaining one’s 
social identity as a member of the RAAF may depend on making a favourable 
comparison of the RAAF against, say, a civilian airline (e.g., “we fly in combat, they 
do not”). In other situations however, establishing or maintaining a social identity as 
a member of the RAAF may entail positive comparisons made against the RAN or the 
ARA. Just which group becomes the basis for comparison or ‘relevant outgroup’ will 
depend on the prevailing circumstances. Civilian airlines may emerge as the relevant 
outgroup in a situation where, for example, RAAF personnel are told that “all aviation 
organizations are the same”. The RAN or the ARA may emerge as the relevant 
outgroup in a situation where RAAF personnel are told they are no different to other 
members of the ADF. Either way, the achievement, maintenance, or enhancement of 
a positive social identity depends on one’s social group remaining positively distinct 
from relevant outgroups (Brewer, 1981; Brown, 1978; Mullen et al., 1992; Tajfel, 
1978; Tajfel & Turner, 1979).
The process described above constitutes a sequence of social categorization- 
social identity-social comparison-positive ingroup distinctiveness/ingroup 
favouritism (Tajfel, 1978; Turner, 1999). In the context of social identity theory, this 
sequence constitutes a cognitive-motivational analysis of the process producing a 
need for positive social identity, and grew out of the desire to make sense of the 
intergroup discrimination observed in the minimal group studies. It constitutes the 
core psychological hypothesis of social identity theory, namely:
.. .that social comparisons between groups which are relevant to an evaluation of 
one’s social identity produce pressures for intergroup differentiation to achieve a 
positive self-evaluation in terms of that identity (Turner, 1999, p. 8).
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This is not to say that ingroup favouritism and intergroup discrimination are to be 
understood as inevitable outcomes of social identification (McGarty, 2001; Turner & 
Reynolds, 2001). As alluded to earlier, in reality (i.e., outside of the minimal group 
paradigm) the process is situated within the context of real-life intergroup relations 
and whether an individual responds to identity-related issues with ingroup favouritism 
will depend not only on the strength of their identification with the relevant group or 
category (Ellemers, Spears, and Doosje, 1999) but their location in, and perception of 
the prevailing social structure. That is, whether or not they perceive it to be possible 
to move from one’s current group to another groups that may offer higher status 
(Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Yet, the basic hypothesis is that many forms of ingroup 
favouritism represent intergroup discrimination and differentiation resulting from 
social comparison processes. Before turning to how this basic hypothesis might 
explain the psychology of problematic non-disclosure of classified information in the 
ADF, it will be necessary to briefly consider how some of the ideas presented above 
have been continued more recently by self-categorization theory (Turner, 1985;
Turner et al., 1987).
Self-categorization theory
As outlined above, an individual’s social identity is that part of their self- 
definition that derives from their membership of social groups or categories (Tajfel, 
1972; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). The emphasis that social identity theory placed on the 
notion of the ‘self was further developed by self-categorization theory (Turner, 1985; 
Turner et al., 1987). According to this theory, the self is categorized in much the 
same way as natural entities in the environment. So, for example, just as a chair can 
be categorized on the basis of its perceived similarity to other chairs and its difference 
to another class of stimuli (e.g., tables), so too can the self be categorized on the basis 
of its perceived similarities and differences with respect to other stimuli, in this case, 
other people. Unlike the categorization of natural stimuli however, the role of self­
categorization is not to determine ‘What is that thing?’ (Bruner, 1957). Instead, 
categorization of the self serves to situate the individual psychologically in the social 
context (Oakes et al., 1994; Turner et al., 1987). In other words, self-categorization 
provides the individual with an answer to the question ‘Who am I?’ in a given
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situation. Seeing oneself as a member of a particular ingroup then represents a self­
categorization at the social rather than an individual level of identity (Turner, 1991).
One important implication of this idea is that the answer to ‘Who am I?’ will 
vary with the prevailing social context (Turner et al., 1987). As a result, self­
categorization theory maintains that the self is a dynamic process rather than a fixed 
cognitive structure (Onorato & Turner, 2001, 2002; Turner, Oakes, Haslam, & 
McGarty, 1994; Turner & Onorato, 1999). It is assumed that, like ‘natural’ 
categories, self-categories exist at different levels o f abstraction with higher levels 
being the more inclusive than lower levels (Turner et al., 1987). For example, an 
individual may perceive themselves as an Australian, an ADF officer, an RAAF 
officer, or “me” with each respective self-category being less inclusive than the next. 
According to self-categorization theory, no one self-category is more real or 
inherently fundamental to a person than any other (Haslam, 2004). Rather, the self- 
category that is psychologically salient (i.e., cognitively activated) at a given point in 
time is the result of an interaction between an individual’s perception of the prevailing 
social context and certain psychological properties (Turner et al., 1987).
Specifically, self-category salience is expected to vary lawfully in accordance 
with two general principles. The first is known as ‘perceiver readiness’ (or ‘relative 
accessibility’) and refers to how ‘ready’ the individual is to categorize themselves in 
terms of that self-category (Oakes, 1987; Turner et al., 1987). This readiness is 
determined by a number of factors including the extent to which the individual 
identifies with the category, their prior experience and their current values, motives, 
goals, and expectations. So, for example, the self-category ‘RAAF officer’ may be 
relatively accessible for the person who identifies strongly with their membership of 
this category and perceives their current goals in terms of this category. The second 
principle concerns the extent to which the self-category ‘fits’ the perceiver’s 
perception of the prevailing social context (Oakes, 1987; Oakes et al., 1994; Turner et 
al., 1987). In this respect, self-category salience depends on the extent to which 
within-category differences are perceived to be less than betxveen-category differences 
(‘comparative fit’). So, for example, in the context of a meeting between RAAF,
RAN and ARA officers about which Service should carry the burden of budget cuts, 
officers would be likely to self-categorize in terms of their chosen Service because in
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this competitive context, they would be likely to perceive the differences amongst 
their Service colleagues to be less than those between personnel of different Services. 
Yet, if the prevailing social context changed dramatically, say if our RAAF, RAN, 
and ARA personnel were airlifted into a major military operation involving US 
military personnel, they would be likely to perceive the differences amongst each 
other to be less than those between themselves and those US members. As a result, a 
more inclusive self-category is likely to become salient, say ‘ ADF personnel’ or 
Australians’. Thus, as alluded to in the previous discussion of social identities, the 
self-categorization that is likely to become salient at any given time will depend on 
the nature of the social comparative context (Oakes et al., 1994; Turner et ah, 1987).
There is however, a second type of ‘fit’ that determines the extent to which a 
self-category become salient, so-called ‘normative fit’ (Oakes et ah, 1994).
Normative fit is the extent to which the perceived differences between categories are 
consistent with the perceiver’s actual expectations. Self-categorization theory holds 
that a self-category becomes salient to the extent that people behave in ways that are 
consistent with the perceiver’s expectation vis-a-vis the normative content of these 
categories. So, for example, in the meeting between RAAF, RAN, and ARA 
personnel about who should bear the brunt of cuts to defence spending, self­
categorization in terms of one’s chosen Service would be unlikely if the officers were 
perceived as behaving in unexpected ways, say if representatives from each Service 
insisted that the spending cuts apply to only their Service’s projects. Such altruistic 
behaviour might be more consistent with a self-categorization at the level of ‘ADF 
officer’.
According to self-categorization theory, a salient self-category leads to a 
process of depersonalization (Turner, 1985; Turner et al., 1987). Depersonalization 
refers to the ‘subjective stereotyping’ of the self. More specifically, it is defined as 
the process whereby an individual comes to perceive themselves as categorically 
interchangeable with other ingroup members. As suggested by Turner (1999):
At certain times the subjective self is defined and experienced as identical, 
equivalent, similar to, or interchangeable with a social class of people in contrast 
to some other class. Psychologically, the social collectivity becomes self, (p.12)
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Therefore, depersonalization involves a “cognitive re-definition of the self’ (Turner et 
al., 1987, p. 528; see also Turner et al., 1994) from an individual with unique 
attributes and traits (“me”) to a group member who behaves in accordance with 
ingroup norms and shares the goals and values of other ingroup members (“we”). 
According to self-categorization theory, it is the process of depersonalization that 
underpins group behaviour (Turner et al., 1987; Turner & Haslam, 2001). That is, the 
shift in self-categorization from the “me” to the “we” not only characterizes group 
behaviour but makes group behaviour possible (Brown & Turner, 1981).
Summary
To this point, we have reviewed some of the fundamental principles of the 
social identity perspective and in doing so, have outlined ideas that are central to both 
social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) and self-categorization theory (Turner, 
1985; Turner et al., 1987). Central to the perspective as a whole is the idea that 
people perceive and respond to the world differently when they view themselves as 
group members rather than as individuals (Turner, 1999; Turner & Haslam, 2001). 
Core to social identity theory is the social identity concept, that is, the idea that 
people’s sense of self derives in part from their membership of social groups and 
categories. According to social identity theory, people have an inherent need for a 
positive evaluation of their social identities and that this involves a process of social 
comparison from which one’s ingroup must remain positively distinct from relevant 
outgroups. Central to self-categorization theory is the idea that social identities are 
self-categorizations that may vary in their level of abstraction or ‘inclusiveness’. 
According to self-categorization theory, it is when a self-category at a social rather 
than a personal level becomes salient that group-level behaviour (i.e., behaving in 
terms of “we” rather than “me”) becomes possible. With these ideas in mind, the 
balance of the chapter outlines two general hypotheses on how the social identity 
perspective might account for non-disclosure of classified information members of the 
ADF.
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Two hypotheses of problematic non-disclosure
Preserving positive distinctiveness
According to the social identity perspective, establishing or maintaining a 
positive social identity is dependent on one’s ingroup remaining positively distinct 
from relevant outgroups. Clearly, one can attempt to achieve positive ingroup 
distinctiveness using a range of strategies. For example, one could accentuate their 
attitudes associated with (or perceptions of) ingroup superiority (i.e., intergroup 
differentiation) or favour their ingroup behaviourally (i.e., intergroup discrimination) 
through the allocation of resources, as was the case in the minimal group studies (e.g., 
Tajfel et al., 1971). Of course, information is also a resource. Indeed, in military and 
defence contexts, information is arguably one of the most precious of all resources. 
Following this idea, it would seem pertinent to ask: does non-disclosure of 
information reflect the establishment or preservation of a valued social identity?
In recent years, some progress in this direction has been made by those 
working from a social identity framework, albeit in the context of research on 
organizational communication (Haslam, 2004; Lea, Spears, & Rogers, 2003; Postmes, 
2001; Suzuki, 1998; Wigboldus, Spears, & Semin, 1999). Communication is 
generally understood to involve the transfer of information and its meaning from one 
entity to another (Katz & Kahn, 1966). Obviously, disclosing classified information 
constitutes an act of organizational communication since it involves the transfer of a 
particular class of information and presumably its meaning from one organizational 
entity to another. Yet, it is important to remember that disclosure is a particular type 
of communication. All disclosures may be communicative, but not all acts of 
communication are disclosures since they do not necessarily involve the transfer of 
information that is hidden or concealed. In the context of proposing an answer to the 
question asked in the preceding paragraph however, accepting disclosure as a 
particular type of communication would seem warranted.
In terms of those working explicitly from a social identity framework, the 
work of Suzuki (1998) may come closest to demonstrating that non-disclosure may 
serve what might be termed an ‘identity-preserving’ function. Suzuki sought to
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investigate how the social distance associated with different national identities 
affected communication patterns in organizations, in this case, large multinationals 
employing predominantly Japanese and Anglo-North American workers. The 
assumption here was that workers in such organizations would likely derive a positive 
social identity along the lines of nationality, that is, they would see those of the same 
nationality as ingroup members and those of the alternative nationality as outgroup 
members. Suzuki hypothesized that the maintenance of social identity would 
manifest in terms of the social distance implicated in employee’s communication 
patterns. Therefore, communication with outgroup members was expected to consist 
largely of task-specific information, that is, information related to work matters (high 
social distance) while communication with ingroup members was expected to extend 
beyond the task-specific to include matters not related to work (low social distance). 
To test this hypothesis, personnel were asked two key questions: (i) who they 
communicated with in their organization, and (ii) the type of information they 
communicated. Findings were generally consistent with expectations. Personnel had 
more task-specific and less non-task specific communication with outgroup members 
compared to ingroup members and this pattem was more pronounced amongst those 
who identified strongly with their national category.
While these results suggest that the maintenance of a valued social identity 
may manifest as non-disclosure behaviour, evidence that non-disclosure (rather than 
non-communication more generally) may serve identity-related concerns can be 
garnered if we step outside of the formal social identity literature, and indeed, outside 
the psychological literature altogether. What is relevant here is the sociological and 
anthropological work that has examined groups in which non-disclosure of certain 
information is inextricably linked to group identity, or in other words, groups in which 
a hallmark of belonging is that certain things can or must be left unsaid. Of course, 
the exemplar of such groups is the so-called ‘secret society’. Simmel (1906) for 
example, recalls a secret order in the Molucca Islands in which group belonging 
meant that one must never discuss their initiation experiences at any time. Indeed, in 
this order, after initiation the candidate was required to not speak at all for a period of 
weeks, not even to family members (see also Bellman, 1981; Mackenzie, 1967; Tefft, 
1980). In conceiving of secret societies more generally however, Simmel (1906) 
argues the first internal relation amongst members is of “reciprocal confidence” (p.
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470) vis-ä-vis the ability to remain silent about certain issues, often the society’s very 
existence. According to Simmel, there resides in this reciprocal confidence “as high 
moral value as in the companion fact that this confidence is justified” (p. 473). The 
association between non-disclosure behaviour and the preservation of a valued 
identity is also evident in sociological analyses of privacy (Kelvin, 1973; Schwartz, 
1968; see also Läufer & Wolfe, 1977). According to Schwartz (1968), the non­
disclosure associated with privacy serves a “group preserving function” (p. 741) in 
that it allows a kind of ‘time out’ to take place amongst group members. Schwartz 
also argues that the non-disclosure associated with privacy assists in maintaining 
status divisions between individual and groups, an issue taken up in earlier research 
by Goffman (1958).
Later work can be drawn upon to illustrate the idea that non-disclosure may 
serve to promote or preserve one’s group identity. Indeed, some of this work refers 
directly to the non-disclosure of classified military information in this regard. Kaiser 
(1980) for instance, conducted a review of the US intelligence community, drawing 
particular attention to the internal norms and mores that were critical to the 
community’s sense of solidarity and “communal identity” (p. 279). According to this 
author, the most critical norm in this respect was one of ‘internal security’, that is, 
non-disclosure of classified information relevant to the communities activities to 
perceived outsiders. Indeed, Kaiser argued “[t]he fact that illicit activities within the 
intelligence agencies went unexposed for decades testified to the importance of this 
norm” (p. 277). The theme that the norms of the military/defence organizations 
support non-disclosure over disclosure of certain types of information is also evident 
in those enquiries made by the US government in the aftermath of September 11, 
2001. For example, when questioned as to why the FBI failed to develop a strategy 
for sharing information with State and local police, its Deputy Assistant Director for 
Counterterrorism replied “[t]he culture says you don’t share that information” (House 
Permanent Select Committee, 2002, p. 358).
At this point, we are left with a general hypothesis regarding the psychology 
of problematic non-disclosure as it might apply to classified information in the ADF 
context. Drawn largely from work conducted within the tradition of social identity 
theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) and supported by research that has been conducted
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both within and outside of the broader social identity tradition we can hypothesise that 
non-disclosure of classified information, particularly that which may surface around 
Service boundaries, reflects the desire to establish and/or maintain positive Service 
distinctiveness and thereby positive Service identity. However, based on the 
theoretical review of the social identity perspective above, an alternative hypothesis 
can also be devised, one in which the self-category that is salient at the time of one’s 
disclosure decision (i.e., the perceived ingroup/outgroup memberships) is central.
A self-categorical gulf
According to the social identity perspective, one’s social identities are to be 
understood as self-categorizations, that is, categorizations of the self as being similar 
and equivalent to other ingroup members, and different from outgroup members 
(Onorato & Turner, 2002, 2001; Turner et al., 1987; Turner & Onorato, 1999). As 
outlined earlier, self-categorization theory holds that when a particular self-category 
becomes salient, a process of depersonalization occurs whereby the self becomes 
categorically interchangeable with other ingroup members. It is this process that 
transforms “my” interests into “our” interests and in so doing underpins all collective 
behaviour.
Following this idea, it would seem pertinent to ask: do patterns of non­
disclosure reflect the ingroup/outgroup memberships that are salient at a particular 
time? In other words, does non-disclosure signify a self-categorical gulf amongst the 
ADF’s army, navy and air force personnel? To date, social identity theorists 
interested in the effects of manipulating one’s perceived ingroup/outgroup 
memberships (i.e., the salient self-category) have not adopted disclosure behaviour as 
one of their primary dependent variables. However, their interest has focused on 
other, more general outcome variables of which disclosure behaviour can be seen to 
represent. As mentioned in Chapter 3, one of these is cooperation and a second is the 
concept of trust.
Social identity processes & cooperation
Generally speaking, cooperation refers to instances where people work 
together to accomplish shared tasks and one’s behaviour is ‘cooperative’ to the extent
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that it intends to benefit the group rather than the individual (Boyd & Richardson,
1991; Tyler, 1999; Tyler & Blader, 2001). In recent years, researchers working from 
a social identity framework have investigated more fully the nature of the 
psychological processes underlying an individual’s decision to engage in cooperative 
behaviour at work (e.g., Ellemers, Van Rijswilk, Bruins, & de Gilder, 1998; Tyler,
1999, 2001; Tyler & Blader, 2000, 2001). The basic idea here is that the extent to 
which an individual identifies with an organization (or a particular organizational 
group) is positively associated with the willingness of workers to behave 
cooperatively toward the organization (or organizational group) by complying with its 
rules, helping other members, and remaining a member (Tyler, 1999; Tyler & Blader,
2000, 2001) .
This core idea can be traced back to earlier studies in the social identity 
tradition which demonstrated that people are relatively more willing to cooperate in 
an organizational context when they perceive the organization and it members to be a 
positively valued ingroup rather than a negatively valued outgroup. Brown (1978) for 
example, examined the relations between the production and development sections of 
a large British factory. In this study, 41 shop stewards representing the two sections 
were interviewed and asked how they would respond to a threat where the factory 
workforce as a whole faced large-scale redundancies. Results showed that 80% of 
interviewees did not spontaneously suggest a course of action that involved 
cooperation between the sections and/or their unions representatives. Brown (1978) 
argued that this reflected a history of often hostile social comparison and intergroup 
differentiation between the two sections which had intensified in the context of a 
recent wage restructuring proposal. In other words, the lack of cooperation was seen 
to stem from a lack of a positively-valued superordinate identity.
More recently, Ellemers, Van Rijswilk et al., (1998) examined the link 
between social identification processes and cooperation in a study of power use in a 
simulated organization. These researchers reasoned that the willingness of workers to 
cooperate with superiors who exercised excessive power would vary according to 
whether the superior was perceived as an ingroup or outgroup member. To test this 
idea, study participants were asked to perform a stock-trading task whereby they made 
decisions about buying or selling stocks under the supervision of a superior who was
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either an ingroup or outgroup member and who wielded either high or low power (via 
the number of decisions that they overruled). Results showed that participants were 
equally willing to work cooperatively with an ingroup superior regardless of the 
amount of power they exercised, but were less willing to cooperate with an outgroup 
superior who had exercised high power. More importantly perhaps, participants were 
more willing to work cooperatively as their identification with (i.e., commitment to) 
their superiors increased. Ellemers, Van Rijswilk et al., (1998) concluded that 
identification with a superior can promote interpersonal cooperation even when the 
superior’s leadership style is evaluated poorly (see also Bruins, Ellemers, & de Gilder, 
1999).
Studies conducted from a social dilemmas framework also demonstrate how a 
salient social identity is able to transform individualistic behaviour into cooperative 
behaviour. Social dilemmas can be defined as situations where an individual faces a 
choice about whether to act in terms of their own personal interest (i.e., “defecting”) 
or in the interests of a group to which they belong (i.e., “cooperating”; see Komorita 
& Parks, 1996). More formally, social dilemmas have an interdependence structure in 
which defecting yields a higher payoff for oneself than does cooperating regardless of 
what other group members do, yet if everyone defects, all will receive a payoff that is 
less preferable than that which would have obtained if all cooperated (Smithson & 
Foddy, 1999). It has been widely hypothesized that people are willing to make 
cooperative decisions in social dilemmas to the extent to which they perceive the 
others involved to be ingroup members.
Wit and Wilke (1992) for instance, organized study participants into 10 person 
teams, presenting each member a particular kind of social dilemma in a real-world 
format (e.g., a traffic-congestion problem)8 9. Participants were told that their payoffs 
would manifest as tokens that could be spent on refreshments later, but that due to a 
shortage of tokens a certain allocation procedure would have to be followed. In the 
group categorization condition, participants were told that only members of randomly 
selected groups would receive their tokens. In the personal categorization condition,
8. Wit and Wilke (1992) employed the Chicken Dilemma Game (CDG), Trust Dilemma Game
(TDG) and Prisoner’s Dilemma Game (PDG).
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participants were told that only randomly selected individuals would receive their 
tokens. The findings showed that this manipulation had a number of significant 
effects. As expected, participants in the group categorization condition were more 
cooperative in their dilemmas choices than those in the personal categorization 
condition. Further, those in the group categorization condition expected more 
cooperation from their group colleagues, than did those in the personal categorization 
condition. Additionally however, they also believed that their group was more 
cooperative compared to other groups participating in the study, than did those in 
personal categorization condition. In other words, group categorization resulted in a 
positive differentiation of the ingroup from other groups in terms of the perceived 
cooperativeness of ingroup members (see also De Cremer & Van Vugt, 1999; Orbell, 
Dawes, & Schwartz-Shea, 1994).
Social identity processes & trust
In Chapter 3, we argued that disclosure outcomes are likely to be reflected in 
the extent to which the potential discloser of the information trusts its potential 
recipient. The idea that trust underpins important organizational processes is also a 
major theme in the broader organizational literature. Here, there is an almost 
universally held assumption that organizational success is positively associated with 
and possibly determined by the extent to which members trust each other (e.g., Jones 
& George, 1998; Kramer, 1999, 2001; Lewicki & Bunker, 1995; McAllister, 1995; 
McCauley & Kuhnert, 1992). This assumption is based on the results of studies 
which have shown that trust has a positive influence on many important 
organizational outcomes including cooperation (Costigan, liter, & Berman, 1998; 
Hagen & Choe, 1998; Jones & George, 1998; Lane & Bachman, 1996; Madhok, 
1995), communication (Chandra-Sekhar & Anjaiah, 1995; Roberts & O’Reilly, 1974), 
problem solving (Zand, 1972), and profit (Davis, Schoorman, Mayer, & Hoon Tan, 
2000). Not surprisingly then, increasing attention has been focused on the 
antecedents of organizational trust (Adams, Bryant, & Webb, 2001; Kramer, 1999).
The antecedents of organizational trust pose an interesting problem for trust 
theorists and researchers. Traditionally, trust is thought to stem from a process of 
repeated and incremental interaction between the trustee and the trustor, allowing the
108
former to become known to the latter (see Boon & Holmes, 1991; Deutsch, 1958). 
However, the complexity of modem organizational structures and environments, and 
the increasing trend toward ‘temporary’ organizational structures, is seen to restrict 
the extent to which an individual member can build up ‘evidence-based’ knowledge 
about the trustworthiness of other members (Kramer, 2001, 1999; Kramer, Brewer, & 
Hanna, 1996; Meyerson, Weick, & Kramer, 1996). Military organizations are no 
exception in this respect with posting cycles that tend to last around three years and a 
trend toward the “rapid” formation and deployment of military Headquarters with a 
lifespan limited to the duration of a particular conflict or crisis (see Adams et al.,
2001; Dorman et al., 1998). Given then, that reputation-building may be problematic 
in organizational contexts, factors other than personal interaction history have been 
considered as antecedents of trust. One of the most influential ideas to emerge in this 
regard is that people use information about the social categories to which others 
belong (e.g., police officers, used-car salesmen, clergy, and so on) to inform and 
shape their trust-related decisions (Brewer, 1981; Williams, 2001). This idea provides 
a backdrop to the view that trust is an outcome of social identity processes and the 
concepts o f ‘depersonalized trust’ (Brewer, 1981), ‘category-based trust’ (Kramer, 
1999) and ‘identification-based’ trust (Kramer, 2001; Kramer et al., 1996; Lewicki & 
Bunker, 1995) are all used somewhat interchangeably in this regard. For those 
working from a social identity perspective, a salient social identity is thought to 
provide a presumptive basis for the placement of trust in others (Brewer, 1981; 
Kramer, 2001; Kramer et al., 1996). More specifically, when an individual shifts 
from a personal to a social level of identity, trust is able to be conferred on other 
ingroup members solely on the basis of their shared category membership (Kramer, 
1999). As Brewer (1981) argues:
Common membership in a salient social category can serve as a rule for defining 
the boundaries of low-risk interpersonal trust that bypasses the need for personal 
knowledge and the costs of negotiating reciprocity.. .Within categories the 
probability of reciprocity is presumed, a priori, to be high, while between 
categories it is presumed to be low or subject to individual negotiation (p. 356).
Supporting this idea is the frequent finding that people perceive ingroup 
members to be more trustworthy than outgroup members (Allen & Wilder, 1975; 
Brewer, 1979; Brewer & Silver, 1978; see also Messick & Mackie, 1989). A number
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of cognitive-motivational mechanisms and models have been advanced surrounding 
this association emphasizing either the perceived similarity of ingroup members 
(Brewer, 1981), group norms as a means to protect against trust violations (Brewer, 
1981; Greenberger et al., 1987), the benefits of displays of trust (Kramer, 2001; Fine 
& Holyfield, 1996), or the role of affective processes (McAllister, 1995; Williams, 
2001). However, the fundamental process according to the social identity perspective 
is depersonalization (Turner, 1985; Turner et ah, 1987). When one perceives 
themselves to be categorically interchangeable with other ingroup members (i.e., 
when a self-category at a social level becomes salient), psychological distance 
between group members decreases, and people becomes oriented toward their shared 
or joints goals and away from their individual goals, promoting both the placement 
and fulfilment of trust.
Given that self-categorization processes are dynamic and that self-category' 
salience is determined (in part) by the nature of the prevailing social context (Turner 
et ah, 1987), the extent to which trust is present can be expected to change with the 
social context. For example, trust between Air Force and Navy personnel may be 
heightened when an inclusive self-category (i.e., ADF) is salient, say in the context of 
planning a high-profile Air-Sea rescue operation. Yet, if the salience of this inclusive 
self-category were to disintegrate, say if the operation was a major failure and each 
Service blamed the other, levels of inter-Service trust would likely fall. Further, the 
extent to which trust is present can be expected to change according to whether the 
dimension on which it is potentially placed is relevant to the salient ingroup identity. 
Just because Navy personnel trust their Air Force counterparts to provide them with 
accurate surveillance information does not mean they also trust their knowledge about 
the best ways to support naval elements with air power.
Chattopadhyay and George (2001) recently sought to investigate the social 
identity processes underpinning intergroup trust in an organizational context.
Drawing on the idea that employees often form social identities around their work 
status, that is, whether they are employed on a permanent or temporary basis these 
researchers hypothesised that work status dissimilarity would constitute a salient 
ingroup-outgroup boundary that could be expected to have a negative impact on 
intergroup trust. To test this idea, they surveyed employees from two large computer
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manufacturing organizations. Results showed that in contexts where work status 
dissimilarity was particularly salient, in this case, when permanent employees were 
numerically outnumbered by their temporary counterparts, members of the former 
(high status) group attributed lower levels of trust to members of the latter (low- 
status) group (see also Chattopadhyay, 1999; Veenstra, 2003).
Again, we are left with a second hypothesis regarding the psychology of 
problematic non-disclosure as it might apply to classified information in the ADF 
context. This hypothesis is drawn largely from work conducted within the tradition of 
self-categorization theory (Turner, 1985; Turner et al., 1987) and supported by 
research within this tradition concerning the psychology of cooperation and trust. 
Specifically, we could hypothesise that non-disclosure of classified information, 
particularly as it may relate to Service boundaries, reflects the particular self-category 
(i.e., the perceived ingroup/outgroup memberships) salient at the given time.
Summary and conclusion
In this chapter, the main principles of the social identity perspective as they 
apply to the psychological basis of ingroup favouritism have been reviewed, as have 
the contributions of the social identity perspective towards understanding trust, 
cooperation, and communication in intergroup settings. A number of important points 
emerge from this analysis. Primary amongst them is the idea when an individual’s 
membership of a particular social group makes a positive contribution to how they 
view themselves, they will seek to positively differentiate this group from other 
groups in the social context. As has been shown in the applied literature reviewed 
above, positive differentiation may manifest in various ways, including one’s 
perceptions about the trustworthiness of others and the extent to which they are 
willing to cooperate or communicate with them. This analysis suggests that the 
Service-loyal disclosure of classified information in the ADF may be related to the 
extent to which ADF personnel seek to positively differentiate their Service vis-ä-vis 
each other. Also of particular significance is the idea that organizational outcomes 
will be determined, to some extent, by the particular level at which people categorise 
themselves (Haslam, 2004). This implies, that any Service-loyal disclosure gradient 
could be transformed into one more consistent with the ideology and doctrines of
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Jointness through the establishment of salient self-category that crosses inter-Service 
boundaries. These ideas are explored empirically in the next chapter.
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Chapter 6
Testing the two hypotheses:
Jointness and the self-categorical gulf
Introduction
In Study 1, we sought to determine if, when, and for whom ADF personnel 
would breach official rules in order to avert problematic non-disclosure. Amongst 
other things, our findings suggested a role for the potential discloser’s group (in this 
case, Service) affiliation. Specifically, we found that ADF personnel tended to be 
more willing to disclose the information to the unofficial request when doing so 
would prevent harm befalling their own Service compared to when the harm would 
befall another Sendee. This suggestion that problematic non-disclosure of classified 
information in the ADF is likely to surface around Service boundaries pointed the way 
toward bringing some theoretical rigour to the problem. To that end, in the previous 
chapter we reviewed the social identity perspective, a theoretical framework that 
encompasses social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) and self-categorization 
theory (Turner, 1985, Turner et al., 1987) and examines how perceptions of and 
responses to the social and organizational world are qualitatively different when 
people see themselves as group members rather than as individuals.
From this review, two general hypotheses of non-disclosure of classified 
information in the ADF emerged. The first holds that non-disclosure is a form of 
ingroup favouritism driven by the need to establish, maintain or protect Service 
distinctiveness and thereby Service identity. According to this hypothesis, the degree 
of problematic non-disclosure around the ADF’s Service boundaries could be 
expected to vary to the extent that positive Service distinctiveness is threatened. The 
second hypothesis holds that, rather than being driven by a perceived or actual threat 
to Service distinctiveness, non-disclosure of classified information (like cooperation 
more generally) follows the contours of the ingroup/outgroup memberships that are 
salient for the potential discloser at that particular time. Here, the degree of 
problematic non-disclosure likely to surface around Service boundaries could be
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expected to vary to the extent that these boundaries represent the salient level of self­
categorization for the potential discloser at the time of their decision-making.
The aim of this chapter is to test these hypotheses. However, and as 
mentioned above, we now move away from addressing the psychology of problematic 
non-disclosure directly (i.e., explicitly) as was the case in the pilot study and Study 1. 
We also move away from issues associated with the potential breach of official rules. 
Instead, our approach in this chapter (and for the remainder of the thesis) is to focus 
on “routine” circumstances involving the potential disclosure of classified 
information, specifically, those in which the potential discloser is requested for 
classified information from a potential recipient. This is an “indirect” approach in the 
sense that we seek to gain insight into the factors implicated in problematic non­
disclosure of classified information by examining ADF personnels’ perceptions of, 
and responses to, routine requests for its disclosure. Of course, such responses can 
manifest in many ways other than an outright decision to disclose or not disclose. 
These may include delaying a decision, seeking advice, verifying the potential 
recipient’s credentials beyond what is necessary, or passing responsibility for the 
disclosure decision to someone else entirely. Our approach from this point on also 
focuses on the content of the information likely to be central to problematic non­
disclosure. As suggested in the previous chapter, problematic non-disclosure appears 
particularly likely to involve information about one’s group that is sensitive to its 
overall interests (Kaiser, 1980). Hence, our focus has tightened somewhat to consider 
the potential disclosure of information that is not only classified but ‘Service- 
sensitive’ in some way. Therefore, we could expect the potential discloser’s 
perceptions about the trustworthiness of the potential recipient to become more 
important in shaping disclosure outcomes.
To that end, two studies are presented in this chapter. The first hypothesis 
outlined above is tested in Study 2 where it is ‘situated’ within a manipulation of the 
Jointness ideology. For some time, a constant theme within discussions of Jointness 
has been the potential for the ideology to threaten Service distinctiveness (Codner, 
1998; Fautua, 2000; Trainor, 1993-4). In essence then, Study 2 asks whether 
Jointness constitutes a vehicle by which Service distinctiveness is undermined and if 
so, whether it is likely to be part of a problem vis-ä-vis problematic non-disclosure of
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classified information in the ADF. Of course, if Jointness turns out to be part of any 
such problem, the principles embedded within this hypothesis help specify how it may 
also be part of the solution.
The second hypothesis is tested in Study 3 where it is situated within a 
manipulation of a ‘shared opinion group’ (see McGarty & Bliuc, 2004). Set against 
the backdrop of social identity research into the effects of ‘recategorization’ (e.g., 
Dovidio et al., 1997), we ask in Study 3 whether disclosure of classified information 
is a function of the salient level of self-categorization, that is, if it follows the 
perceived ingroup-outgroup memberships salient at the time of decision-making. If 
so, it follows that the disclosure of classified information could be ‘re-routed’ by 
changing these perceived memberships.
Study 2 
Introduction
As discussed in Chapter 5, an idea central to the social identity perspective is 
that people seek to positively differentiate their ingroups from comparable outgroups 
(Tajfel & Turner, 1979; see also Turner & Reynolds, 2001). In other words, in order 
to make a positive contribution to social identity, a group must remain positively 
distinct from other groups in the comparative context (Tajfel, 1978). It follows from 
this idea that a superordinate categorization or ideology that downplays or indeed 
eliminates intergroup boundaries, either purposefully or inadvertently, impedes the 
ability of the included groups to positively differentiate themselves from one another 
(Hornsey & Hogg, 2000a). In short, such categorizations and ideologies may be seen 
by group members to be undermining group distinctiveness (Hornsey & Hogg, 1999, 
2000a, 2000b; van Leeuwen & van Knippenberg, 2003).
In the social identity literature, categorizations and ideologies that undermine 
group distinctiveness are viewed as ‘threats’ to social identity (Branscombe, Ellemers, 
Spears, & Doosje, 1999; Jetten et al., 1999). Further, research shows that such threats 
frequently evoke an intensification of ingroup favouritism in an effort to restore the 
group’s positive distinctiveness (Hornsey & Hogg, 1999, 2000a; Jetten et al., 1999;
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Mlicki & Ellemers, 1996; Roccas & Schwartz, 1993; van Leeuwen, van Knippenberg 
& Ellemers, 2001). For instance, Hornsey and Hogg (2000b) argue that 
distinctiveness threats often result in group members asserting their group identity, 
sharpening their perception of intergroup boundaries, and accentuating their sense of 
ingroup solidarity. Research in the tradition has also shown that the extent to which 
threats to social identity evoke ingroup favouritism often varies according to one’s 
level of identification with the threatened group (Jetten et al., 1999). Not surprisingly, 
those who identify strongly with the threatened group (so-called “high-identifiers”) 
usually display the greatest ingroup favouritism in response to identity threats while 
those who identify only marginally with threatened group (so-called “low identifiers”) 
however, generally respond with ingroup favouritism to a lesser degree, or may even 
welcome the categorization or ideology that undermines group distinctiveness (e.g., 
Spears, Doosje, & Ellemers, 1997). According to self-categorization theory (Turner, 
1985; Turner et ah, 1987) the extent to which an individual identifies with a given 
social group or category reflects the extent to which that particular self-category is 
central and of evaluative importance to one’s self-definition, and is thus related to the 
notion of perceiver readiness (Turner, 1985; Turner et ah, 1987).
On the basis of these ideas, there has emerged a general consensus amongst 
social identity theorists that cooperative intergroup relations are likely to depend on 
superordinate categorizations and ideologies that preserve rather than eliminate 
subgroup distinctiveness (Hornsey & Hogg, 2000b; see van Leeuwen & van 
Knippenberg, 2003)9 10. Indeed, this message has become central to many models of 
intergroup relations including the recategorization model proposed by Gaertner et ah, 
(2000), the Mutual Intergroup Differentiation Model (Hewstone & Brown, 1996), the 
ASPIRe model (Haslam et ah, 2003), and Optimal Distinctiveness Theory (Brewer, 
1991). This idea also resonates within Western military organizations including the 
ADF, primarily in relation to the concept of Jointness. Since Jointness was formally 
conceived after the end of World War II, it has remained a source of considerable 
tension amongst military personnel primarily because of its perceived potential to 
undermine the distinctiveness of the individual Services (Trainor, 1993-4; see also 
Dunn, 1995, Fautua, 2000). As the number of recent publications on this issue would
9. This reflects the debate in the broader cultural relations literature between the benefits of multiculturalism
over assimilationist policies (see Berry, 1976; Hornsey & Hogg, 2000a, 2000b).
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suggest, this tension shows little sign of abating (see Ankersen, 1998; Codner, 1998; 
Fautua, 2000; Owens, 1993-94; Sapolsky, 1997; Wilkerson, 1997). Alluding to the 
social identification processes described above, Beaumont (1993) provides an 
eloquent description of the tension:
Armies, navies, and air forces must be able to restore and regenerate after major 
destruction and heavy losses. They function in the face of death, maiming, 
mutilation, capture, and punishment, condition with no counterpart in civil life 
aside from, and then only briefly major catastrophes.. .It is not surprising, then, 
given the hunger for strong, well-demarcated allegiances and identities found 
among warriors, that many have resisted cooperation, fusion, and jointness. (p. 
185)
Our question now is whether problematic non-disclosure of classified 
information in the ADF is likely to surface around Service boundaries because of a 
perceived threat to Service distinctiveness that is evoked by Jointness.
To address this, we will present ADF personnel with two antithetical views of 
Jointness, one advocating the irrelevance and removal of Service distinctiveness, the 
other advocating its importance and preservation. Along the lines suggested above, 
we expect that the former will constitute a threat to Service distinctiveness while the 
latter will not. More importantly however, we expect the former, what we will term 
“threatening Jointness” to evoke disclosure outcomes that are more Service-loyal than 
those evoked by the latter or “non-threatening Jointness”. As discussed above, the 
disclosure outcomes here relate to those courses of action which ADF personnel are 
likely to take in response to a request to disclose classified information that is also 
sensitive in terms of one’s Service interests. We formulate this general hypothesis in 
the broader context of investigating how the potential discloser’s affiliations impact 
the disclosure of classified information. Yet, and in light of the results of Study 1, we 
must also accept that a role will be played by risk in this respect. Specifically, we 
could expect threatening Jointness to lead to Service-loyal disclosure outcomes only 
when non-disclosure would not risk key ADF goals. Formally, the hypotheses of 
Study 2 are summarised below:
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HI. Threatening Jointness will evoke Service-loyal disclosure outcomes to a greater 
degree than non-threatening Jointness. This will be moderated by:
(a) Perceived risk to the ADF, in that the Service-loyal disclosure will be 
confined to circumstances where risk to the ADF is low;
(b) Identification, in that the Service-loyal disclosure will likely be 
accentuated amongst those who identify strongly with their Service.
Method
Participants and design
Eighty-nine ADF personnel took part in Study 2. This comprised 60 members 
of the RAN drawn from Navy Headquarters and a nearby RAN establishment and 29 
members of the ARA drawn from Army Headquarters. Most were men (n = 74) and 
the mean age was 38 years. Of those commissioned, most were of Major-equivalent 
rank or above (n = 45) with a small number of Captain (Army) equivalent rank or 
below (« = 7). The remaining 35 participants were non-commissioned officers 
(NCOs). Two participants did not indicate their rank. Participants had served an 
average of 18 years in the ADF and most {n = 59) held a TOP SECRET clearance.
The study had a 2 (Jointness: threat/no-threat to Service identity) x 2 (risk to 
ADF: low/high) x 2 (requester’s Service: own/other) mixed within-between 
participants design. The first two independent variables were manipulated between- 
participants while the third was manipulated within-participants.
Participants were given a questionnaire in which they were told that a stated 
opinion and a short scenario provided the backdrop to a number of questions. The 
stated opinion was one about Jointness in the ADF and advocated either the 
irrelevance and removal of Service distinctiveness (‘threatening Jointness’) or the 
importance and preservation of Service distinctiveness (‘non-threatening Jointness’). 
Immediately following their responses to the stated opinion, participants were given a
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short scenario in which they were asked to imagine receiving a request for a certain 
piece of classified information from another member of the ADF. Following this, 
they were asked to respond to a number of questions assessing their perception of the 
requester (i.e., potential recipient) and their likely response to the request.
Materials and procedure
Four versions of the study questionnaire were developed, one corresponding to 
each o f the between-subjects conditions (see Appendix B). Each questionnaire was 
copied on DSTO letterhead and attached to a covering letter that invited participation 
in a research program examining the “knowledge environment” of the ADF. The 
covering letter also stated that participation was voluntary and that all information 
collected would remain anonymous. Questionnaires were randomly distributed to 
ADF personnel in the participating organizations, facilitated by the respective Chief 
of Staff or Commanding Officer.
Manipulation o f Jointness (Service identity threat)
Upon opening the questionnaire, participants were instructed to read “one of 
the most common opinions” held by members of the ADF about Jointness. In the 
‘threatening Jointness’ condition, the opinion read as follows:
In the ADF, we work as a Joint team - a team where Jointness sets the standards, 
a team that knows Jointness is inseparable from real capability...
The single-Service ethos is dead (or it should be dead). Retaining a ‘single- 
Service mentality’ is an excuse for not moving with the times. Ridding ourselves 
of single-Service traditions and replacing them with Joint values is the way to 
achieve responsiveness.
In Jointness, the potential of our forces is realised. Outdated ideas about ‘single- 
Service loyalty’ compromise that potential. Such loyalty has no relevance, as our 
future is Joint.
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In the ‘non-threatening Jointness’ condition, the stated opinion read as follows:
In the ADF we must work as a Joint team - one capable of integrating the unique 
abilities of each Service, one that can focus single-Service strengths into optimal 
capabilities.
Our single-Service traditions are the building blocks of Jointness. They are, after 
all, highly relevant to Service ethos and performance. Complementing strong 
Service traditions and ethos with Joint concepts, where appropriate, is the way to 
achieve responsiveness.
Jointness should not get in the way of the Services - it should help each Service 
to achieve the best overall outcomes.
In both conditions, the opinion was fabricated by the experimenter (working in 
consultation with serving and former ADF officers). Participants then responded to a 
series of questions on 7-point Likert-type scales.
Following this, participants were instructed to imagine the following scenario 
(bracketed terms indicate wording used to match questionnaires to participant’s 
Service):
You work in an [Army/Navy] Headquarters. As part of your usual work duties, 
you receive information about the readiness of certain force elements belonging 
to the [Army/Navy].
On this occasion, you are one of several [Army/Navy] personnel privy to 
classified information that details a temporary lack of readiness of some force 
elements. The reasons for this lack of readiness would be clear to [Army/Navy] 
personnel, however this information could be interpreted by other personnel in a 
way that would severely damage the image of the [Army/Navy].
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Manipulation o f risk to ADF
In the low risk to ADF condition, the scenario concluded with the following:
Elsewhere, a Joint area is preparing a report on how the principles of Jointness 
can be used to improve the readiness of force elements.
In the high risk to ADF condition, the scenario concluded with the following:
Elsewhere, a Joint area is preparing plans for an imminent Joint operational 
deployment which may require those affected force elements.
Manipulation o f the requester’s Service
After reading the end of scenario, participants were asked to imagine that they 
received a request for the potentially damaging information from a member of the said 
“Joint area” who held an adequate security clearance and who was from either their 
own Service or another Service. As the latter was manipulated within-participants, 
the ordering of the requester’s Service was counterbalanced across conditions (i.e., an 
own-Service requester then an other-Service requester, or vice versa). Participants 
then responded to a series of questions on 7-point Likert-type scales.
Dependent measures
At the very beginning of the questionnaire, participants responded to three 
items measuring the extent to which they identified with their Service: (1) “I identify 
with my Service”, (2) “I feel strong ties with the personnel of my Service”, and (3) “I 
am committed to the aims of my Service”.
Following the manipulation of Jointness, participants rated the extent to which 
they agreed with five statements. The first three measured the extent to which they 
endorsed the view of Jointness presented: (1) “I share this view of Jointness”; (2) 
“This view of Jointness should be widely accepted by all members of the ADF”, and 
(3) “This view of Jointness is compatible with the traditions of my Service”. The 
remaining two items measured the extent to which they believed that the view of 
Jointness presented was being promoted in the ADF context: (4) “This view of 
Jointness has been imported into the ADF from other military organizations (e.g., in
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Canada, U.S.)”; (5) “This view of Jointness is being pushed by some prominent parts 
of the ADF”. Collectively, these items served to check the manipulation of Service 
distinctiveness threat, where relatively low scores on items (1) - (3) (i.e., non­
endorsement) coupled with high scores on items (4) and (5) (i.e., perceived pressure 
to endorse) were assumed to reflect a state of ideological threat (Kenworthy, in press).
To check the manipulation of perceived risk to the ADF, participants were 
asked the following: “If this information is not provided to anyone in the Joint area, 
how likely do you think it is that key ADF objectives will be compromised?”.
Following the disclosure scenario, participants were asked to respond to six 
questions relating to their perception of, and likely response to the requester. The first 
question assessed the extent to which participants trusted the requester in this context:
(1) “To what extent would you trust this individual not to allow the information to 
damage the image of the [RAN/ARA?]” {trust). The remaining items assessed the 
extent to which participants would be likely to take various courses of action in 
response to the request. Specifically, they were asked how likely they would be to:
(2) “Provide the information to the requester without further consultation?” (disclose);
(3) “Delay responding to the request in anticipation of a change in readiness?” (delay);
(3) “Personally verify the requester’s clearance and/or ‘need-to-know’?” (verify);
(4) “Seek advice from Service peers before deciding whether to disclose?” (seek);
(5) “Pass the responsibility for dealing with the request up the chain of command?” 
(pass).
These questions were then repeated for the own/other-Service requester. Responses 
to all dependent measures were recorded on 7-point scales with end-points “Not at 
all” (1) and “Very likely” (7) or the relevant equivalents.
Finally, demographic information including age, sex, rank, length of ADF 
tenure, and level of security clearance was collected. Participants were thanked for 
their time and invited to provide comments.
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Results
Missing data
There were thirteen cases of missing data. In each case, the median score on 
the item for the sample as a whole was substituted.
Data reduction
As there was a high degree of inter-item reliability between the three items 
used to measure participants; identification with their Service, they were collapsed to 
create a single scale (a = .86). A high degree of inter-item reliability was also evident 
between the three items measuring the extent to which participants endorsed the view 
of Jointness presented. Hence, these were collapsed to create a single ‘Jointness 
endorsement’ scale (a = .90).
Manipulation checks
With respect to the manipulation of Jointness (i.e., Service identity threat) 
means on the Jointness endorsement scale differed significantly across the 
threatening/non-threatening Jointness conditions in the expected direction (Ms=3.38, 
5.08,/?<.001). However, inspection of frequency histograms showed that in the 
threatening Jointness condition, the distribution of responses on this scale was 
markedly bimodal (see Figure 6.1). In other words, a sizeable proportion of 
participants expressed a degree of non-endorsement of threatening Jointness and a 
comparable proportion a degree of endorsement for this view. Means on the item 
assessing the extent to which the view of Jointness presented was seen to be 
“imported” into the ADF from overseas did not differ across the threatening/non­
threatening Jointness conditions (Ms=4.23, 4.12, respectively), nor did those on the 
item assessing the extent to which it was seen to be being “pushed” by prominent 
parts of the ADF (Ms=4.81, 4.71, respectively). Therefore, our manipulation of 
Service distinctiveness threat was only marginally successful.
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not at all
Endorsement of threatening Jointness
very much
Figure 6.1 Frequency responses to threatening Jointness.
Confirming the success of the risk to ADF manipulation, non-disclosure was 
seen to present a greater risk to key ADF goals when the information was required for 
an imminent operation (M= 5.17) than for a report on how Jointness could improve 
force readiness (M= 4.36; /(84) = 2.34,/?<.05). However, it should be noted that both 
means are moderate and thus provide a somewhat weaker manipulation of high and 
low risk than was desired.
Analysis o f variance (ANOVA)
Means and standard deviations for the key dependent measures (courses of 
action) are shown in Table 6.1.
Table 6.1
Means and standard deviations for courses of action as a function of Jointness and 
risk to ADF.
Jointness Threatening Non-threatening
Risk to ADF High Low High Low
Own Service requester
Course of action
Trust 4.54 4.75 4.37 4.32
( 1 .6 7 ) ( 1 .5 7 ) ( 1 .8 0 ) ( 1 .7 6 )
Disclose 3.33 3.21 3.42 2.23
( 2 . 18 ) ( 1 . 8 9 ) ( 1 .7 1 ) ( 1 .3 4 )
Delay 2.58 2.96 3.21 3.91
( 1 . 8 4 ) ( 1 .5 2 ) ( 2 .0 2 ) ( 1 -9 5 )
Verify 5.75 5.62 5.26 6.05
( 1 .7 8 ) ( 1 .4 4 ) ( 1 .6 6 ) ( 1 .4 3 )
Seek 5.00 5.58 4.89 5.32
( 2 .0 6 ) ( 1 .6 4 ) ( 1 .8 2 ) ( 1 .9 4 )
Pass 4.46 4.46 4.11 4.77
( 2 .3 0 ) ( 1 .9 8 ) ( 2 .0 8 ) ( 1 .7 2 )
Other Service requester
Trust 3.75 3.58 3.42 3.18
( 1.7 5 ) ( 1 .6 1 ) ( 1 .6 1 ) ( 1 .7 1 )
Disclose 3.04 2.87 2.89 2.18
( 2 . 14 ) ( 1 .7 3 ) ( 1.6 3 ) ( 1 .5 6 )
Delay 3.21 3.29 3.32 4.00
( 2 . 19 ) ( 1 .7 8 ) ( 2 . 14 ) ( 1 .9 0 )
Verify 5.92 6.00 5.32 5.91
( 1 .6 7 ) ( 1 .2 5 ) ( 1 .4 6 ) ( 1 .6 0 )
Seek 5.17 5.54 4.79 5.27
( 2 . 18 ) ( 1 .7 7 ) ( 2 . 10 ) ( 2 . 12 )
Pass 4.75 4.96 4.32 5.00
( 2 .3 1 ) ( 1 .9 0 ) ( 2 .2 4 ) ( 1 .9 5 )
Scores for key dependent measures were submitted to a 2 (requester’s Service: 
own/other) x 2 (Jointness: threatening/non-threatening) x 2 (risk to ADF: low/high) 
mixed within-between participants ANOVA (see Table 6.2).
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Table 6.2
ANOVA statistics for courses o f action as a function o f Jointness, risk to ADF, and 
requester ’s Service.
Source df F >i2 P
Between participants
Jointness (J) 1 0.56 .01 .46
Risk (R) 1 1.17 .01 .28
JxR 1 0.15 .00 .70
Subjects within-group error 85 (6.78)
Within participants
Requester’s Service (S) 1 3.83 .04 .05*
SxJ 1 2.85 .03 .10
SxR 1 0.07 .00 .79
S x J x R 1 0.28 .00 .59
S x Subjects within group error 85 (0.71)
Note. Values enclosed in parentheses represent mean square errors. 
*p = .05;
Results of this analysis revealed a main effect for the requester’s Service 
(F(i,85) = 3.83, p =.05) of small effect size. There were no other main effects or 
interactions, hence we found no support for HI.
In order to more fully investigate the impact of the requester’s Service 
manipulation, scores on key dependent measures were collapsed across between- 
participants factors and submitted to a 2 (requester’s Service: own/other) x 6 
(potential courses of action) repeated measures ANOVA. Results indicated no main 
effect for requester’s Service but a significant interaction between requester’s Service 
and the likely course of action (F(i,88)= 16.96,/?<.001; rf = .16). Post-hoc analysis 
revealed that compared to another-Service requester, participants: trusted an own- 
Service requester more (Ms = 3.49, 4.51,/?<.001); were more likely to provide the 
information to own-Service requester without further delay (Ms = 2.75, 3.04, /?<.05); 
were less likely to delay responding to an own-Service requester (Ms = 3.45, 3.15, 
/?<.01); and were less likely to pass responsibility for dealing with the request from an
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own-Service requester up the chain-of-command (Ms = 4.78, 4.46, /?<.001).
However, the requester’s Service had no impact on the likelihood of verifying the 
requester’s security clearance and/or need to know details, or seeking advice from 
one’s Service peers on how the deal with the request.
Correlational analyses were conducted in order to examine any association 
between the perceived trustworthiness of own- and Other-Service requesters and the 
potential courses of action. Results are presented in Table 6.3.
Table 6.3
Correlations between trust in own- and Other-Service requesters and course o f  action.
Course of action
Provide Delay Verify Seek Upchain
Trust (own-Service requester) .54** -.08 -.10 -.21 -.28**
Trust (other-Service requester) .50** -.14 -.41** -.28** -.45**
**p < .01
For both own and Other-Service requesters, trust was positively related to the 
likelihood of providing the information without delay and negatively related to the 
likelihood of passing the request up the chain of command. However, for Other- 
Service requesters, trust was also related to the likelihood of verifying security 
clearance and/or need-to-know details and seeking advice about how to deal with the 
request.
Discussion
The aim of Study 2 was to test the first of our hypotheses of problematic non­
disclosure derived from the social identity perspective. It was hypothesized that the 
degree of problematic non-disclosure of classified information likely to surface 
around Service boundaries would vary to the extent to which participants felt that the 
distinctiveness of their Service was threatened. We reasoned that when the ideology 
of Jointness is viewed as a threat to Service distinctiveness, as many have recently 
argued (e.g., Ankersen, 1998; Codner, 1998; Trainor, 1993-4), participants’ disclosure
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intentions would be more Service-loyal than when Jointness is viewed as preserving 
or promoting Service distinctiveness. We also expected this pattern to be moderated 
by the degree of risk to the ADF associated with non-disclosure and the level of 
participant identification with their Service (HI).
Yet, support for HI was not forthcoming in that there was no interaction 
between the requester’s Service, the manipulation of Jointness, and risk to the ADF on 
participants’ likely courses of action. Indeed, our manipulation checks suggested that 
both manipulations obtained less than ideal support. Importantly, these checks 
indicated that “threatening Jointness” did not appear to constitute a clear threat to 
Service identity. Those participants who were presented with this view of Jointness 
could be divided into two comparable groups: those expressing some degree of 
resistance to the view and those expressing some degree of support for it. Further, 
findings indicated that our sample of participants did not see threatening Jointness as 
an ideology that was being imported or “pushed” into the ADF any more than non­
threatening Jointness. In the face of these results, it was difficult to conclude that 
Jointness constitutes a clear threat to Service identity and one might argue that this 
was confirmed by the lack of any subsequent effects on participants’ disclosure 
intentions. While the manipulation of risk to the ADF (associated with non­
disclosure) was successful, we can only generalise our results to a scenario of 
moderate risk.
There are a number of plausible reasons why threatening Jointness did not 
constitute a clear threat to Service identity. One straightforward possibility is that 
threatening Jointness was simply not related to those dimensions of Service identity 
referred to (see Turner, 1978a). We may, for instance, have been more successful in 
evoking a Service distinctiveness threat by undermining other dimensions likely to be 
central in this respect, such as Service roles or unique capabilities rather than Service 
ethos, traditions, and values. However, given that these ethos, traditions, and values 
are frequently cited as core elements of military affiliation (see Baker, 1995; 
Beaumont, 1993), it is hard to accept they are irrelevant or ‘secondary’ aspects of 
Service identity. A second and related possibility is that Jointness (in any form) is 
viewed as a task-specific (i.e., operational) ideology and that identity issues may not 
have the same potency in this task-oriented environment that they might do in other
128
settings that are less ‘outcome-focused’. A third, and again related possibility may lie 
in the perceived interdependence of the Services. Specifically, ADF personnel may 
not have wished to express a lack of endorsement for either view presented because of 
the belief that doing so would undermine a system upon which organizational success 
as a whole depends (Behm et al., 2001; Dunn, 1995; Hinge, 1996; see also Hornsey & 
Hogg, 2000a). The following comment provided by one participant contains elements 
of these ideas:
Joint is good for operations and capability. Joint customs and traditions will 
never work. In most cases, when you say Joint to Navy, that means Army is in 
charge. (Participant 71)
Another participant similar sentiments with respect to the Army that reflected parts of 
HI:
While I respect the Army as an equal Service, I am concerned that both the Navy 
and the Air Force are losing their identity due to their absolute saturation in the 
Army command and the Army way of doing things. (Participant 23)
Whatever the case, the finding that a significant proportion of participants expressed a 
degree of support for threatening Jointness could be seen to mark a shift away from 
the strong resistance it has encountered previously.
While no support was found for HI, our results here are intriguing in another 
respect. Specifically, they indicate that problematic non-disclosure of classified 
information, this time in the context of request relationships, was likely to surface 
around Service boundaries. However, just as the results of Study 1 showed that the 
Service-loyalty effect was qualified by the prospect of formal punishment (i.e., it only 
emerged when punishment was not expected) our results here do not represent a full 
and robust Service-loyalty effect. Specifically, Service-loyal disclosure intentions 
were qualified by the particular course of action participants indicated they would be 
likely to take. When the requester of classified and ‘Service sensitive’ information 
was from within one’s Service, participants trusted them more, were more likely to 
provide the information without delay, were less likely to delay responding, and were 
less likely to pass responsibility up the chain of command than when the requester
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was from another Service. However, Service membership did not affect the 
likelihood of the participants verifying clearance and/or need to know details, nor 
seeking advice about how to deal with the request.
While these qualified results do speak to the role of Service affiliation, caution 
must be taken before concluding that there is something about Service boundaries, in 
and o f themselves, that gives rise to problematic non-disclosure of classified 
information. Specifically, it is possible that by emphasizing the potential for the 
classified information in question to be “interpreted by other Service personnel” in a 
way that could harm one’s Service, our operationalization of ‘Service-sensitive’ 
classified information may have made non-disclosure to Other-Service personnel 
perfectly justifiable. It is also possible that the potency of this prospect eliminated the 
salience of any Joint identity that emerged beforehand. Thus, it is necessary to test 
whether problematic non-disclosure of classified and Sendee sensitive information is 
still likely to surface around Service boundaries when these justifications are removed 
from the disclosure scenario, and when the desired social identity (i.e., level of self­
categorization) can be expected, beyond reasonable doubt, to be salient.
A final and important point deserves mention. The disclosure scenario 
employed in Study 2 was one in which the requester had an adequate level security- 
clearance and, arguably, a legitimate ‘need to know’ the information requested. In the 
low-risk condition, the requester belonged to a “Joint area” and asked for the 
information in the process of preparing a report about how force readiness could be 
improved. In the high risk condition, the request emanated from an individual in a 
“Joint area” who was preparing plans for an imminent ADF deployment. Our finding 
that participants were Service-loyal in many of their disclosure intentions however 
suggests that the perceived need to know of the requester may have varied according 
to their Service membership. That, is, own-Service requesters may have been 
perceived to have a greater need to know the information than other-Service 
requesters, regardless of what the information was required for. In Study 2, an insight 
into how psychologically speaking, the requester’s Service might influence (at least 
partly) their need to know is provided by the association between trust in the requester 
and the various courses of action likely to be taken. Results showed that trust was 
strongly related to a number of courses of action that might be taken in response to a
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request for classified information from both own-and Other-Service requesters, 
notably the likelihood of providing the information without further delay and of 
passing responsibility for dealing with the request up the chain of command. 
However, trust (or more accurately a lack of trust) in an Other-Service requesters was 
additionally related to the likelihood that one would verify their security clearance 
and/or need to know details and seek advice from one’s peers about whether to 
disclose or not. At this point then, it would appear necessary to determine whether 
perceived need to know does vary with the prevailing social-psychological context, 
specifically the requester’s perceived trustworthiness.
In summary, the findings of Study 2 suggest that Jointness is not likely to 
constitute a vehicle that undermines Service distinctiveness and in doing so, evoke 
Service-loyal disclosure outcomes. In other words, problematic non-disclosure 
around the ADF’s Service boundaries do not appear to be driven by a psychological 
process of Service identity threat. However, this does not imply that social identity 
processes should be disregarded insofar as gaining an insight into when and why 
problematic non-disclosure of classified information may surface around Service 
boundaries. It may be that, rather than being driven by identity threat, problematic 
non-disclosure emerges from a ‘self-categorical gulf between the potential discloser 
and recipient. We test this hypothesis in Study 3.
Study 3 
Introduction
As outlined above, a core principle of the social identity perspective is that an 
individual’s social identities are self-categorizations, that is, they represent 
categorizations of the self (Onorato & Turner, 2001, 2002; Turner & Onorato, 1999). 
According to self-categorization theory, when a self-category becomes salient, a 
process of depersonalization occurs in which the self is perceived as similar and 
equivalent (i.e., categorically interchangeable) with other ingroup members and 
different from outgroup group members (Turner et al., 1987). It is the process of 
depersonalization that is thought to make possible all collective and cooperative 
behaviour by transforming “my” interests into “our” interests.
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In the social identity literature, a considerable amount of work has shown that 
ingroup favouritism can be reduced by manipulating the level of inclusiveness of the 
salient self-category, that is, changing who people perceive to be ingroup and 
outgroup members at any given time (e.g., Dovidio et ah, 1997; Gaertner, Mann, 
Murrell, & Dovidio, 1989; Kessler & Mummendey, 2001). The basic hypothesis 
common to this work is that ingroup favouritism can be overturned if the salience of 
the existing “them and us” categorization can be degraded and a new ingroup 
categorization that includes members of the former outgroup can be made salient 
(Seta, Seta, & Culver, 2000; see also Gaertner et ah, 2000). In these circles, this 
process is commonly referred to as recategorization (Gaertner et ah, 1993; Seta et ah, 
2000).
On the basis of these ideas it could be argued, that like non-cooperation more 
generally, problematic non-disclosure of classified information may be driven by the 
perceived ingroup/outgroup memberships that are salient for the potential discloser at 
the time of their decision-making. Thus, the extent to which problematic non­
disclosure of classified information is likely to emerge around Service boundaries 
could be expected to vary according to whether one’s Service represents the salient 
level of self-categorization when contemplating the disclosure of classified and 
Service-sensitive information. In this vein, we can conceptualise Service membership 
as a kind of self-categorical gulf that creates a basis for problematic non-disclosure 
around Service boundaries. Our intention in this study is to explore the possibility of 
bridging this self-categorical gulf by making both Services part of the same ingroup. 
Conventionally, this would be achieved by having group members categorise 
themselves as belonging to the same superordinate group. In this case however, we 
propose to bridge this self-categorical gulf by forming an alternative common group 
membership based on a shared opinion (see McGarty & Bliuc, 2004). Importantly, 
this shared opinion group membership should be one where the meaning of the group 
and its implied norms convey a sense of common purpose and cooperation. Of 
course, the same could be implied by making salient the superordinate category 
“ADF” but as we have established, this superordinate identity is potentially 
problematic. For example, Navy and Air Force personnel know that are supposed to 
cooperate with the Army in the context of, say, ADF operations, but they may also
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believe that the latter will seek to claim a superior status and dominate them. In other 
words, there is a pre-existing set of expectations that may impede cooperative 
disclosure. The alternative proposed here is to craft an identity that should promote 
cooperative disclosure outcomes. In this case, this would be achieved by defining 
other-Service requesters as a “supporter” of the potential discloser’s Service, that is, 
as a member of an opinion-based group that is defined by a favourable attitude toward 
the potential discloser’s Service meaning that both discloser and recipient are “on the 
same team”.
Formally, our hypotheses can be summarised as follows:
H I. Perceived need to know and disclosure intentions will be more cooperative 
when the requester is perceived as an ingroup rather than an outgroup member.
We may also expect:
H2. Perceived need to know and disclosure intentions will be more cooperative 
when the requester is from one’s own Service than from another Service.
Importantly, we also expect there to be an interaction between these factors, in that:
H3. Service-loyal disclosure outcomes will be accentuated when the requester is an 
outgroup member and attenuated when the requester is an ingroup member.
Also, we can now hypothesize that:
H4. The perceived need to know of the requester will be positively related to the 
extent to which they are perceived to be trustworthy.
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Method
Participants and design
One hundred and ninety-six ADF personnel took part in Study 3. This 
comprised 82 members of the RAN, 92 members of the ARA, and 22 members of the 
RAAF. Participants were drawn from Maritime and Land Headquarters (MHQ,
LHQ), the Capability Systems Staff (CSS) and the Knowledge Systems Staff (KSS). 
Again, most were men (87%) and the mean age was 38 years. The majority were of 
Major equivalent rank or above (78%), with the remainder being of Captain (Army) 
equivalent rank or below (21%) or of the non-commissioned ranks (1%). Participants 
had served in the ADF for an average of 19 years and most (76%) held a TOP 
SECRET security clearance.
The study had a 2 (requester’s opinion: supporter/non-supporter) x 2 
(requester’s Service: own/other) design with both independent variables manipulated 
between-participants.
Participants were given a questionnaire in which they were presented with a 
view of their Service and a short scenario which provided the backdrop to a number of 
questions. The view was an opinion that distinguished “supporters” of the 
participant’s Service by emphasizing those dimensions upon which this Service was 
respected insofar as its contribution to Australia’s defence. Immediately following 
their responses to the opinion, participants were given a short scenario in which they 
were asked to imagine receiving a request for certain classified information from 
another member of the ADF. Following this, they were asked to respond to a number 
of questions assessing their perception of the requestor (i.e., the potential recipient) 
and their likely response to the request.
Materials and procedure
Four versions of the study questionnaire were developed, one corresponding to 
each of the between-subjects conditions (see Appendix C). Each questionnaire was 
copied on DSTO letterhead and attached was a covering letter which invited
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participation in a research program examining the “knowledge environment” of the 
ADF. The covering letter also stated that participation was voluntary and that all 
information collected would be anonymous. Questionnaires were randomly 
distributed to ADF personnel in the participating organizations facilitated by the Chief 
of Staff or Commanding Officer.
Establishment o f  the opinion-based group
Written instructions informed participants that there were “competing views” 
of their Service and that one view which distinguished “supporters” was presented for 
them below. This view read as follows (questionnaires were matched to participant’s 
Service, the Army example is shown below* 11):
The Australian Army makes a first-rate contribution toward the defence of our 
national interests. The complexities of the land environment demand exceptional 
dedication, expertise, and dependability. The Army has provided, and continues 
to provide these qualities to the ADF. It has built a reputation for excellence as a 
land power that is underscored by its values of courage, initiative, and teamwork.
Manipulation o f  requester ’s opinion and Service
After responding to the opinion presented above, participants were instructed 
to imagine a disclosure scenario involving themselves and another member of the 
ADF known as ‘Person X ’. This person was either a supporter or non-supporter of 
the participant’s Service and either belonged or did not belong to the participant’s 
Service. The scenario was presented in point form as follows (bracketed terms 
indicate wording of different conditions, the army example is shown below12):
• Person X is a member of the [Army/belongs to one of the other Services], and is 
working on a report about ADF readiness.
• You know that Person X [is/is not] a supporter of the Army -  that is, they 
genuinely [hold/do not hold] the view of the Army presented earlier.
10. Respective Service labels, dimensions (i.e., land/maritime/air) and values varied accordingly.
11. Respective Service labels varied accordingly.
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• Person X asks you for classified information about the readiness of some Army 
force elements (assume you’re routinely privy to this information). Person X has 
the appropriate level security clearance.
• The information that Person X requests contains details about force elements 
being temporarily at unsatisfactory levels of readiness. The information could 
damage the image of the Army if not managed with care.
Dependent measures
At the very beginning of the questionnaire, participants responded to three 
items measuring the extent to which they identified with their Service. These items 
were identical to those employed in Study 2.
Following the establishment of the opinion-based group, participants were 
asked to indicate whether they: (1) shared, or (2) did not share this view of their 
Service. They were also asked to rate the extent to which they agreed with two 
statements included to increase the salience of membership of the opinion-based 
group: (1) “I am confident that this view of the [RAN/RAAF/Army] truly captures my 
own personal beliefs”, and (2) “I see myself as a supporter of the [RAN/RAAF/ 
Army]”.
Following the disclosure scenario, participants were asked to respond to 12 
questions. The first three questions served as a check of the manipulation of the 
shared opinion group, that is, whether participants saw Person X as an ingroup 
member: (1) “To what extent would you feel that Person X respected the 
[RAN/RAAF/Army]?”; (2) “To what extent would you feel that you and Person X 
were on the same side?”; and (3) “To what extent would you feel that you and Person 
X were working toward a common goal?”.
Two items served to measure participants’ perceptions of Person X ’s need-to- 
know: (1) “How legitimate would you consider Person X ’s ‘need to know’ the 
information?”, and (2) “How important do you think it is that Person X obtain this 
information?”. One item measured the extent to which participants viewed Person X
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as trustworthy in this context: “How confident would you be that Person X would 
manage this information with care?”.
The next five questions mirrored those employed in Study 2 to measure the 
likelihood of the participant taking various courses of action. Specifically, they were 
asked how likely they would be to:
(1) “Provide the information to the requester without further delay?” (disclose);
(2) “Delay responding to the request until readiness circumstances changed?” (<delay);
(3) “Go to considerable lengths to verify the requester’s security clearance?” (verify);
(4) “Seek advice from Service peers about how to deal with the request?” (advice);
(5) “Pass the responsibility for handling the request up the chain of command?” (pass).
A sixth and final question was added regarding the participant’s likelihood of 
respecting the concerns of Person X if the situation were reversed: (6) “How likely 
would you be to respect the concerns of Person X if the situation were to be 
reversed?” (reciprocate). Responses to all dependent measures were recorded on 7- 
point scales with end-points “Not at all” (1) and “Very likely” (7) or the relevant 
equivalents.
Finally, demographic information including age, sex, rank, length of ADF 
tenure, and level of security clearance was collected. Participants were then thanked 
for their time and invited to write comments.
Results
Missing data
There were 11 cases of missing data. In each case, the median score on the 
item for the sample as a whole was substituted.
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Data reduction
There were 18 participants who indicated that that did not share the view that 
defined supporters of their Service. Additionally, 3 participants failed to respond to 
the question as to whether they agreed with this view or not. These participants were 
excluded from further analyses leaving a total sample of 175 participants.
As there was a high degree of inter-item reliability between the three items 
used to measure participants’ identification with their Service, they were collapsed to 
create a single scale (a = .86). A high degree of inter-item reliability was also present 
between the two items measuring participants’ perceptions of the Person X’s need to 
know. Hence, these were collapsed to create a single perceived need to know scale (a 
= .92).
Manipulation checks
Confirming the success of the shared opinion group manipulation, results 
showed that when Person X was a ‘supporter’, they were: (1) considered more 
respectful of the participant’s Service than when they were not a supporter (Ms =
5.47, 3.18; /(173) = 12.63; p < .001); (2) participants felt to a greater extent they were 
on the same side as Person X than when they were not a supporter (Ms = 5.31, 3.55;
/(173) = 8.01; p < .001); and (3) participants felt to a greater extent that they and 
Person X were working toward a ‘common goal’ than when they were not a supporter 
(M= 5.33, 3.74; ?(173) = 7.46;p  < .001).
Analysis o f variance
Scores on dependent variables were submitted to 2 (requester’s opinion: 
supporter/non-supporter) x 2 (requester’s Service: own/other) analysis of variance 
(ANOVA). Means, standard deviations, and F-values are presented in Table 6.4
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Table 6.4
Means, standard deviations and F-values for dependent measures as a function o f 
requester ’s Service and requester ’s opinion.
Requester’s Service Own Other F-values
Requester’s Supporter Non-supporter Supporter Non-supporter RS RO RS x RO
Opinion
Item (if scale no. items)
Need to know (2) 5.49 5.14 5.08 4.45 4.82* 3.80* 0.10
(1.54) (1.63) (1.60) (1.77)
Trust 5.64 4.37 4.63 3.44 18.95*** 30.29*** 0.07
(1.34) (1.56) (1.20) (1.69)
Disclose 5.30 4.97 4.42 4.16 9.72** 1.16 0.28
(1.68) (1.60) (1.65) (2.06)
Delay 2.32 2.74 2.74 2.50 0.14 0.13 0.93
(1.67) (1.70) (1.71) (1.43)
Verify 3.72 4.37 4.26 4.22 0.33 0.86 0.89
(2.31) (2.02) (2.14) (2.13)
Seek 3.70 3.94 4.40 4.42 3.70 0.19 0.04
(2.25) (2.04) (1.48) (2.09)
Pass 3.81 3.71 3.91 4.34 1.43 0.31 1.26
(2.28) (2.02) (1.54) (2.01)
Reciprocate 5.70 4.94 5.12 4.76 3.44 7.25** 1.85
(1.08) (1.39) (1.28) (1.61)
Note: RS = Requester’s Service; RO= Requester’s opinion 
*p < .05; **p<. 01; ***/?<-001.
A main effect for the requester’s opinion was evident on three dependent 
measures. The first related to the perceived need-to-know of Person X (F(i(i7i) = 3.80, 
/><.05; r\2 = .02). Participants rated Person X’s need to know as greater when they 
were a ‘supporter’ (M= 5.29) than when they were a non-supporter (M= 4.80). The 
second effect related to the perceived trustworthiness of Person X (.F(i,i7i) = 30.29, 
/K.001; r|2 = .15) whereby Person X was considered more trustworthy when they were 
a supporter than a non-supporter (M =5.13;M =3.91, respectively). The third effect 
related to participants’ willingness to respect the concerns of Person X of the situation 
were reversed i,i71) = 7.25,/?<.01; q2 = .04). Here, participants were more likely to 
respect the concerns of Person X if the situation were reversed when Person X was a 
supporter than when they were a non-supporter (M= 5.41; M= 4.85, respectively). 
However, the manipulation of requester’s Service did not affect the extent to which
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participants were likely to disclose without delay. Thus, only partial support was 
found for HI.
A main effect for requester’s Service was evident on three dependent 
measures. The first of these related to the perceived need-to-know of Person X 
CF(i,ni) = 4.82,/?<.05; rp = .03). Specifically, participants rated Person X ’s need-to- 
know to be significantly greater when they were from their own Service (M=  5.32) 
than when they were from another Service (M=  4.76). The second effect related to 
the perceived trustworthiness of Person X (F(i,i7 i) = 18.95,/?<.001; r|2 = .10). Here, 
participants rated Person X as more trustworthy when they belonged to their Service 
(M = 5.01) than when they belonged to another Service (M = 4.03). The third effect 
related to participants’ intentions of providing the information without delay (F(iti7 i) = 
9.72, /?<.001; rj2 = .05). Specifically, participants indicated that they were more likely 
to disclose the information immediately when Person X belonged to their own Service 
(M =5.14) than when they belonged to another Service (M = 4.29). Thus, support 
was found for H2.
No significant interactions between the variables were evident and thus, no 
support was found for H3.
Correlations
In order to examine the relationship between perceived need to know, 
perceived trustworthiness and the various courses of action, a correlational analysis 
was performed. Correlations are shown in Table 6.5. The extent to which the 
requester was perceived to have a need to know was positively correlated with the 
extent to which they were trusted to manage the information with care. Therefore, 
support was found for H4. Perceived need-to-know was also highly correlated with 
the likelihood of disclosing the information with further delay, and negatively 
correlated with all other courses of action, other than for reciprocate. The same 
pattern was evident for the perceived trustworthiness of the requester, however the 
correlation coefficients were generally slightly lower.
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Table 6.5
Correlations between perceived need to know, perceived trust, and courses o f action.
Course of action
Item (if scale no. items) 1 2 Provide Delay Verify Advice Pass Reciprocate
1. Perceived need to know (2) — .63** .84** _ 4 4 ** -.18** -.2 0 ** -.40** .2 2 **
2. Perceived trust — .59** -.35** -.16* -.24** -.27** .2 2 **
* * p <  . 01 .
Discussion
The aim of Study 3 was to test the second of our general hypotheses of 
problematic non-disclosure derived from the social identity perspective. Here, it was 
argued that like non-cooperation more generally, problematic non-disclosure of 
classified information is driven by the perceived ingroup/outgroup memberships that 
are salient for the potential discloser of classified information at the time of their 
decision-making. Thus, we expected a main effect on disclosure outcomes for shared 
social identity (HI). Results supported HI to the degree that when participants 
perceived the requester of classified information as an ingroup member (i.e., a 
‘supporter of their Service’) they rated them as more trustworthy and were more likely 
to reciprocate the concerns of the requester if the tables were to be turned. Moreover, 
participants perceived the need to know of an ingroup requester to be greater than that 
of an outgroup requester. Yet, perceived ingroup membership did not influence other 
key dependent measures, particularly the likelihood of disclosing the information to 
the requester without further delay. Thus only partial support was found for H I.
These findings suggest that while a salient and shared identity goes some way to 
promoting cooperative disclosure outcomes, there is a limit to the extent to which this 
is likely to be so, as suggested in the comments of one participant:
If Person X has appropriate clearance (given) and a legitimate need-to-know, 
there should be no question of withholding information! Their personal view of 
the RAN should not be an issue. (Participant 145).
We also hypothesized was that a main effect would be observed for the 
requester’s Service (H2). While this hypothesis was not supported across all
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dependent measures, it was supported on key measures. That is, when the requester 
was from one’s Service rather than another Service, participants rated them as more 
trustworthy and as having a greater need to know than when the requester was from 
another Service. Most importantly perhaps, participants were more likely to disclose 
the information without delay when the requester belonged to their Service than to 
another Sendee. These results mirror those yielded in Study 2 in that a Service- 
loyalty effect was found on certain courses of action but not others. A parallel can 
also be drawn here between the size of these effects. For each of the effects listed 
above, the Service-loyalty effect remained small, just as it did in Study 2. There is 
arguably a tension within this pattern of results. One the one hand, problematic non­
disclosure of classified information appears likely to surface around Service 
boundaries by impacting the perceived need to know of its potential recipient. On the 
other hand however, these effects have been shown to be consistently small to date, 
suggesting that it is not robust and inherent to the ADF.
Our third hypothesis was that the effects for requester’s opinion and the 
requester’s Service would interact in that Service-loyal disclosure outcomes would be 
accentuated when the requester was an outgroup member and attenuated when the 
requester was an ingroup member (H3). However support for H3 was not found for 
any of the dependent variables. This findings would appear to confirm the idea that 
Service-loyal disclosure outcomes are not driven by concerns relating to participants’ 
Service identity. Our final hypothesis was that the perceived need to know of the 
requester would vary to the extent to which they were perceived to be trustworthy, 
and be predictive of disclosure intentions (H4). Results supported this hypothesis, 
providing empirical evidence that perceived need to know did indeed vary according 
to the prevailing social-psychological context.
General conclusions
On the basis of the two studies presented in this chapter, we must reject the 
two hypothesis of problematic non-disclosure derived from the social identity 
perspective in Chapter 5. In so doing, it is now possible to draw some general 
conclusions about the psychology of problematic non-disclosure in the ADF. First, 
the findings of Study 2 suggest that Jointness is neither part of the problem and
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therefore, nor can it be part of its solution. Second, the findings of Study 3 suggest 
that problematic non-disclosure of classified information in the ADF does not 
represent a self-categorical gulf between ADF personnel in terms of their Service 
identities. Together however, the failure of these studies to adequately account for the 
psychology of problematic non-disclosure draws attention to a broader and more 
significant point. That is, it is now possible to conclude that problematic non­
disclosure of the form we have investigated here is not driven by personnel’s concerns 
about their Service identity. In other words, the findings of these studies suggest that 
problematic non-disclosure is not a form of inter-Service rivalry or ‘tribalism’ driven 
by issues relating to Service identity.
Having said that, it must be acknowledged that social identification processes 
may play a limited role in shaping the disclosure environment. Specifically, a shared 
and salient social identity was found to heighten the perceived trustworthiness of the 
requester as well as their perceived need to know the information. However, a shared 
social identity did not influence the extent to which participants in this Study rated 
themselves as likely to disclose the information to the requester without further delay. 
Thus, we could conclude that while overtures to a shared social identity may make the 
general environment more cooperative in nature, they are unlikely to lead to an shift 
actual disclosure outcomes.
The findings of Study 3 also flesh out arguments made in earlier in Chapter 2 
regarding the determination of another’s need to know. We have demonstrated in 
Study 3 that the perceived need to know of the potential recipient of Service-sensitive 
classified information varies to the extent to which they trust the requester. 
Additionally, it was also the case that perceived need to know varied in Service-loyal 
terms, that is, according to whether the potential discloser and recipient belonged to 
the same Service. At this point, attention must now be directed more fully how both 
need to know and disclosure intentions are influenced by the second master-factor 
derived in Chapter 3, that is, perceived risk.
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Chapter 7
Disclosure as decision-making under risk: 
The guardedness hypothesis
Introduction
Our early findings suggested that problematic non-disclosure of classified 
information in the ADF may be likely to surface around the organization’s Service 
boundaries. In Chapter 6, we tested two hypotheses of non-disclosure with this in 
mind, both derived from the social identity perspective. The first focused on the 
notion o f ‘social identity threat’ (Branscombe et al., 1999; Jetten, 1999) where it was 
argued that problematic non-disclosure o f ‘Service-sensitive’ classified information 
across Service boundaries is driven by a threat to Service distinctiveness evoked by 
Jointness. According to this hypothesis, a conception of Jointness that undermines 
Service distinctiveness should accentuate ‘Service-loyal’ disclosure outcomes while 
one that highlights Service distinctiveness should attenuate such outcomes. The 
second hypothesis held that problematic non-disclosure of classified information 
across Service boundaries reflects a self-categorical gulf between the organization’s 
army, navy, and air force personnel that is salient at the time of the disclosure 
decision. Here, we expected to attenuate any Service-loyal disclosure outcomes by 
making salient an alternative self-category that allowed the potential discloser to view 
a requester from another-Service as an ingroup member.
Only partial support was forthcoming for the hypotheses of Studies 2 and 3. 
Most importantly, our findings showed that Jointness is unlikely to be part of any 
non-disclosure problem. However, the extent to which the potential discloser of 
‘Service sensitive’ classified information perceives the potential recipient to be an 
outgroup member may play some limited role in this phenomenon. Regardless of 
their Service, an outgroup requester was trusted less than an ingroup member and was 
seen to have less of a need to know the information than an ingroup member. This 
latter finding constituted our first piece of empirical evidence showing how the 
determination of another’s need to know classified information will vary according to
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the social-psychological context. Yet, our manipulation of social identity in Study 3 
had no direct effect on the disclosure intentions of participants. That is, they were no 
more likely to disclose the information without further delay for an ingroup requester 
than for an outgroup requester. Our results also showed that a shared and salient 
social identity was not sufficient to overturn Service-loyal disclosure perceptions and 
intentions. Our findings indicated that when the participant and the requester were 
from different Services, the former perceived the latter to be less trustworthy and they 
were less prepared to disclose to them without further delay than when they were 
from one and the same Service. Moreover, ‘other-Service’ requesters were attributed 
with less need to know the information than ‘own-Service’ requesters. Thus, at the 
end of Chapter 6 we were able to conclude that the problematic non-disclosure of the 
type examined here is not grounded solely in psychological issues concerning Service 
identity.
In this chapter, we move away from the social identity perspective as an 
explanatory framework of problematic non-disclosure. Our plan now is to attempt to 
gain further insights into the psychology of problematic non-disclosure by focusing on 
the second of the master factors derived from Chapter 3, that is, perceived risk. In the 
pilot and Study 1, we examined how risk associated with the consequences of not 
disclosing affected decisions about breaching national security. At this point, it is 
necessary to examine how risk relating to the expected consequences of disclosing is 
likely to affect perception of and responses to requests for Service-sensitive classified 
information, and if these differ for own- and other-Service requesters.
The purpose of this chapter is to review the theoretical and empirical progress 
that has been made in psychology regarding risk and its impact on decision-making. 
Though it is acknowledged, it is not intended here to review the wider literature on 
risk, that is, the literature beyond the scope of psychology. Instead, our focus here is 
to cast disclosure and non-disclosure as a type of decision-making, and thus address 
only the field of ‘decision-making under risk’. There are a many theories of decision­
making under risk however our focus here will be on three that have held sway in 
psychology at one time or another: subjective expected utility theory (Savage, 1954; 
von Neumann & Morgenstern, \9AA), prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), 
and regret theory (Bell, 1982; Loomes & Sugden, 1982). Each spans psychology,
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economics, and mathematics, however it is their core psychological hypotheses that 
are of interest. These hypotheses along with the support they have obtained in studies 
of decision-making in organizational contexts is reviewed. In order to help us 
determine what risks ADF personnel are likely to perceive to be involved in the 
disclosure of classified information to each other, we also turn to the sociological 
literature on secrecy. The chapter then concludes with a general hypothesis of 
problematic non-disclosure of classified information in the ADF context.
Decision making under risk: Theoretical & organizational perspectives
Like most psychological concepts, risk suffers from a degree of definitional 
fluidity (Yates & Stone, 1992). Generally speaking, risk is defined as a type of 
uncertainty that includes the prospect of loss (Smithson, 1994). Thus, it relates to 
circumstances where people perceive the consequences of their decision-making to 
include the probability of negative outcomes - the more negative the outcome, the 
greater the risk (Vlek & Stallen, 1980; Yates & Stone, 1992). However, the term is 
also used to refer to variance in the probability of outcomes irrespective of whether 
these outcomes are positive or negative (Forlani & Mullins, 2000; Shapira, 1995). 
Rather than reflecting the magnitude of the loss, this view sees the more risky 
decision alternative as the one where the outcome variance is greatest (Lopes, 1987). 
Both views of risk have enjoyed long histories in psychological theory, primarily 
within the decision-making (i.e., ‘decision-theoretic’) literature. For the most part, 
this literature has been dominated by subjective expected utility theory (Savage, 1954; 
von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1944).
Subjective expected utility theory
While the term ‘expected utility theory’ is used to refer a family of decision­
making theories that span a number of disciplines, primarily economics, mathematics, 
and psychology, it is commonly associated with the early work of von Neumann and 
Morgenstern (1944) and Savage (1954). Fundamental to the theory is the notion of 
‘utility’. Generally speaking, utility refers to the personal value or desirability of the 
consequences that may arise from a decision in a particular situation (Moser, 1990). 
For example, a decision to disclose classified information may have consequences 
that are desirable (e.g., receiving information in return) and those that are undesirable
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(e.g., incurring a breach of national security). According to expected utility theory, 
consequences that are highly desirable are deemed to have higher personal utility than 
those that are less desirable. The aim of expected utility theory is to infer or reveal 
utility from people’s decisions and preferences (Luce & Raiffa, 1989; Moser, 1990). 
Hence, the main ‘result’ of the theory is a utility function that reflects an individual’s 
preferences among various decision alternatives (Luce & Raiffa, 1989).
In expected utility theory, decision-making under risk is a probabilistic affair. 
That is, a decision is said to be made under risk when the probabilities associated with 
the various decision outcomes are known (Luce & Raiffa, 1989; Moser, 1990), such 
as when betting on the toss of a coin where the probability of each outcome is 0.5. In 
von Neumann and Morgenstem’s (1944) articulation of the theory, the probabilities 
associated with decision outcomes were assumed to be objectively determinable. 
However, later utility theorists argued against objective probabilities, pointing out that 
most decision-making takes place in situations where precise outcome probabilities 
are unknown. Therefore, subjective expected utility theory (e.g., Savage, 1954) 
replaces objective probabilities with subjectively-derived probabilities, arguing that 
people assign their own probabilities or ‘degrees of belief to the possible outcomes of 
their decisions (Sawyer, 1990). Either way, risk is conceived as variation in the 
probability of possible decision outcomes (Forlani & Mullins, 2000; Lopes, 1987; 
Sawyer, 1990; Shapira, 1995). The core hypothesis of the theory is that people 
behave as i/they maximised ‘expected utility’, that is, the summed product of the 
utility of each possible outcome and its probability of occurrence (Luce & Raiffa, 
1989; Mongin, 1997; Moser, 1990). The theory holds then that, all other things being 
equal, individuals will prefer alternatives with smaller rather than larger risks (March 
& Shapira, 1987; Shapira, 1995). In other words, people are seen to be generally 
‘risk-averse’ in their decision-making (Lopes, 1987).13
Though subjective expected utility theory is rarely mentioned by those seeking 
to understand how organizational decisions are made, the findings of organizational 
research often support the theory’s general predictions. For example, Dunegan,
12. While the term ‘risk averse’ is used here to refer to general avoidance of risks, the term is often 
used to refer more specifically to those who are more avoidant o f risk than subjective expected 
utility theory would predict.
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Duchon, and Barton (1992) had members of an international engineering company 
read a mixed-motive scenario in which they had to decide between keeping an 
existing and very reliable customer that earned the company a modest income, and 
dropping the existing customer for a less reliable one that might earn them more, but 
which had a greater chance of going bankrupt in the process. Participants in this 
study were asked to rate the degree of risk associated with declining the new account 
and the likelihood that they would pursue it, despite the objections from the existing 
customer. Not surprisingly, the results indicated that as the perceived risk of not 
taking up the new account increased, the more likely it was to be pursued.
In a similar vein, Forlani and Mullins (2000) sought to examine how different 
dimensions of risk influenced the decisions of entrepreneurs about whether or not to 
invest in a new business venture. These researchers manipulated the riskiness of new 
ventures in terms of the factors outlined earlier, that is, the magnitude of potential loss 
(low or high) and the variability associated with the predicted outcome (low or high).
It was hypothesized that as both dimensions of risk increased, so too would the 
amount of risk that the entrepreneurs perceived to be associated with the new venture, 
and that high-risk ventures would be avoided. These hypotheses were supported with 
one interesting exception. Specifically, Forlani and Mullins found that their sample of 
entrepreneurs showed a tendency to prefer high-hazard ventures, that is, those in 
which the magnitude of potential loss was high. To explain these results, the 
researchers argued that high-risk ventures may be attractive as long as the prospect of 
commensurate gains are sufficiently likely. However, an alternative explanation may 
be found in the work of March and Shapira (1987; see also Shapira, 1995). Based on 
a large survey of business managers, these researchers found that managers were 
willing to take large risks if they perceive themselves to be able to exercise some 
degree of control over the possible outcomes. Indeed, in follow-up research by 
Forlani (2002), this very hypotheses was supported in a study of investment decision­
making.
As illustrated above, people are well known for not always avoiding what 
appear to be large risks. Indeed, classical economists remain vexed by the fact that 
the people behave as if they are risk-averse in some circumstances (e.g., purchasing 
house insurance) and risk-seeking in others (e.g., purchasing lottery tickets; see
148
Lopes, 1987). One of the best-known theoretical analyses that attempts to account for 
certain inconsistencies of this kind is prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979).
Prospect theory
Prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; see also Kahneman & Tversky, 
1982) is a theory of decision-making under risk developed to account for certain 
violations of expected utility theory. As outlined above, the latter maintains that the 
overall utility of a decision alternative is the expected utility of its outcomes and that 
people are generally risk-averse in their decision-making. However, Kahneman and 
Tversky observed that the expected utility of a decision alternative was usually 
assessed in relation to a reference point, generally the status quo. Moreover, they 
observed that by varying the way a decision problem was ‘framed’, that is, whether 
the decision represented the prospect of a loss or a gain, people would be either risk- 
averse or risk-seeking in their choices. To demonstrate this, Kahneman and Tversky 
typically presented individuals with a set of decision problems in which they had to 
choose between two alternatives, A and B. One option (A) represented a risk-seeking 
choice while the other (B) represented a risk-averse choice. Further, the decision 
situation was presented in either a ‘gain frame’, for example:
Which of the following would you prefer?
A: 50% chance to win $100 B: Win $45 for sure.
50% chance to win $0;
or a Toss frame’, for example:
Which of the following would you prefer?
A: 50% chance to lose $100 B: Lose $45 for sure.
50% chance to lose $0;
The results of studies like these indicated that people tended to be risk-averse when 
faced with the prospect of a gain (i.e., they tend to take the ‘sure thing’). Yet, when 
faced with the symmetrical gamble framed as a loss, people tended to be risk-seeking, 
that is, they tended to ‘chance their hand’ in the hope of avoiding any loss. According 
to prospect theory then, an individual’s value function (utility was redefined as value)
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depends on whether one is facing potential gains or potential losses. In other words, 
people’s risk-taking behaviour is shaped in large part, by the context of the decision 
situation.
Applied research has yielded some support for the idea that perceptions of risk 
are influenced by context. It is argued, for instance, that the prevailing context makes 
certain dimensions of risk more salient than others (Fischhoff, Watson, & Hope, 1984; 
Forlani & Mullins, 2000; March & Shapira, 1987; see also Vlek & Stallen, 1980; 
Yates & Stone, 1992). Specifically, the probability of loss may be important in 
situations where its magnitude is small and the probabilities are well specified. 
However, the magnitude of loss may be more important in circumstances where the 
loss is considerable in size and its probability is difficult to assess (Vlek and Stallen, 
1980). Yet, direct support for prospect theory is evident in the findings of much 
organizational research (see Fiegenbaum & Thomas; 1988, Hoskinsson, Hitt, & Hill, 
1991; MacCrimmon & Wehrung, 1986; March & Shapira, 1987; Shapira, 1995). A 
common theme in this research, for instance, is that company managers are generally 
unwilling to take risks when their companies are performing well and there is little 
danger of falling behind performance targets (i.e., when in the ‘domain of gains’).
Yet, when one is in danger of missing performance targets or when the company’s 
actual survival is at stake (i.e., when in the domain of losses), riskier options become 
more attractive. This focus on the psychology of potential gains and losses draws 
attention to the impact that emotions have on decision-making under risk14. 
Theoretically, this area has been dominated by regret theory (Bell, 1982; Loomes & 
Sugden, 1982) in which the concept o f ‘anticipated regret’ is employed to explain 
phenomena such as risk-aversion and so-called ‘sunk-cost’ effects (see Connolly & 
Zeelenberg, 2002).
Regret theory
By referring to people’s emotional experiences, the aim of regret theory is to 
offer an alternative model of decision-making under risk. The historical roots of 
regret theory can be traced at least as far back as Savage (1954) and Luce and Raiffa
13. See Meilers, Schwartz, & Ritov (1999) for a brief overview review of emotion-based theories of 
choice.
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(1957) who argued that prior to decision-making, people compute their maximum 
possible regret for each decision alternative and then choose the alternative where this 
maximum is the lowest - the so-called minimax principle o f regret (Meilers, et al., 
1999; Zeelenberg, 1999). In later years, Janis and Mann (1977) argued that people 
will seek to ensure their decision-making is of high quality if they think beforehand 
about possible regret. However, Bell (1982) and Loomes and Sugden (1982) were the 
first to devise a formal psychological theory of decision-making under risk in which 
the notion of anticipated regret was central (Sugden, 1985).
Two emotions are core to formal regret theory: regret and rejoicing (Sugden, 
1985). Regret is the negative feeling that emerges when the outcome of one’s actual 
decision is worse than that which would have been obtained if one had chosen 
differently (e.g., discovering that the lottery ticket one refused turns to be out the 
winner). Rejoicing is the feeling that emerges when one discovers that the outcome of 
their actual decision was, in fact, the best outcome (e.g., finding out that the train one 
did not take had broken down). While regret and rejoicing are post-decisional 
experiences, regret theory holds that they have a strong pre-decisional influence on 
decision-making in that they are anticipated when a decision-maker is faced with a 
choice between risky options (Zeelenberg, 1999). Specifically, it is assumed that 
decision-makers wish to minimize post-decisional regret (Connolly & Zeelenberg, 
2002; Zeelenberg, 1999). Thus, according to regret theory, people will be risk-averse 
when the ‘risky’ choice is the one that makes post-decisional regret salient, and will 
be risk-seeking when it is the more certain alternative that may lead to greater levels 
of post-decisional regret (see Zeelenberg, 1999).
Empirical support for regret theory has been mixed (see Loomes, Starmer & 
Sugden, 1992; Zeelenberg, 1999). Support is offered by Simonson (1992) who found 
that people’s purchasing decisions could be varied by making salient the level of 
regret they would experience if their choice were to turn out badly. Here, high levels 
of anticipated regret influenced people to buy a more expensive and reliable brand
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product than a cheaper and more risky one. Yet, the regret-rejoicing process has not 
received extensive attention in studies of organizational decision-making15.
Summary and implications
So far, we have reviewed three theories of decision-making under risk that 
have held sway in the psychological literature at some time or another: subjective 
expected utility theory (Savage, 1954; von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1944), prospect 
theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) and regret theory (Bell, 1982; Loomes &
Sugden, 1982). We have also briefly reviewed the extent to which support for the 
core ideas of these theories has been found in studies of organizational decision­
making. It would now be possible therefore to propose general statements about the 
psychology of problematic non-disclosure for each of the theoretical frameworks 
reviewed. For instance, it could be argued that non-disclosure simply maximises 
expected utility. Or, from the point of view of prospect theory, it could be said that 
non-disclosure is the alternative that provides the potential discloser with a chance of 
avoiding certain loss. Finally, a regret theorist might argue that non-disclosure is 
associated with lower levels of anticipated regret.
While such statements represent the potential discloser as a decision-maker 
operating under risk, they fail to answer a question of the central importance: why is it 
that not-disclosing rather than disclosing maximises expected utility, avoids certain 
loss, or minimizes post-decisional regret? In other words, neither the theoretical nor 
the empirical work reviewed above sufficiently addresses why the disclosure of 
classified information amongst ADF personnel should be considered a risky activity. 
Furthermore, the work offers no insight into the reasons why intra- or inter-Service 
disclosure should be seen as the riskier option. It is now necessary to step outside the 
psychological literature for an insight into the answer to these questions. We 
therefore turn to the sociological literature relating to secrecy.
14. To some extent, many o f the findings reported above could be argued to be consistent with regret 
theory, however little or no reference is made within these studies to the emotional experiences 
(anticipated or otherwise) of participants in general.
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The contribution of sociology and the guardedness hypothesis
In Chapter 3, we saw how perceived risk has long been associated with non­
disclosure of personal information. More specifically, a major theme running through 
psychological analyses of self-disclosure is that the revelation of personal information 
is risky because its leaves the potential discloser vulnerable to the unknown intentions 
and perceptions of the potential recipient (Kelly, 2001; Margulis, 1977; Petronio, 
1999). Similar ideas are also evident in the sociological literature that relates to the 
dynamics of organizational secrecy. However in the sociological literature, a 
distinction can be made between two traditions within this research.
In the first tradition, risk is seen as an external factor shaping the organization 
from the outside. In other words, the organization is vulnerable to threats emanating 
from beyond its boundaries and these threats justify a need for information control 
systems to be developed in order to protect the organization (Erickson, 1979). This 
idea can be traced back to Simmel who, in discussing the structure of the secret 
society argued that “the purpose of secrecy is, above all, protection” (Simmel, 1950, 
p. 345). The use of secrecy for protection from external threats and risks is obviously 
important in defence organizations where elaborate forms of information control 
function, first and foremost, to conceal a nation’s defence arrangements (i.e., its 
weaknesses and advantages) from outsiders perceived to have malicious intents (Bok, 
1984; Lowry, 1972; Wilsnack, 1980). As suggested by Bok (1984), the unrelenting 
presence of an external source of risk appears to permeate the psyche of military 
personnel in a way that orients them inward and away from their counterparts in 
civilian life:
To insiders, the dangers of ill-advised disclosure seems greater than that of ill- 
advised secrecy.. .To live with secrecy day in and day out, to be aware of a threat 
to both one’s nation and to oneself from a diminution of secrecy, and to be 
trained to give up ordinary moral restraints in dealing with enemies is an 
experience that isolates and transforms participants (pp. 198-99).
In the second tradition, risk is viewed as an internal factor and therefore one 
capable of shaping the relations amongst an organization’s personnel from the inside. 
Work in this tradition converges on the idea that risks within the organization make
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organizational secrecy an inherently unstable form of information control (Bok, 1984; 
Lowry, 1972; Wilsnack, 1980). Moreover, these internal risks are seen as 
fundamental to why disclosure outcomes within the organization may not always be 
commensurate with those envisaged by formal rules and procedures (Erickson, 1979). 
Hence, a major theme in this work is ‘organizational paranoia’. That is, instead of 
looking outward for sources of threat, an organization’s members turn their suspicions 
toward one another and these manifest as dysfunctional patterns of non-disclosure. 
Again, Bok (1984) captures the essence of this idea:
It is no wonder that military secrecy offers fertile ground for pathological 
disturbances. The fear of betrayal - seeing enemies everywhere, fearing 
pervasive conspiracies and hidden designs - flourishes under conditions of 
external threat between nations. And the secrecy sought in response to such fears 
begins to seem more and more like a conspiracy in its own right, as it spreads 
and erodes rationality (pp. 199).
Perhaps the most significant sociological contribution in this vein is that made by the 
functionalist Edward Shils (1956) in The Torment o f Secrecy. In his analysis of 
McCarthyism, Shils observed that the mere possession of an official secret during this 
era gave rise to the suspicion of disloyalty, in this case, to one’s country. Significant 
also are Lowry’s (1972) self-reports while employed by a U.S. Army ‘think-tank’. 
Here, Lowry observed that official secrecy served not only to protect national security 
but to restrict politically sensitive information from reaching others within the 
organization deemed to be a political threat (see also Wilsnack, 1980). Along similar 
lines, Aftergood (2000) recently differentiated three categories of secrecy as practiced 
by defence organizations (1) genuine national security secrecy, (2) bureaucratic 
secrecy (i.e., secrecy conducted for the sake of secrecy without any real national 
security implications) and (3) political secrecy, or the deliberate non-disclosure of 
classified information to gain political advantage or avoid political embarrassment.
A second, more subtle theme also runs through work in this tradition, in this 
case, one of guardedness. Here, non-disclosure of valuable information is seen as a 
response to fear and uncertainty about how the information might be used ‘down the 
line’. This idea is well illustrated by Erickson (1979). Working from a conflict 
framework (see Dahrendorf, 1968), Erickson argues that the perceived need for
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secrecy is based on fear and uncertainty as to how others would use valuable 
information if it happened to be disclosed to them. Specifically, Erickson argues that 
organizations in which secrecy is perceived to be necessary are dominated by norms 
of distrust rather than norms of rationality, pointing out that:
One can judge others as enemies who are intentionally interested in subverting 
one’s aims and the past history of their actions can serve as a basis for arriving at 
such a judgement. But one can also judge others as stupid or careless and 
therefore fear what would happen if certain information were made available to 
them. These reasons for fearing others have as their central core feature an 
evaluation of the untrustworthiness of others (p. 126).
A sense of guardedness is also evident in recent analyses of the intelligence-sharing 
arrangements amongst the agencies of the U.S. Intelligence Community prior to 
September 11, 2001 (see United States House Committee, 2002). As alluded to in 
Chapter 2, intelligence collectors often restricted the access of intelligence analysts to 
sensitive information because of fears that the latter might use the information in a 
way that exposed the source, that is, the actual technique or person that acquired the 
information. These fears were found to have reinforced inappropriate norms of 
‘ownership’ over sensitive information. According to Admiral Thomas Wilson, a 
former director of the CIA, perceived ownership of information represented a 
significant cultural concern and that agencies need to “shed the belief that they own 
information, which, in fact, belongs to the government” (United States House 
Committee, 2002, p. 363).
Based on the work conducted within this latter tradition, we can derive a 
general hypothesis of problematic non-disclosure of classified information in the ADF 
that could be termed ‘the guardedness hypothesis’. According to this hypothesis, 
perceived risk as to how the requester of Service-sensitive classified information 
might use the information if disclosed is central. Specifically, problematic non­
disclosure of the form examined here is argued to represent a guardedness that is 
aroused by uncertainty as to whether the requester and/or the recipient of subsequent 
disclosures will use the information in a way that is harmful to one’s Service. Further, 
the guardedness hypothesis could be extended so as to argue that such guardedness 
will be accentuated when the potential recipient is from another Service. According
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to the ideas reviewed above, we could expect members of ‘other’ groups to be 
malicious or careless with sensitive information about one’s own group and that one 
must be most cautious when deciding whether to disclose such information to these 
‘outsiders’.
Summary and the way ahead
We began this chapter by reviewing the major theoretical contributions that 
have been made in psychology concerning decision-making under risk. Of the many 
theories of this kind, three were outlined together with evidence in support of their 
hypotheses. While it is possible to derive a number of general statements about the 
psychology of problematic non-disclosure in line with each of these theories, such an 
exercise is inadequate for our purposes in one important respect. Specifically, neither 
the theories of decision-making under risk nor contemporary organizational research 
in this vein are able to shed any light on why the disclosure of classified information 
as it takes place amongst ADF personnel should be considered a risky activity nor 
why inter- or intra-Service disclosure should be considered the more risky option.
In order to gain such an insight, it is necessary to examine how risk and non­
disclosure have been associated in sociological analyses of secrecy. In this literature 
two distinct traditions were discerned. In the first, risk is viewed as a factor that 
shapes the organization from outside thus orienting its members inward. However, it 
was argued that the second tradition is the more important. Here, risk is viewed as 
something that resides within the organization relating to how other insiders might use 
valuable information if it is disclosed to them. On the basis of this idea, we 
hypothesized that problematic non-disclosure of Service-sensitive information in the 
ADF represents a form of guardedness or circumspection driven by uncertainty as to 
how disclosed information might be used by the requester or those the requester may 
disclose the information to. The following chapter is to test this idea empirically.
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Chapter 8
Testing the guardedness hypothesis
Introduction
In the previous chapter, our attention shifted toward risk, the second of the two 
master factors derived from the review of disclosure conducted in Chapter 3. Chapter 
7 summarised three of the major theoretical approaches to risk in the psychological 
literature and reviewed the extent to which the arguments and assumptions of these 
theories are reflected in studies conducted within an organizational context. Like 
research conducted in the social identity tradition, studies of organizational decision­
making under risk have yet to adopt disclosure and non-disclosure as dependent 
variables of major research interest. Therefore, in order to gain some insight into how 
risk might underpin problematic non-disclosure in the ADF and why inter- or intra- 
Service disclosure should be seen as the riskier option, it was necessary for us to turn 
to sociological accounts of organizational secrecy where perceived risk is a central 
theme (e.g., Coser, 1963; Erickson, 1979; Lowry, 1972; Shils, 1956; Wilsnack, 1980).
On the basis of the arguments presented in the sociological literature, we 
concluded Chapter 7 by proposing what we have termed the guardedness hypothesis. 
This hypothesis holds that problematic non-disclosure of Service-sensitive classified 
information is a protective response to perceived risk. More specifically, it is argued 
that problematic non-disclosure of the form examined here represents a cautiousness 
or circumspection aroused by perceived uncertainty as to whether the requester (or 
those the requester may subsequently disclose the information to) will use the 
information in a way that harms the potential discloser’s Service. Further, it was 
suggested that the hypothesis could be extended so as to argue that any guardedness in 
one’s perceptions and intentions to disclose would be accentuated when the potential 
recipient of the information belongs to another Service. Those from other groups, it 
was argued, being more likely to be the ones that are careless or ignorant to the 
sensitivities embedded within such information.
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The aim of this chapter is to test the guardedness hypothesis and two studies 
are conducted to that end. The purpose of Study 4 is to provide an initial validation of 
the ideas central to the hypothesis in the ADF context. More specifically, the goal 
here is to demonstrate using a simple survey that the disclosure of classified 
information both within and across Service boundaries is likely to be associated with 
various risks relating to the potential recipient’s use of the information. Further, we 
seek to also demonstrate that the determination of another’s need to know is likely to 
be associated with one’s level of confidence about (i.e., toward) these risks. In Study 
5, the aim is to test the guardedness hypothesis more directly, seeking causal rather 
than correlational associations. Specifically, the goal of Study 5 is to determine 
whether perceived risk as to how the classified information might be used causes 
participants to be cautious in attributing to own- and Other-Service requesters a need 
to know the information and in deciding to disclose to them without delay. To that 
end, we manipulate the extent to which study participants feel as though they are able 
to control how own- and other-Service requesters might use Service-sensitive 
classified information they disclose. Thus, this study draws on organizational 
research which suggests that perceived control moderates one’s reluctance to choose 
risky options (Forlani, 2002, March & Shapira, 1987; Shapira, 1995). In an effort to 
flesh out the variability in Service-loyalty across all thesis studies, the chapter 
concludes by providing a number of illustrative excerpts from qualitative data 
collected by way of interviews and experimental questionnaires.
Study 4 
Introduction
Core to the guardedness hypothesis is the idea that the disclosure of sensitive 
information carries with it a risk that it will be misused by the recipient (or those the 
recipient may subsequently disclose to) either deliberately or accidentally. This broad 
class of risk arguably potentially contains a number of subclasses that may be 
important drivers of non-disclosure, either independently or in combination. For 
example, guardedness in one’s disclosure intentions may be driven primarily by a 
perceived inability to predict or anticipate how Service-sensitive information will be 
used if disclosed. Additionally, it may emanate from an expectation that the potential
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recipient of the information will not recognise and/or manage any risk to one’s 
Service that is inherent in the information. Alternatively, it may be the case that the 
potential discloser of the information is primarily concerned with the consequences 
they face if disclosing turns out to be the ‘wrong’ decision. In other words, the 
guardedness in one’s disclosure intentions may stem from the perceived risk of being 
held personally responsible for any damage to one’s Service that might occur post­
disclosure. Finally, it may be that the risks relate largely to the prospect of disclosing 
to people that one does not know personally.
As outlined above, the aim of Study 4 is twofold. First, our goal is to 
demonstrate that the disclosure of classified information in both intra- and inter- 
Service contexts is likely to be associated with various risks relating to the potential 
recipient’s use of the information, such as those that have been outlined above. 
Second, we seek to demonstrate that the extent to which personnel feel confident 
about these risks is likely to affect their judgment of the recipient’s need to know the 
information. To this end, it was decided to conduct Study 4 as a simple survey in 
which ADF personnel are asked to rate their level of confidence toward risks such as 
those described above in addition to their level of confidence regarding their ability to 
determine need to know. The primary purpose of Study 4 is to demonstrate the 
associations that are core to the guardedness hypothesis and we can expect that:-
H1: The more confident that ADF personnel are about the risks associated with
disclosing classified information, the more confident they will be about determining 
need to know.
Based on prior results, we might also expect that:
H2: ADF personnel will be more confident about the risks associated with
disclosing classified information in intra- rather than in inter-Service contexts.
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Method
Participants and design
Thirty ADF personnel drawn from the Deployable Joint Force Headquarters 
(DJFHQ) took part in Study 4. This comprised 23 men and 7 women, all belonging to 
the ARA. The majority were commissioned officers with 7 of Major rank or above 
and 11 of Captain (Army) rank or below. The remaining 12 were non-commissioned 
officers. The mean age was 36 years and average length of ADF service was 16 
years. Most held a TOP SECRET security clearance (n = 22).
The survey was designed to measure the general level of confidence of ADF 
personnel with respect to various risks associated with disclosing classified 
information in intra- and inter-Service contexts. It had a 2 (disclosure context: intra- 
versus inter-Service) x 6 (class of risk) design with both factors manipulated within- 
participants.
Materials and procedure
Each survey was copied on DSTO letterhead and attached to a covering letter 
that invited participation in a research program that examined the “knowledge 
environment” of the ADF (see Appendix D). The covering letter also stated that 
participation was voluntary and that information collected would remain anonymous. 
Questionnaires were distributed with the assistance of the Chief of Staff.
Instructions at the beginning of the questionnaire informed participants that 
the aim of the questionnaire was to examine what ADF personnel thought about the 
provision of classified information to each other, and that they would be asked to rate 
how confident they were about a number of issues relating to the disclosure of 
classified information within and across Service boundaries. These instructions read 
as follows:
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On the next page, you will be asked to rate how confident you would be about 
a number of issues involving the disclosure of classified information in the ADF. 
Each question requires that you respond twice.
That is, on the left hand side of the page, you are asked to respond keeping in mind 
disclosure that takes place across Services. And, on the right hand side, you are 
asked to respond to the same question, but this time keeping in mind disclosure that 
takes place completely within your Service.
Ordering of the disclosure context was counterbalanced and questionnaires 
were distributed to personnel on a random basis.
Dependent measures
For each disclosure context, personnel were asked to rate how confident they 
were with respect to six different issues, each of which represented a potentially risky 
aspect of disclosing classified information. Specifically, participants were asked how 
confident they were:
(1) “about being able to determine ‘need-to-know’?” (need-to-know)
(2) “about being able to anticipate or predict how the disclosed information might be 
used?” (prediction)
(3) “that risks to your Service associated with disclosing will be recognised by the 
recipient(s)?” (recognition)
(4) “that risks to your Service associated with disclosing will be managed by the 
recipient(s)?” (management)
(5) “that you would not be seen as ‘personally responsible’ if classified information 
you disclosed was used by others in a way that damaged the image of your Service?” 
(blame)
(6) “about disclosing classified information about your Service to recipient(s) you 
don’t know personally?” (unknown)
Responses to all six classes of risk were recorded on 7-point scales with end­
points labelled “not at all” (1) and “very confident” (7) and headed either “Disclosing 
within my Service” or “Disclosing across Services
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Finally, demographic information including age, sex, rank, level of security 
clearance, and years of ADF service was collected. Participants were then thanked for 
their time and invited to provide comments.
Results
Missing data
There were three cases of missing data. In each case, missing data was 
substituted with the median of the relevant variable for the sample as a whole.
Correlational analysis
For each disclosure context, correlations between ail dependent measures were 
calculated and are shown in Table 8.1. We found support for HI with respect to both 
intra- and inter-Service disclosure contexts. In intra-Service contexts, the extent to 
which participants felt confident about determining need to know was associated with 
their level of confidence across all other classes of risk, particularly that relating to 
being able to predict how disclosed information might be used. In inter-Service 
contexts, this pattern was mirrored to a large degree. There was one difference here in 
that confidence about determining need to know in inter-Service contexts was not 
related to confidence about disclosing to personnel (in this case, those from other 
Services) that one did not know personally. Indeed, in the inter-Service disclosure 
context, participants’ level of confidence about disclosing to those they did not know 
personally was not related to their confidence toward any other class of risk.
Analysis o f variance
Scores for the dependent measures were submitted to a 2 (disclosure context: 
intra/inter-Service) x 6 (class of risk) within-participants ANOVA. Means and 
standard deviations for dependent measures are shown in Table 8.2. ANOVA 
statistics are shown in Table 8.3.
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Table 8.1
Inter-correlations between dependent measures for intra- and inter-Service contexts.
Class of risk 1 2 3 4 5 6
Intra-Service disclosure
1. Need to know — .6 6 ** .42* .50** .37* .42*
2 . Prediction — 4 9 ** .58** .50** .56**
3. Recognition — .87** .40* .39*
4. Management — .52** .40*
5. Blame — .35
6 . Unknown —
Inter-Service disclosure
1. Need to know — .82** .54** 60* * .54** .19
2 . Prediction — .53** .58** 46** .25
3. Recognition — .92** .51** .18
4. Management — .61** .15
5. Blame — .36
6 . Unknown —
*p < .05; **p  < .01; ***p < .001
Table 8.2
Means and standard deviations for dependent measures for intra- and inter-Service 
disclosure contexts.
Disclosure context
Item Intra-Service Inter-Service
Need to know 5.87 4.50
(0.97) (1.53)
Prediction 5.47 3.87
(1.07) (1.53)
Recognition 5.17 3.57
(1.34) (1.57)
Management 5.00 3.43
(1.49) (1.59)
Blame 3.60 3.00
(2.18) (1.95)
Unknown 3.93 2.83
(2.07) (1.90)
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Table 8.3
ANOVA statistics for classes o f risk as a function of disclosure context.
Source df F n 2 P
Disclosure context (D) 1 45.54 .61 .000***
Class of risk (C) 5 12.47 .30 ooo***
DxC 5 5.73 .17 ooo***
***/?<.001;
We found support for H2 in that results indicated a main effect of large size 
for disclosure context (Ep ,29) = 45.54,/?<.001). Specifically, participants were more 
confident about disclosing classified information in intra-Service rather than in inter- 
Service contexts (Ms = 4.84, 3.53 respectively). Results also indicated a main effect 
of moderate size for class of risk in that participants’ confidence varied across the 
classes of risk presented (F(5)i45)= 12.47, p<001). Estimated marginal means are 
shown in Table 8.4.
Table 8.4
Estimated marginal means for confidence about class of risk
Class of risk
Need-to-know Prediction Recognition Management Blame Unknown
5.18a 4.67b 4.38b 4.22b 3.30c 3.38c
Means not sharing any subscript differ significantly at p<.05 or less.
Participants were most confident about their ability to determine need to know, yet 
were only moderately confident about being able to anticipate or predict how the 
recipient of classified information would use this information, and that the recipient 
would recognise and manage any risks to one’s Service inherent in the information. 
The lowest levels of confidence were in respect to the expectation that one would not 
be seen as personally responsible if information they disclosed was later used by 
others in a way that damaged the image of their Service, and about disclosing 
classified information about one’s Service to unknown others.
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There was also an interaction between disclosure context and class of risk of 
small effect size (F(5)i45)= 5.73,/?< 001) indicating that the disclosure contexts yielded 
significantly different disclosure confidence profiles as shown in Table 8.5.
Table 8.5
Means for dimensions o f disclosure confidence: Intra- and inter-Service contexts
Class of risk
Context Need-to-know Prediction Recognition Management Blame Unknown
Intra-Service 5.87a 5.47b 5 .17b)C 5 .00c 3.60d 3.93d
Inter-Service 4 .5 0 a 3.87b 3 .57b>c 3 .43b;C 3 .00C)d 2.83d
Means not sharing any subscript differ significantly at p<.05 or less.
The only difference between the two disclosure confidence profiles related to 
participant’s level of confidence that they would not be seen as personally responsible 
if information they disclosed was used by others in a way damaging to their Service 
{blame). For the intra-Service context, mean scores for blame were significantly 
lower than all other means except for unknown. However, for the inter-Service 
context, mean scores on blame did not differ significantly from those on recognition 
and management.
Discussion
The aim of Study 4 was to provide an initial and broad validation of the ideas 
central to the guardedness hypothesis in the ADF context. Specifically, the primary 
purpose of this study was to demonstrate that the disclosure of classified information 
both within and across Service boundaries is likely to be associated with various risks 
relating to the potential recipient’s use of the information. The findings of Study 4 
speak to this objective in that our participants were readily able to rate and 
differentiate their level of confidence about various issues relating to disclosure of 
classified information that are core to the hypothesis. When the disclosure context 
was intra-Service in nature, participants were moderately confident about their ability 
to predict how disclosed information would be used, as they were that the recipient of
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such information would recognise and manage any risks to their Service inherent in 
the information. However, for an inter-Service disclosure context, participants were 
far less confident in these respects.
We expected in Study 4 that participant’s level of confidence towards the risks 
associated with disclosing classified information would vary directly with their level 
of confidence about determining need to know (HI). We found support for this 
hypothesis for both the intra- and inter-Service disclosure contexts. In short, the more 
confident that participants were about the various risks, particularly about being able 
to predict how disclosed information might be used, the more confident they were 
about their ability to determine need to know. There was one interesting exception in 
that participants’ confidence about being able to determine need to know was not 
related to their confidence about disclosing to unknown others when these unknown 
others were from outside one’s own Service. It would appear then that the most 
salient risks associated with inter-Service disclosure are not to do with the potential 
recipient being unknown to the potential discloser, but with more broader issues 
relating to predictability and the recognition and management of risk to one’s Service.
We also expected that participant’s level of disclosure confidence would be 
greater when contemplating intra- rather than inter-Service disclosure (H2) and this 
hypothesis too was supported. Indeed, the size of this Service-loyalty effect was 
somewhat larger than had been observed in our prior studies. It is possible that this is 
due to the particular sample of personnel that took part in Study 4. While DJFHQ is 
officially a ‘Joint’ organization, the majority of personnel of this Headquarters and 
indeed all of those who took part in Study 4, belong to one Service, in this case, the 
ARA. These results provide support for the extension of the guardedness hypothesis 
outlined earlier, specifically, that the potential discloser of classified information that 
is sensitive to one’s Service will likely be more cautious in disclosing it to other- 
Service personnel than to own-Service personnel.
In summary, the findings of Study 4 provide an initial validation of the ideas 
central to the guardedness hypothesis. Moreover, they go some way toward showing 
that the extent to which the potential discloser of classified information is confident 
toward disclosure risk is likely to be a salient factor in the determination of another’s
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need to know the information. However, the correlational nature of this data means 
that causal relationships remain uncertain. It is not clear, in other words, whether the 
risk associated with the inability to anticipate how the recipient will use the 
information causes personnel to rate need to know as lower and to be more reluctant 
to disclose classified information without delay. The aim of Study 5 is to investigate 
whether this causal association. Specifically, our goal is to investigate the whether it 
is possible to systematically change one’s perceptions of a requester’s need to know 
by varying the extent to which the disclosure situation is perceived to be risky, in this 
case, in terms of how the requester might use the information if disclosed. Central 
here is the extent to which the potential discloser perceives that they can control how 
the requester will use the infonnation (see Forlani, 2002). Specifically, we expect the 
following:-
H1: When participants believe that they can exert such control, they will perceive the 
disclosure situation to be less risky than when they believe that they cannot exert such 
control, and
H2: When participants believe that they can exert such control, they will attribute to 
the requester a greater need to know and be more willing to disclose without delay 
than when they believe that they cannot exert such control.
Based on the results of prior studies, we could also expect Service-loyal 
outcomes. Specifically:-
H3: When participants are from the same Service as the requester, they will perceive 
disclosing to be less risky, attribute a greater need to know to the requester, and be 
more willing to disclose without delay, than when they are from a different Service.
However, it could also be expected that:-
H4: The Service-loyalty effects of H3 will be accentuated when participants believe 
that they can exert control over the requester, and attenuated when they believe that 
they cannot exert such control.
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Study 5
Method
Participants and design
Ninety-six ADF personnel from HQNORCOM, AHQ, NHQ and AFHQ took 
part in the study. This comprised 74 men and 18 women (4 participants did not 
indicate their sex). Of these, there were 46 ARA personnel, 23 RAN personnel, and 
27 RAAF personnel. The majority {n = 63) were commissioned officers with 43 of 
Major-equivalent rank or above and 20 of Captain (Army)-equivalent rank or below. 
The remaining 30 participants were non-commissioned officers (3 participants did not 
indicate their rank). The mean age was 37 years, and average length of ADF service 
was 17 years. The vast majority (n = 67) held a TOP SECRET security clearance.
The study had a 2 (perceived control: low/high) x 2 (requester’s Service: 
own/other) design with both independent variables manipulated between-participants.
Participants were given a questionnaire in which they were told that a short 
scenario provided the backdrop to a number of questions. In the short scenario, 
participants were asked to imagine receiving a request for a certain piece of classified 
information from another member of the ADF. Following this, they were asked to 
respond to a number of questions assessing their perception of the requester and their 
likely response to the request.
Materials and procedure
Four versions of the study questionnaire were developed, one corresponding to 
each of the between-subjects conditions (see Appendix E). Each questionnaire was 
copied on DSTO letterhead and attached to a covering letter that invited participation 
in a research program examining the “knowledge environment” of the ADF. The 
covering letter also stated that participation was voluntary and that all information 
collected would remain anonymous. Questionnaires were randomly distributed to
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ADF personnel in the participating organizations, facilitated by the respective Chief 
of Staff or Commanding Officer.
Upon opening the questionnaire, participants were instructed to read the 
following scenario (RAAF version shown, bracketed terms indicate wording used to 
match questionnaires to participant’s Service)
Imagine that you are routinely privy to classified information about the capability 
level of RAAF force elements as part of your normal duties.
On this occasion, you are approached by a member of [the RAAF/another 
Service] who is preparing a report concerning ADF preparedness. For the 
purposes of this report, this person, whom you don’t know personally, requests 
that you provide classified information regarding the current capability level of 
certain RAAF force elements.
The information requested contains details about force elements being 
temporarily at unsatisfactory levels of capability and if not managed with care, 
could damage the image of the RAAF.
Manipulation o f perceived outcome control
In the low perceived control condition, the scenario concluded with:
The requester, who is appropriately cleared, reminds you that you will not be 
able to view the report before it is completed and disseminated.
In the high perceived control condition, the scenario concluded with:
The requester, who is appropriately cleared, provides a guarantee that you will be 
able to check the report before it is completed and disseminated.
Dependent measures
To check the manipulation of perceived control, participants were asked the 
following: “To what extent would you feel you could control how the requester used 
the information?”.
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Following this, participants were asked to respond to 7 questions relating to 
the disclosure situation generally, their perception of the requester, and their likely 
response to the request. Four items served to assess the extent to which the requester 
perceived the disclosure situation as risky (bracketed terms indicate wording used in 
different conditions):
(1) “To what extent would providing the information without delay be risking the 
[Army’s/RAAF’s/RAN’s] image?” (image) ;
(2) “To what extent would providing the information without delay be risking your 
professional reputation?” (reputation)',
(3) How confident would you be that the requestor would manage any risks to the 
image of the [Army/RAN/ RAAF]?”; (manage)
(4) “If you were to provide the information to the requestor without delay, how 
confident would you feel that the final report would treat the [Army/RAN/ RAAF] 
fairly?”, (fairness)
Along similar lines to the measures used in Study 3, two items served to 
measure participants’ perception of the requester’s need to know: (1) “To what extent 
would you think the requestor has a ‘need to know’?”; and (2) “To what extent would 
you think it important that the requestor obtain the information?”. In line with our 
previous studies, a final item served to assess participants’ disclosure intentions:
“How likely would you be to provide the information to the requester without further 
delay?” (disclose). Responses to all dependent variables were recorded on a 7-point 
scale labelled “Not at all” (1) and “Very likely” (7) or the relevant equivalents.
Finally, demographic information including age, sex, rank, level of security 
clearance, and years of ADF service was collected. Participants were then thanked for 
their time and invited to provide comments.
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Results
Missing data
There were two cases of missing data. In each case, missing data was 
substituted with the median of the relevant variable for the sample as a whole.
Data reduction
The two items measuring perceived need-to-know were highly inter-correlated 
and were therefore combined to create a single scale (a=.82).
Manipulation check
The measure of perceived controllability was positively skewed in each of the 
four conditions. Specifically, around half («=49) the respondents indicated that they 
felt they would have no control over how the requestor used the information at all {M 
= 1) with the remainder («=36) indicating that they felt they could exert some degree 
of control in this regard (M= 3.06). Thus, the perceived control item was split into 
two conditions in which the potential discloser perceived they had either no control 
over how the requester used the information {absent) or had some degree of control in 
this respect {present).
Analysis o f variance
Scores on all dependent variables were submitted to a 2 (perceived control: 
absent/present) x 2 (requester’s Service) analysis of variance. Means, standard 
deviations, and F-values are presented in Table 8.6.
We found support for HI in that results indicated a main effect for perceived 
control on each of the dependent measures assessing the extent to which participants 
viewed the disclosure situation as risky. Compared to those who felt they had no 
control over how the requester might use the information, those who felt they had 
some control perceived disclosing without delay to present less risk to the image of 
their Service (Ms=4.80; 3.99; rj2= 0.04) and less risk to their personal reputation
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(Ms=5.01; 3.59; rj2 = 0.11). Further, when participants perceived themselves to have 
some degree of control over how the requester would use the information, they were 
more confident that the requester would manage any risk to their Service (M= 4.61) 
and that the final report would treat their Service fairly (M=4.48) than when 
participants saw themselves as having no control over how the information would be 
used (Ms=2.54; 2.53; r|2= 0.35, 0.33 respectively).
We also found support for H2. Compared to participants who felt they had no 
control over how the information would be used, those who felt they could exercise 
some control in this respect perceived the requester as having a greater need to know 
the information (Ms=3.64; 4.96; r\2 = 0.13) and were more likely to disclose without 
delay (Ms=2.31; 3.97; q2= 0.16).
Only very marginal support was evident for H3. In this case, there was a main 
effect for requester’s Service on a single dependent measure, this being the extent to 
which participants believed the requester would manage any risks to the image of 
their Service. Specifically, participants rated requesters from their own Service as 
more likely to manage such risks than those from another Service (M= 3.88; 3.27, 
respectively; r|2= 0.05). There was no interaction between perceived control and the 
requester’s Service whereby high levels of the former attenuated Service-loyal 
disclosure outcomes. Hence no support was not found for H4.
Mediational analysis
In order to examine the potential mediating role of need-to-know in the relationship 
between perceived control and the intention to disclose without delay, a mediational 
analysis was conducted (Figure 8.1). Consistent with the results above, the 
requester’s Service was not a significant predictor of either need-to-know or intention 
to disclose without delay. However, while perceived control was a significant 
predictor of disclosing without delay, the strength of this association was reduced 
when need-to-know was entered into the model.
172
Table 8.6
Means, standard deviations, and F-values for key dependent measures as a function 
ofperceived controllability and requester’s Service.
Perceived control Absent Present F-values
Requester’s service Own Other Own Other PC RS PC x RS
Item (if scale no. items)
Image 4.67
( 2 .3 2 )
4.93
( 1 .8 8 )
3.73
( 1 . 8 8 )
4.26
( 1 .7 9 )
3.93* 0.96 0.12
Reputation 4.75
( 2 .3 4 )
5.26
( 1 .8 2 )
3.18
( 1 . 8 6 )
4.00
( 1 .9 8 )
11.70** 2.58 0.14
Manage 2.63
( 1 .5 3 )
2.44
( 1 .4 2 )
5.14
( 1 .2 1 )
4.09
( 1 .5 9 )
49.14*** 4.31* 2.15
Fairness 2.54
( 1 .4 7 )
2.52
( 1 .5 8 )
4.91
( 1 . 19 )
4.04
( 1 .3 6 )
44.83*** 2.33 2.10
Need-to-know (2) 3.44
( 1 .6 2 )
3.69
( 1 .6 9 )
4.64
( 1 .4 7 )
4.80
( 1 .3 8 )
13.27*** 0.43 0.16
Disclose 2.25
( 1 . 8 0 )
2.30
( 1 .7 7 )
4.27
( 2 .0 5 )
3.48
( 1 .8 3 )
17.71*** 0.97 1.29
Note: PC = Perceived control; RS = Requester’s service; 
*p < .05; **p<  .01; ***p < .001; Df(l, 81).
GFI = .99
Perceived
controllability
Perceived need- 
to-know
Requester’s
service
Disclose without 
delay
Figure 8.1 Partial mediation o f the impact o f perceived controllability on intentions 
to disclose without delay by perceived need to know.
*p<.05; ***p<.001
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Qualitative data
In the context of the other studies conducted in the thesis, one of the most 
interesting results of Study 5 was the general absence of any Service-loyalty effect. 
Specifically, the findings in this study indicated that an effect for the requester’s 
Service was only observed on one dependent measure, in this case, the extent to 
which the requester was expected to manage any risk to the image of the participant’s 
Service. Here, participants expected less risk in this respect when the requester was 
from their own Service rather than from another Service. This isolated Service- 
loyalty effect stands in sharp contrast to the results reported in Study 4 where intra- 
Service disclosure was considered by participants in that study to be far less risky than 
inter-Service disclosure on all of the dependent measures. It also stands in contrast to 
the results of Studies 2 and 3 where the requester’s Service was found have a 
significant effect on a number of key variables including the extent to which the 
requester was deemed to have a need to know the information and the likelihood that 
participants would disclose to the requester without further delay.
This variation in the extent to which Service boundaries affect the perceptions 
and prospective disclosure intentions of participants calls into question the idea that 
Service-loyalty is likely to be an inevitable part of the disclosure environment of the 
ADF. Indeed, and apart from the findings of Study 4, it must be remembered that the 
Service-loyalty effects reported throughout the thesis have often yielded only small 
effect sizes and been qualified by interactions with other variables. For example, 
participants in Study 1 were only prepared to favour their own Service over another 
Service when they could be assured that their breach would not lead to being formally 
punished. Given this, it was deemed appropriate to flesh out the variation in Service- 
loyalty across all thesis studies with qualitative data collected by way of interviews 
and invited comments made on experimental questionnaires16.
One of the most common themes expressed in this data was that personal 
experience outside of one’s Service environment was likely to reduce the extent to 
which Service boundaries were perceived as psychological barriers to the disclosure
16. For data collected by way of interviews, those interviewees were not actual participants in any of 
the studies reported in this thesis.
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of classified information and communication more generally. This theme is well 
illustrated in the following response of one participant:
Personally, I find that in my last 3 years of employment, which has been in a 
very high level Joint Headquarters has fundamentally changed my view on these 
issues. More than 3 years ago, I would have been swayed towards decisions 
which protected my parent Service. However, the last three years where I have 
been intimately involved in the planning and execution of several ADF 
operations involving the forces of all 3 Services, has given me a different 
perspective. I now believe that protection of the ADF’s position as a whole is 
more important than that of the individual Service. In fact, I am now somewhat 
dismayed by the attitude of individual Services who apparently vehemently 
defend their positions to the detriment of the ADF (and Australia) as a whole, 
and the senior management of these Services are the worst offenders! (Study 1, 
Participant 42).
It is also expressed in the words of an RAAF officer interviewed during the course of 
the research. In this case, the officer had spend a number of years in a Joint area and 
had recently returned to AFFIQ. According to this officer:
The joint culture and the single service culture that I’ve experienced are very 
different. I was surprised and I guess disappointed, having had four years out of 
the headquarters, to come back into it - that’s the RAAF headquarters, to see just 
how much - how many decisions are made here based on stories and anecdote 
and not on analysis.. .In the Joint domain, what’s different there I suppose from 
my experience where I was is that.. .maybe because we don’t have the stories 
that are common across Army, Navy and Air Force, we’re forced to build a 
common set of metaphors and a common set of understandings...In the context of 
building Joint capabilities like command support systems and communications 
systems you’re forced to analysis because you’ve got no other way of building a 
common language that then bring a whole bunch of stakeholders to the one table. 
(Interviewee 1)
In some cases, participants simply expressed individual attitudes consistent with this 
broader theme of cooperation, irrespective of whether they had served in areas of the 
ADF outside of their particular Service. For example, one participant in Study 1 
remarked:
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My loyalty is to the ADF personnel, the ADF, and the Australian people, not to 
“projects” or “capability studies” which come and go. If this exercise does not 
show this then it is misleading. (Study 1, Participant 76)
A similar attitude was voiced by a participant in the final study:
Capability deficiencies need to be managed as an ADF problem not just a single 
Service issue and therefore if an Army problem, “we” should be looking to 
improve this, not “tribal infighting”. (Study 5, Participant 22)
A further theme derived from the qualitative data was that problematic non­
disclosure of classified information was more likely to follow the contours of Service 
boundaries at higher strategic levels of the ADF than at lower tactical levels. More 
specifically, it was the strategic levels of the organization that were seen to be the 
most prone to experience severe inter-Service rivalries and jealousies capable of 
inappropriately affecting the flow of classified information. In contrast, problematic 
non-disclosure of such information was regarded as less likely amongst those 
conducting actual military operations, as implied by the following participant:
I hope your study discriminated between inter-Service politics (i.e., Canberra) 
and the conduct of operations. (Study 3, Participant 194)
and another:
Information flow between different colour uniforms isn’t the problem.. .The 
political machinations of what the recipient does with the information is the 
problem. Different Services compete for the same bucket of money so what can 
be embarrassing for one Service could profit another...I have not come across 
peers from different Services deliberately screwing each other over, but their 
bosses have. (Study 3, Participant 119; emphasis in original).
This idea that the prevailing military/defence context influences the extent to which 
Sendee boundaries are likely to constitute disclosure barriers was also examined in 
interviews with a number of serving ADF personnel. In one interview an officer of 
the ARA was questioned as to if and why strategic areas of the ADF were more likely 
to suffer problematic non-disclosure of classified information than tactical or 
operational levels, to which they replied:
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.. .the trouble is that at the strategic level it becomes so much more complex... 
because you have got so many other factors to consider. When you are talking 
about joint operations at a tactical and operational level, for example, finance is 
not a consideration, if you know what I mean. Money is not really a factor in 
tactical and operational planning in a military domain. At a strategic level 
money is everything. (Interviewee 2)
These sentiments were echoed in the words of the RAAF officer interviewed. When 
asked to describe the relationship between the culture of the strategic-level RAAF 
Headquarters and disclosure outcomes, this officer argued that senior officers at 
strategic levels of the RAAF like to think in terms of...
.. .their tribal roots, if you like. And what’s pretty interesting about that is that 
most of them, I sense, are very comfortable doing that - not too many are 
uncomfortable.. .and that when they’re there, the disclosure is okay in terms of 
the RAAF, within the tribe. But there is very much an expectation that some 
stuff will be held within that group and not be shared with the others as they’re 
seen as potential adversaries, predators in terms of money, or competitors in 
terms of money. So at that point that value of the RAAF and its integrity into the 
future as an organisation is the paramount value, more important than the 
defence of Australia or building a balanced defence organisation, which actually 
might mean de-investing in RAAF and investing more in Army and Navy... 
that’s not seen as an option. (Interviewee 1).
It is argued that this qualitative data collected by way of interviews and 
experimental questionnaires provides some insight into the complexities associated 
with whether Service boundaries will surface as problematic features in the terms of 
the disclosure of classified information in the ADF. From this data, it is possible to 
discern a number of complex and interrelated themes and issues that are likely to play 
a role in this respect. Professional experience beyond the boundaries of one’s Service, 
one’s attitude toward the ADF, and whether one is located with an operational- or 
strategic-level environment are all likely to be implicated to some extent in the 
response of participants to the issues raised in the empirical studies conducted through 
this thesis.
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Discussion
Our aim in Study 5 was to provide a direct test of the guardedness hypothesis. 
As outlined above, this hypothesis holds that problematic non-disclosure of Service- 
sensitive classified information represents a cautiousness or circumspection aroused 
by perceived uncertainty as to whether the requester will use the information in a way 
that harms the potential discloser’s Service. In Study 5, our specific goal was to 
investigate whether uncertainty of this kind was causally related to three variables: the 
perceived riskiness of the disclosure situation, the need to know of the requester, and 
likelihood of prospective disclosure without further delay. Extending work that has 
been conducted in the field or organizational decision-making under risk (e.g.,
Forlani, 2002), we varied the level of uncertainty surrounding the requester’s use of 
the information by manipulating the extent to which participants felt they could 
control the requester in this respect.
The results of Study 5 provided strong support for the guardedness hypothesis. 
When participants perceived they had some degree of control over how the requester 
might use the information requested, they judged the disclosure situation to be less 
risky compared to when they perceived themselves to have no such control. This 
support for HI was observed on each of the variables that assessed the amount of risk 
perceived to be present in the disclosure situation. Specifically, a degree of perceived 
control led participants to perceive there to be less risk to the image of their Service, 
less risk to their own personal reputation, a greater likelihood that the requester would 
manage any risk, and a greater likelihood that the information would be used in a way 
that treated the participant’s Service fairly. Results here also provided strong support 
for H2. That is, when participants perceived they had some degree of control over 
how the requester might use the information requested, they attributed to a greater 
need to know to the requester and were more likely to disclose the information 
without delay than when they perceived themselves to have no such control.
These findings are consistent with and extend those of organizational decision­
making under risk reported in previous literature. Generally speaking, past studies 
have shown that organizational decision-makers (managers, investors, and the like) 
are more likely to choose the risky options when they believe they can influence to
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some extent, the outcomes of these decisions, that is when they have a degree of 
‘outcome control’ (Forlani, 2002; March & Shapira, 1987; Shapira, 1995). Our 
findings also reflect prior arguments made by organizational sociologists concerning 
organizational secrecy. By focusing on issues of perceived risk, Study 5 also reflects 
many of the ideas presented in the decision-theoretic literature concerning risky 
choice, such as expected utility theory (Savage, 1954; von Neumann & Morgenstern, 
1944), regret theory (Bell, 1982; Loomes & Sugden, 1982) and prospect theory 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). In this theoretical vein, our manipulation of perceived 
control could be seen as a manipulation of outcome variability. That is, when a sense 
of perceived control was lacking, the possible outcomes of disclosure were more 
variable, and hence opened up the possibility of negative outcomes. We can see 
support for this idea in the responses of participants about the degree to which the 
disclosure situation involved risk. When participants believed they had no control 
over the use of the information, disclosing without delay was perceived to pose a 
greater risk, to both the image of one’s Service and to one’s personal reputation, than 
when one believed that they could influence the way in which the information was 
used. Thus, the present findings extend the applicability of the fundamental ideas of 
theories of decision-making under risk further into the organizational domain, but this 
time with respect to disclosure behaviour, rather than purely economic decisions.
The results of Study 5 yielded only very limited evidence of a Service-loyalty 
effect and, in doing so, provided only marginal support for H3. In this case, we 
observed that personnel were more confident that risks to their Service would be 
managed when the requester was also from this Service than from another Service.
As was discussed above, this limited evidence of a Service-loyalty effect stands in 
contrast to the relatively large impact of a Service boundary that was suggested by the 
findings in Study 4. In order to explain the marked variability in which Service-loyal 
disclosure outcomes have emerged throughout the course of the thesis, it is necessary 
to appreciate the complexity of factors outside of our experimental control that 
contribute to either increasing or decreasing the salience of Service boundaries in 
shaping disclosure outcomes. In a review of the qualitative data collected by way of 
interviews and study questionnaires, it is apparent that a number of complex and 
interrelated factors are important in this respect. These include (but are arguably not 
limited to) the nature of personnel’s experiences outside of their single-Service
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environment, their attitudes towards the ADF, and the nature of the prevailing defence 
context in which these studies have been conducted.
From the findings of Study 5, we can provide a tentative explanation as to why 
the Service-loyalty effect was limited to this measure alone that is consistent with the 
themes derived from the interview data. Specifically, the majority of the participants 
who took part in Study 5 were drawn from Headquarters Northern Command 
(HQNORCOM), a Joint operational-level organization whose role is to conduct Joint 
operations in the northwest of Australia. Unlike the sample from DJFHQ in which 
participants for Study 4 were drawn, HQNORCOM is comprised of somewhat equal 
numbers of RAN, RAAF, and ARA personnel. Furthermore, HQNORCOM is 
responsible for the conduct of ADF operations, primarily the coastal and aerial 
surveillance of Australia’s maritime exclusion zone (e.g., Operation RELEX). As 
with all ADF operations, success here depends upon the close cooperation of RAAF 
and RAN capabilities and personnel. As a result, Service-loyalty could be expected to 
be both incommensurate with the culture and the functional responsibility of the 
Headquarters.
General conclusions
The guardedness hypothesis of problematic non-disclosure holds that the 
phenomenon is a protective response to risk. In the context of this thesis, this 
hypothesis suggests that ADF personnel will be motivated to withhold classified 
information that is sensitive to the interests of their Service because of fears as to how 
the potential recipient or those ‘further down the line’ may use to the information. 
Thus, the hypothesis constitutes an alternative to that in which Service identity is 
considered to be a central and driving element of problematic non-disclosure. 
According to the guardedness hypothesis, the Services of the ADF are only likely to 
be part of a non-disclosure problem to the extent that the potential discloser perceives 
those from other Services as more likely to be malicious, careless or ignorant of the 
sensitivities associated with the disclosure of this type of information.
In this chapter, we conducted two tests of the guardedness hypothesis. In the 
first, we sought merely to demonstrate that ADF personnel perceive the disclosure of
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classified information, both within and across their Service boundaries, to be 
associated with various classes of risk, such as uncertainty as to how the disclosed 
information might be used. Not only did we find support for this idea, we also 
demonstrated that the extent to which personnel feel confident toward such risks is 
related to their overall level of confidence in determining the need to know of others. 
In the second study (Study 5) we tested the guardedness hypothesis more directly, 
seeking causal rather than correlational findings. Based on a manipulation of the 
extent to which participants felt they could control the actions of the potential 
recipient post-disclosure, it was possible to systematically vary the extent to which 
participants perceived the disclosure situation as risky, the extent to which they 
attributed to the requester a need to know, and the extent to which they were likely to 
disclose to the requester without delay. In short, the findings of Study 5 provided 
strong support for the guardedness hypothesis as a psychological account of 
problematic non-disclosure of Sen/ice-sensitive classified information.
In providing this support, the results of Study 5 proved particularly valuable in 
a second respect. Specifically, we can now conclude with some certainty that 
Service-loyalty is not an inherent or inevitable factor in the disclosure environment of 
the ADF. In providing only a very limited Service-loyalty effect, the findings of 
Study 5 direct us to an appreciation of the complexity surrounding the extent to which 
Service boundaries are likely to impact classified disclosure outcomes. Past 
experiences, attitudes to the ADF, location in the ADF, and the nature of the 
prevailing military environment each emerged through qualitative data collected by 
way of interviews and questionnaires as a potentially important factor in this respect. 
These findings, together with those of the foregoing chapters and their implications 
for understanding problematic non-disclosure of classified information in the ADF are 
revisited in Chapter 9, the final chapter of this thesis.
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Chapter 9
Summary & conclusions
Introduction
At the beginning of the thesis we asked: why might people who share a 
common organizational purpose fail to disclose valuable knowledge and information 
to each other when non-disclosure could have negative, even disastrous outcomes? 
Clearly, this question has become increasingly significant in the post-September 11 
environment and in the wake of other major events that have issues of ‘who knew 
what?’ and ‘why wasn’t it passed on?’ at their core. In this thesis, we have attempted 
to provide an answer to the question as it relates to the non-disclosure of classified 
(i.e., officially secret) information in the ADF context. Our focus on this type of 
information and this organization is not due to any prior acknowledgement that the 
flow of classified information throughout the ADF is beset with problems (though at 
times this has been suggested; see Marr & Wilkinson, 2003) but for two interrelated 
reasons. The first is that problematic non-disclosure of classified information 
amongst ADF personnel could have disastrous consequences for the organization 
including the loss of national security and conceivably the loss of life. The second 
reason is that there is an assumption that official rules will ensure that any non­
disclosure of classified information amongst ADF personnel is always ‘appropriate’ 
non-disclosure and, as has been argued above, this assumption cannot be maintained.
These first steps toward a psychology of problematic non-disclosure in the 
ADF have been guided by more than one theoretical framework. We have drawn on 
research conducted not only across different areas of psychology but also on theory 
and research conducted outside of this discipline. On the basis of our findings, it is 
argued that problematic non-disclosure of classified information, in this case that 
sensitive to Service interests, is a protective response to perceived risk concerning 
how the information will be used if disclosed. Specifically, problematic non­
disclosure of the kind investigated here represents a form of guardedness that 
manifests as a reluctance to attribute to the potential recipient a need to know such 
information and an unwillingness to disclose the information to them without further
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delay. In this the final chapter, a summary of the thesis is presented and the 
implications of our findings for both organizational practice in the ADF and the 
literatures reviewed are outlined. Following this, some limitations of the research 
program are discussed as are directions for future research. The chapter concludes 
with a final comment about the broader implications of the thesis.
Summary
Where Chapter 1 discussed the background to the research problem and 
provided an overview of the thesis chapters, Chapter 2 set the scene for a 
psychological analysis of problematic non-disclosure of classified information in the 
ADF context. The official rules governing access to classified information provided 
the backdrop to this process and it was argued that these rules constitute a formal 
model from which we derive a commonsense view of disclosure outcomes. 
Specifically, the formal model suggests that classified information comes to be known 
by those who have a ‘need to know’ if, and only if they also possess an adequate-level 
security clearance. We argued that while the formal model is necessary and may 
suffice as an explanatory framework when there is consensus about the 
appropriateness of disclosure outcomes, it is not sufficient as an explanatory 
framework when this is not the case. More specifically, it fails to explain the when 
and why of problematic non-disclosure of classified information. It was argued that 
any such explanation must recognise that the disclosure of classified information and 
more specifically, the determination of ‘need to know’ involves psychological 
processes of judgment and attribution. Therefore, the focus of the thesis shifted 
toward gaining an insight into the contribution that psychology has made with respect 
to understanding the factors affecting disclosure behaviour.
In Chapter 3, this contribution was reviewed. Disclosure and non-disclosure 
were found to be central to a number of phenomena that have attracted the attention of 
researchers interested in issues of psychological process. The bulk of this work has 
been devoted to self-disclosure (Hendrick, 1987; Jourard, 1971) where the interplay of 
risk and trust is a core theme. From self-disclosure, we turned to the confidentiality 
literature which addressed the issue of problematic non-disclosure directly because of 
the potential for non-disclosure to have negative (i.e., Tarasoff-type) consequences.
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In this area, the potential discloser was cast as a decision-maker weighing up the 
expected costs and benefits of disclosing and of withholding information from an 
ever-increasing number of parties seeing themselves as having a legitimate need to 
know. This idea was also evident in discussions about the psychology of whistle­
blowing (e.g., Dozier & Miceli, 1985; Gundlach et al., 2003). Yet, an additional 
insight was provided here in that the discloser (i.e., the whistle-blower) was viewed as 
someone behaving in a prosocial way, that is, in the interest of others (Brief & 
Motowildo, 1986; Miceli et ah, 1991; Street, 1995). The idea that affiliation 
underpins one’s disclosure intentions was taken a step further in a review of secrecy 
as it relates to families, organizations and secret societies (e.g., Ericson, 1989; 
Vangelisti & Caughlin, 1987). On the basis of this review we distilled two ‘master 
factors’ thought likely to be implicated in the disclosure of classified information in 
the ADF context - risk and group affiliation.
The empirical work began in Chapter 4 where the effects of risk and group 
affiliation on prospective disclosure intentions was examined in two studies. Here, 
we followed the path laid by those examining problematic non-disclosure in the area 
of confidentiality (e.g., Knowles & McMahon, 1995; Lindenthal et al., 1984) by 
investigating whether ADF personnel were prepared to disclose against the mandate 
of official rules (i.e., to breach national security) in order to avoid negative outcomes 
and if so, when and for whom. To that end, a pilot study was conducted involving a 
sample of DSTO scientists bound by the same rules governing access to classified 
information as their ADF counterparts. These participants were given a set of 
disclosure dilemmas, in which prospective disclosure would breach national security 
policy or a less formal condition of entrustment, and non-disclosure would negatively 
affect either a colleague, a division, or DSTO at large. While prepared to 
prospectively breach the less formal conditions of entrustment, particularly when they 
were affiliated with the element harmed by non-disclosure, these participants were 
largely unprepared to prospectively breach national security via the unofficial 
disclosure of classified information under any conditions.
However, different results were obtained in the main study of Chapter 4 
(Study 1) which involved a larger sample of ADF personnel. In Study 1, we again 
presented participants with various entrustment scenarios including one in which they
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were hypothetically entrusted with classified information. As with the pilot study, a 
decision to prospectively disclose would constitute a breach of national security 
policy (or a less formal condition of entrustment) whereas a decision to withhold the 
information would allow harm to befall a colleague, a Service, or the ADF at large. 
The results showed that these participants grew increasingly willing to prospectively 
disclose the classified information as the consequences of non-disclosure grew 
progressively more severe. Further, the rate of prospective disclosure increased 
significantly when participants expected to evade formal punishment for any such 
breach. While these results supported the idea that risk moderates problematic non­
disclosure, the most interesting results were arguably related to participants’ Service 
affiliation. Specifically, we found that participants were more willing to prospectively 
breach national security when non-disclosure threatened to harm their own Service 
compared to another Service, albeit when they expected their breach to go 
unpunished. This suggested that problematic non-disclosure of classified information 
in the ADF may be likely to surface around the organization’s Service boundaries. As 
a result of these findings, our focus shifted in Chapter 5 toward the social identity 
perspective as a potential explanatory framework for understanding the psychology of 
problematic non-disclosure of classified information in the ADF.
In Chapter 5, the social identity perspective, comprising the arguments of both 
social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) and self-categorization theory (Turner, 
1985; Turner et al., 1987) was reviewed. Underlying the perspective as a whole is the 
idea that people perceive and respond to the world in a qualitatively different way 
when they define themselves as members of social groups than as unique individuals 
(Turner, 1999; Turner & Haslam, 2001). Based on work conducted in the tradition of 
social identity theory (e.g., Tajfel et al., 1971), the perspective holds that just as 
individuals wish to evaluate themselves positively as individuals (Festinger, 1954), so 
too do they seek positive self-evaluation as group members (Tajfel, 1978; Tajfel & 
Turner, 1979). Moreover, the establishment, maintenance or enhancement of a 
positive social identity is thought to involve intergroup comparisons in which one’s 
ingroup is positively distinct from relevant outgroups (Tajfel & Turner, 1979; see also 
Turner, 1975). Additionally, based on work in the tradition of self-categorization 
theory, the perspective maintains that social identities are categorizations of the self 
(Onorato & Turner, 2002, 2001; Turner & Onorato, 1999). It is said that when a self-
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category becomes psychologically salient, a process of depersonalization occurs 
whereby other ingroup members are perceived to be categorically interchangeable 
with the self (Turner et al., 1987). According to the perspective, depersonalization 
aligns the goals and interests of group members and makes collective behaviour 
possible (Turner et al, 1987).
Two preliminary hypotheses of problematic non-disclosure were formulated 
from these ideas. First, it was argued that problematic non-disclosure of classified 
information between the Services is driven by the need to preserve a valued social (in 
this case, Service) identity. Second, it was held that problematic non-disclosure of 
this type arises when potential discloser perceives the potential recipient as a member 
of a salient outgroup. In support of the first of these ideas, we reviewed work 
conducted both within and outside of the social identity tradition suggesting that in 
order to establish or preserve a sense of group affiliation, people vary not only what 
they communicate but to whom they communicate (e.g., Suzuki, 1998). Attention was 
also focused on those groups and societies such as the Intelligence Community in 
which those who claim they belong are expected to keep certain knowledge and 
information concealed from outsiders (Bellman, 1981; Kaiser, 1980; Simmel, 1906; 
see also United States House Committee, 2002). In support of the second of these 
ideas, a brief review was made of work within the social identity tradition that 
demonstrates that people are less willing to cooperate with outgroup members (e.g., 
Ellemers, van Rijswijk et al., 1998; Tyler, 1999; Tyler & Blader, 2000, 2001; Wit & 
Wilke, 1992), as they are more likely to perceive outgroup members as less 
trustworthy (Allen & Wilder, 1975; Brewer, 1981; Kramer, 2001; Yamagishi et al, 
2003).
These hypotheses were tested in Studies 2 and 3 respectively which were 
presented in Chapter 6. Here, our general approach shifted somewhat. Rather than 
situating these hypotheses within the context of breaches of national security and the 
like, we examined their validity by examining ADF personnel’s perceptions of and 
responses to routine requests for classified information. Our approach also shifted in 
terms of specifying the kind of classified information of concern. In line with work 
reviewed in Chapter 5, our attention turned to classified information relating to 
sensitive issues about the potential discloser’s Service, in this case their Service’s
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capability. Finally, we sought greater specification as to the form that non-disclosure 
might take. For example, would non-disclosure manifest as delayed decisions, 
passing the request up the chain of command, or verifying the potential recipient’s 
access credentials?
The first preliminary hypothesis was set in the context of the Jointness 
ideology. There was good reason for doing this. Since Jointness emerged at the end 
of World War II, there has been continual debate in Australia and overseas about the 
extent to which a nation’s armed forces should be ‘Joint’ (e.g., Ankersen, 1998; 
Codner, 1998, Wilkerson, 1997). A fundamental theme running through this debate 
concerns the potential for Jointness to undermine the distinctiveness of single-Service 
customs, traditions, and identity (e.g., Trainor, 1993-4). Thus, a manipulation of the 
Jointness ideology (i.e., a threat to Service distinctiveness or not) and the requester’s 
Service (i.e., own or other) was used to examine not only the independent effects of 
each factor, but also whether Service-loyal disclosure outcomes would be accentuated 
when Service distinctiveness was threatened and attenuated when it was preserved. 
The results of Study 2 provided little support for these predictions. Jointness did not 
emerge as a clear threat to Service distinctiveness and identity. Yet, the results did 
indicate significant interactions between the requester’s Service and the likelihood 
that certain courses of action would be taken. Compared to an own-Service requester, 
participants trusted an Other-Service requester less, were less likely to disclose to an 
other-Service requester immediately, were more likely to delay responding to an 
other-Service requester, and were more likely to pass responsibility for dealing with 
an other-Service requester up the chain-of-command.
The second preliminary hypothesis was set in the context of a Service-relevant 
opinion-based group (see McGarty & Bliuc, 2004). Here, we established an opinion 
based on a respect for the potential discloser’s Service, that is, being a ‘supporter’ of 
this particular Service, as the criteria for shared group membership. In other words, 
we created a new self-category for the potential discloser about their Service that 
could include both own and other-Service requesters as ‘supporters’ of this Service. 
Thus, a manipulation of both the requester’s opinion (i.e., supporter or non-supporter) 
and the requester’s Service (i.e., own or other) was used to examine not only the 
independent effects of each of these factors but also whether Service-loyal disclosure
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outcomes would be accentuated when the potential recipient was an outgroup member 
(i.e., a non-supporter) and attenuated when they were an ingroup member (i.e., a 
supporter). Results of Study 3 showed that the manipulation of identity had a number 
of positive effects on participants’ perceptions about the requester, regardless of the 
requester’s Service. That is, when the requester was an ingroup member, participants 
perceived them to be more trustworthy, and indicated that they would more willing to 
respect their concerns ‘if the tables were turned’ than when the requester was an 
outgroup member. Furthermore, ingroup requesters were also attributed a greater 
need to know the information than outgroup requesters. However, participants were 
no more willing to disclose the information to an ingroup requester than they were to 
an outgroup requester. Additionally, and like in Study 2, the manipulation of the 
requester’s Service had a number of effects on key measures. Most importantly, 
compared to own-Service requesters, those belonging to another Service were 
perceived by participants to have less of a need to know and were less likely to be 
disclosed the information without further delay. These findings shifted the focus of 
the thesis in Chapter 7 toward examining more fully how the second ‘master factor’, 
of perceived risk, shapes disclosure outcomes generally and whether it plays a role in 
the Service-loyal findings observed in Studies 2 and 3.
In Chapter 7, we reviewed three theories of decision-making under risk that 
have been influential within the broader decision-theoretic literature at some time. 
These were subjective expected utility theory (Savage, 1954; von Neumann & 
Morgenstern, 1944), prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), and regret theory 
(Bell, 1982; Loomes & Sugden, 1982). While these theories are rarely mentioned in 
research investigating how people make risky decisions in organizational contexts, 
their core hypotheses are reflected in many of the findings of organizational research 
(see March & Shapira, 1987; Shapira, 1995). Despite this, non-disclosure has not 
been a dependent variable of interest in this literature. Instead, the focus has been on 
management and investment decisions (e.g., Forlani & Mullins, 2000). In order gain 
an insight into the relationship between risk and non-disclosure, we needed to step 
outside the psychological literature and turn to the sociological literature concerning 
organizational secrecy.
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Consistent with the psychological literature examining the relationship 
between perceived risk and self-disclosure (Kelly, 2001; Petronio, 1999), risk is also 
considered to be a major determinant of disclosure outcomes in sociological analyses 
of organizational secrecy (Coser, 1963; B. H. Erickson, 1981; Erickson, 1979; Lowry, 
1972; Shils, 1956; Wilsnack, 1980). In this work, risk is viewed as a factor shaping 
the organization from either the outside or from within. In the former, risk is seen as 
justifying the need for organizational secrecy (Bok, 1984; Erickson, 1979). In the 
latter however, risk is viewed as bringing about dysfunctional disclosure outcomes 
within the organization (see Lowry, 1972; Shils, 1956). Here, other members of the 
organization may be perceived to be malicious in their intent, or thought likely to be 
careless with the information or ignorant of its sensitivities (Erickson, 1979). A 
general hypothesis of problematic non-disclosure of classified information in the ADF 
was formulated along these lines. Specifically, we concluded Chapter 7 by arguing 
that uncertainty as to how classified information may be used leads to the potential 
discloser to be guarded in the attitudes and behaviours toward the potential recipient, 
particularly when the latter belongs to another Service.
In Chapter 8, the guardedness hypothesis was tested. In Study 4, the aim was 
twofold. First, we sought to validate the idea that disclosure of classified information 
within and across Service boundaries is associated with various risks. Second, we 
wished to show that the extent to which the potential discloser lacked confidence 
about these risks was related to their level of confidence about determining need to 
know. To that end, we asked a sample of ADF personnel to rate how confident they 
were about various issues including their ability to predict how classified information 
they disclose might be used and that the recipients of the information would recognise 
and manage any risks to their Service. We also asked them to rate how confident they 
were about determining the need to know of potential recipients. In line with our 
expectations, results indicated that participants were more confident in these respects 
when disclosing would take place within their Service rather than across Service 
boundaries, not that this meant intra-Service disclosure was perceived to be risk-ffee. 
Moreover, findings showed that as participants lost confidence with respect to being 
able to determine how the disclosed information might be used and whether the 
potential recipient would recognise and manage any risks, they also lost confidence 
about their ability to determine a potential recipient’s need to know.
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On the basis of these findings, we tested the guardedness hypothesis more 
directly in Study 5. Specifically, we sought to determine whether perceived risk 
relating to how the potential recipient might use classified information was causally 
related to perceived need to know and prospective disclosure intentions. The study 
was conducted not only against the backdrop of sociological work arguing that this 
class of risk transforms the relations between an organization’s members but also 
against work in organizational decision-making suggesting that guardedness may be 
moderated by the decision-maker’s belief that they retain some form of control over 
decision outcomes (Forlani, 2002; March & Shapira, 1987; Shapira, 1995). That is, 
when the decision-maker believes they can control the outcomes of their decision, 
they will be more willing to make what otherwise appear to be risky decisions. Thus, 
a manipulation of perceived control as to how disclosed information might be used 
(low or high) and requester’s Sendee (own or other) was used to examine not only the 
independent effects of each factor, but whether Service-loyal disclosure outcomes 
were accentuated when perceived control was low and attenuated when it was high.
The findings showed that the manipulation of perceived control had an effect 
on all dependent variables. Specifically, when compared to those who perceived 
themselves to have no control whatsoever over how the disclosed information might 
be used, participants who possessed some control viewed the disclosure scenario as 
far less risky, perceived the requester as having a greater need to know, and were far 
more likely to prospectively disclose the information without further delay. Further, 
perceived need to know was shown to partially mediate the extent to which perceived 
control influenced participants’ intentions to prospectively disclose without delay.
The findings also showed that the requester’s Service only had an impact on only one 
dependent measure, that being the extent to which participants believed that the 
requester would manage any risks to the image of their Service. Moreover, the 
requester’s Service did not interact with perceived control over how the information 
would be used by the potential requester. In light of these latter results, we concluded 
Chapter 8 by drawing on qualitative data to help explain the variance in Service-loyal 
perceptions and intentions observed over the course of the research program. That 
data underscored the complexities associated with the disclosure of classified 
information within and across the Services of the ADF, drawing attention to a number
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of factors outside of experimental control, such as one’s past training and experience 
and the nature of prevailing defence context.
Integration and implications
Provided they possess an adequate-level security clearance, it is assumed that 
ADF personnel come to know classified information when they have a ‘need to know’ 
that information. The intent of this thesis was not to challenge this assumption as it is 
written here, nor to argue against the use of formal decision-making criteria to govern 
access to classified information. To do so would be both misguided and unhelpful 
since defence organizations, perhaps more than any other, rely upon a system of rules 
to ensure effective disclosure and non-disclosure of their most valuable information. 
However, what this thesis does provide is a psychological account of how ADF 
personnel interpret and respond to these rules. In doing so, it challenges their subtext 
- that an individual’s need to know classified information is impartially determined to 
be either present or absent and that any problematic non-disclosure of classified 
information must be thought of as an aberrant event.
The hypotheses tested in this thesis have emphasized either one of the two 
factors we derived in Chapter 3 as likely to be involved in problematic non-disclosure 
of classified information in the ADF. The first factor was group affiliation and here, 
the group of interest was the potential discloser’s Service. Informed by theory and 
research in the social identity tradition, we derived psychological hypotheses of 
problematic non-disclosure of classified information in the ADF in which Service 
identity was central. It was argued that problematic non-disclosure was likely to be a 
problem with or, more accurately between the Services of the ADF, arising from 
either a self-categorical gulf between the organization’s army, navy and air force 
personnel or the defence ideology of Jointness. Yet, the studies conducted to that end 
made it clear that problematic non-disclosure of the form examined in this thesis is 
not driven by issues relating to Service identity. That is, our results indicate that it is 
not a form of inter-Service rivalry or ‘tribalism’ evoked by Jointness or created by a 
self-categorical gulf that exists between personnel of different Services. Indeed, we 
have shown that ADF personnel can perceive there to be problems with Jointness 
concerning the status and/or distinctiveness of their Service or perceive there to be a
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self-categorical gulf between themselves and other-Service personnel, yet neither 
represents the process that underlies problematic non-disclosure of Service-sensitive 
information between them. Therefore, it would be wrong to the lay the blame for 
problematic non-disclosure of the form we have investigated here at the feet of the 
three Services.
Having said this, we have shown that overtures which make salient a shared 
social identity where behaviour supportive of the participant’s Service is normative 
are likely to evoke a more cooperative orientation amongst ADF personnel. By 
creating such a social identity in Study 3, it was possible to increase the extent to 
which our participants perceived Other-Service personnel as trustworthy, as being on 
‘the same side’, and as having a need to know the information they requested. This 
represents a broadening of the scope of the social identity perspective as it applies to 
organizational practice. Specifically, the findings of Study 3 complement the 
continuing work of social identity theorists to improve intergroup relations in 
organizational contexts by understanding and seeking to manipulate the social 
identification processes that are involved (e.g. Eggins, Reynolds, & Haslam, 2003; 
Haslam et ah, 2003; see also Reynolds, Turner, & Haslam, 2003). Interesting as they 
may be, these processes do not account for the particular phenomenon examined in 
this thesis. Thus, interventions that aim to improve inter-Service relations by 
allowing the Services to express their identities or by orienting ADF personnel toward 
Jointness may be effective in improving some types of inter-Service cooperation, yet 
our results would indicate that they will be of limited utility if the desire is to 
minimize or eliminate problematic non-disclosure of classified information.
The second factor thought to be involved in problematic non-disclosure of 
classified information in the ADF was perceived risk. We examined risk in two forms 
- first, as it relates to the consequences of not disclosing (the pilot study and Study 1) 
and second, as it relates to the consequences of disclosing (Study’s 4 and 5). With 
respect to the latter, and informed by the sociological literature concerning 
organizational secrecy, we derived a psychological hypothesis which we have termed 
the guardedness hypothesis. This hypothesis formed an alternative to those in which 
Service affiliation and identity were central. Core to the guardedness hypothesis is 
the idea that the intentions of the potential recipient (or recipients) of classified
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information can never be known with complete certainty. Specifically, it holds that 
problematic non-disclosure of classified information is a guarded or protective 
response to the risk that the potential discloser perceives with respect to how the 
intended recipient might use the information if disclosed. The studies conducted to 
test the guardedness hypothesis yielded findings that were strongly in its favour. The 
findings of Study 4 indicated that as personnel grew less confident with respect to the 
risks associated with disclosing, so too did they become less confident with 
determining need to know. Moreover, we were able to show in Study 5 that it was 
possible to vary the extent to which participants perceived the disclosure of Service- 
sensitive classified information to be risky by manipulating the extent to which they 
felt they had some control over how the recipient would use the information. In doing 
so, it was possible to systematically vary both participants’ perception of another’s 
need to know the information and their disclosure intentions.
On the basis of these findings, we are now in a position to offer an answer to 
the question that has guided this thesis. In line with the guardedness hypothesis, ADF 
personnel may decide not to disclose classified information about their Service, 
despite this being potentially problematic to the ADF as whole, because of the 
perceived risks associated with how the information may be used either by the 
recipient or further ‘down the line’. Problematic non-disclosure of the type examined 
here is a protective response to this perceived risk, one that seeks to protect both the 
interests of the Service involved and of the potential discloser. Therefore, rather than 
represent a phenomenon where Service boundaries and identity play a central role, 
problematic non-disclosure of this kind represents a guardedness or circumspection 
amongst ADF personnel that manifests in their perceptions and behavioural intentions 
toward one another. In other words, it is a phenomenon not about Service identities 
nor inter-Service jealousies but about the information environment of the ADF. We 
have showed in this thesis that this information environment is not imperiled by 
strong views about the contributions of the Services to the ADF, nor about Jointness 
and the need to preserve or eliminate Service identity. Rather, problematic non­
disclosure of the type examined here is a more nuanced and complex phenomenon. It 
is one in which the information environment of the ADF is imperiled by perceived 
uncertainty as to how classified information might be used once disclosed. Further, it 
is one in which Service boundaries may come into sharp relief or evaporate
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completely depending on those involved and the prevailing organizational culture and 
context.
In light of the evidence for the guardedness hypothesis, a simple analysis 
would be one that implies there is a lack of trust between ADF personnel. That is, if 
there were greater trust between ADF personnel, there would be less need for the 
potential discloser of classified information to be guarded or protective in their 
orientation. Yet this simple analysis is inadequate and inaccurate. We have shown in 
this thesis that through a manipulation of social identity that it was to possible to 
systematically vary the extent to which our participants trusted the potential recipient 
of Service-sensitive classified information with respect to managing the information 
with care. Yet, it was clear that prospective disclosure intentions did not follow the 
contours of this trust in particular and social identity in general, as would be expected 
if the simple analysis were correct. The support we have obtained for the guardedness 
hypothesis implies more about the information environment of the ADF than the level 
of trust between the potential discloser and recipient at any given time. Specifically, 
it implies that the information environment of the ADF is one compartmentalised not 
only by formal security policy but by a culture of circumspection. Put another way, 
problematic non-disclosure reflects an information environment dominated by norms 
of cautiousness rather than norms of distrust. Arguably, these norms extend beyond 
the potential recipient of classified information as the locus of risk to encompass a 
more general sense of uncertainty with how information might be used by others in 
the immediate and not so immediate setting.
What does an information-environment compartmentalised by a culture of 
circumspection mean for the ADF? First, and on the basis of the findings reported in 
this thesis, it means that explicit attempts to de-compartmentalise the information 
environment (as far as is possible) that appeal to a sense of shared identity will be 
limited in their utility, and this has been discussed at some length above. Second, a 
simple analysis of the support that we have obtained for the guardedness hypothesis 
might imply that organizational policies and procedures must now seek to compel the 
potential recipient of Service-sensitive to articulate how this information is to be used. 
However, there are limits to the extent to which this is possible and indeed, desirable. 
Information can be used in a vast number of ways and therefore any formulation of
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such proscriptions as to how it can and cannot be used would no doubt be difficult if 
not impossible. More importantly however, the modem defence organization requires 
flexibility in how it uses classified information and in who comes to use it. 
Proscriptions as to how a certain piece of sensitive classified information can be used 
would represent a further layer of formalization over and above that which exists 
already. Thus, this simple analysis of the implications of the thesis could exacerbate 
rather than attenuate problematic non-disclosure.
The answer we have provided to the question guiding this research has been 
psychological in nature. Thus, the way forward for the ADF must be one that takes 
account of the psychology that is central to the guardedness hypothesis. Specifically, 
it is one that involves changing how ADF personnel perceive the organization and its 
processes rather than changing the formal rules and policies that they are expected to 
comply with. The knowledge that ADF personnel have about the risks associated 
with the disclosure of classified information is key to this change. Problematic non­
disclosure of the type examined here is avoidable to the extent that the potential 
discloser knows the needs and roles of the potential recipient(s) of the information.
Put another way, in being about uncertainty, the solution to problematic non­
disclosure of this type rests upon bringing about certainty. Thus, forms of cross­
training of briefings in which individuals come to know how sensitive information 
will be used ‘down the line’ would appear to be an important component of any future 
steps taken to avoid problematic non-disclosure of classified information in the ADF. 
More specifically, rather than have personnel move from one area of the information 
environment to another, the findings of this thesis suggest that it would be particularly 
important to be more systematic in this process. ADF personnel must come to acquire 
within the context of their posting cycles a knowledge of the ‘information life-cycle’. 
In doing so, one acquires not only a knowledge of the perceived risk at the point of 
disclosure but of how these risks are recognised and ultimately managed by those 
further along the line. This recommendation is not to say that changing the way ADF 
personnel perceive the organization and its processes is an easy task. However, in this 
case, it is a necessary one.
By way of recapitulation, three statements can be made regarding the 
psychology of problematic non-disclosure in the ADF context as it relates to classified
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information that is sensitive to the interests of the Services. These statements refer to 
the key insights obtained throughout the course of this thesis. Specifically:-
1. Problematic non-disclosure of classified information in the ADF is not a form of 
inter-Service ‘tribalism’ founded on issues relating to Service identity. Therefore, 
neither tribalism, Jointness, nor any other phenomenon in which Service identity 
is likely to be central can be part of its solution.
2. Problematic non-disclosure of classified information in the ADF will not 
necessarily emerge around the ADF’s Service boundaries. Any efforts made to 
break down inter-Service boundaries will not solve problematic non-disclosure of 
this kind.
3. Problematic non-disclosure of classified information in the ADF is a response to 
perceived risk and uncertainty as to how the information will be used. The key to 
solving or avoiding problematic non-disclosure of the kind examined here lies in 
increasing the knowledge of ADF personnel in this regard.
In the following sections, some limitations and considerations of the thesis are 
outlined, some future directions are specified, and a final comment regarding the 
broader implications of this thesis is made.
Limitations and considerations
Ecological validity
It is important to recognise that, despite the fact that ADF personnel were 
utilized as study participants, these findings were obtained within the context of 
scenario-based experimental manipulations. Clearly, it would have been ideal to be 
able to examine the extent to which these factors affected the disclosure of actual 
classified information in ‘live’ (or sufficiently simulated) defence environments with 
extraneous factors held constant. Therefore, it is possible that our manipulations may 
not accurately reflect actual disclosure intentions and outcomes. However, while 
scenario-based manipulations carry constraints relating to ecological validity, it is
196
through research designs of this type that psychological processes can be isolated (see 
Haslam & McGarty, 2003; Turner, 1981b). Indeed, we must also recognise that any 
study of the factors affecting the disclosure of actual classified information in 
relatively naturalistic setting would have invariably been influenced by extraneous 
factors out of our experimental control, as in arguably the case with regard to the 
varying degrees of Service-loyalty observed throughout the studies presented here.
Sample consistency
One of the primary considerations in being able to conduct quantitative 
research with serving-ADF personnel was to minimize the degree of disruption that 
the data gathering phases caused. In order to obtain a sufficient amount of data over 
the course of a number of studies, it was necessary to disperse this disruption widely 
by drawing participants from more than one area of the ADF. To that end, the 
empirical work in this thesis has involved participants from a variety of organizations. 
While the majority were employed at the time of their participation in ‘single-Service’ 
organizations, these have been at both the strategic (e.g., AHQ, NHQ, & AFHQ) and 
operational (e.g., MHQ, LHQ) levels of the ADF. Additionally, personnel were also 
drawn from ‘tri-Service’ organizations (e.g., DMO, KSS, CSS) and other 
organizations formally designated as ‘Joint’ (e.g., DJFHQ, HQNORCOM). Within 
studies, statistical analyses consistently showed that the type of organization from 
which participants were drawn had no significant effects on the various perceptions 
and disclosure intentions measured (nor for that matter did the particular Service 
participants belonged to). However, it was impossible to determine the extent to 
which this was the case between studies, with the sample of personnel shifting to 
some extent with each study. As argued above, it is possible that the varying nature 
of the organizational samples employed across the studies contributed the variability 
with which Service-loyal perceptions and disclosure intentions were evident in our 
results. In spite of this limitation, we have been able to observe a remarkable degree 
of consistency in some results across the samples employed. Furthermore, the 
varying nature of these samples also provides an insight into the varied cultures 
contained within the ADF.
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The strategic defence environment
The results of all social-psychological research must be understood in terms of 
the prevailing social context, particularly that conducted within naturalistic settings. 
During the course of this research, the prevailing context as it related to military and 
defence affairs in Australia and internationally was shaped by a number of significant 
events. The most significant beyond doubt were the terrorist attacks in the United 
States of September 11, 2001, which ultimately drew a considerable contingent of 
ADF personnel from each Service into war in both Afghanistan and Iraq. However, 
there were also a number of other events that took place during the course of the 
research in which the media spotlight was focused on the ADF more directly. These 
included the ‘Children Overboard’ issue and the Bali bombings. It is possible that 
these events influenced how our participants responded to many of the disclosure 
scenarios in the studies reported in this thesis. In the wake of September 11, 2001, for 
example, ADF personnel may have been generally more cooperative in their 
perceptual and behavioural orientations toward one another than they were before the 
tragedy. Clearly, the nature of the research issue here rendered it impossible to 
control for such effects. Therefore the present findings must be viewed against the 
richly textured backdrop of the strategic defence environment.
Future directions
Service-loyalty
Clearly, finding that problematic non-disclosure of classified information in 
the ADF may also be likely to surface, to a greater or lesser extent, around the 
organization’s Service boundaries has implications for Jointness. After many years of 
development and debate, Jointness and inter-Service cooperation have emerged as 
conceptual mainstays around which many major Australian military policies have 
been developed (Behm et al., 2001). A central and necessary aspect of these policies 
is achieving ‘interoperability’ between the three Services in both a technological and 
doctrinal sense. However, empirical findings reported throughout this thesis imply 
that interoperability on these dimensions may be of little value if Service boundaries 
are to emerge as psychologically salient barriers that denote Other-Service personnel
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as less trustworthy recipients of Service-sensitive classified information than own- 
Service personnel. It would be comforting to believe that by taking care of issues 
relating to both shared identity and perceived control, inter-Service boundaries would 
not longer constitute such a barrier. However, the results of our studies caution 
against making such a conclusion. It may prove worthwhile therefore, for future 
research to examine more closely the factors that evoke Service-loyalty in some 
military contexts and not others.
Beyond the ADF
Clearly, the ADF does not exist in a vacuum. Instead, the organization lies at 
the heart of a tightly interwoven network of organizations, each of which depends to 
some degree, on the others in order to make a positive contribution to the total 
defence effort. One of the most important interdependencies in this respect is that 
between military (i.e. ADF) and civilian personnel. Over the past few years, the 
extent to which military and civilian members of the ADO have been brought together 
in fully integrated organizations has increased dramatically. Furthermore, a number 
of the organizations upon which the ADF is dependent in a number of ways are 
staffed by a majority of civilian personnel. Throughout the course of this thesis, many 
participants expressed a concern that information-sharing between military and 
civilian elements of the ADO needed to be improved. Indeed, in light of the findings 
of this thesis, it is somewhat ironic that a participant in Study 1 wrote:
The civilian side of Defence is one of the worst offenders when it comes to 
sharing information. They still staunchly protect their information in some areas 
because they feel that the military either do not know what they are doing, or will 
misuse the information. (Study 1, Participant 42)
It is desirable therefore that future research extend our current focus on inter-Service 
boundaries to that boundary, perceived or real, between military and civilian 
personnel of the ADO. There is, however, more that can be said on this point. It is 
the case that future ADF operations are likely to be conducted in partnership with 
military forces from other nations (Behm, et al., 2001). The recent ADF-led operation 
in East Timor, for example, involved military forces from a number of countries, 
many of which had little or no prior working relationship with the ADF. Given this, it
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would seem appropriate to also extend the scope of the ideas examined in the thesis to 
include an analyses of problematic non-disclosure of classified information not only 
within the ADF but between this organization and those of other nations with whom it 
must cooperate to achieve operational success.
Final comment
A primary implication of this thesis is that we are likely to be misguided by 
the prevailing assumption that structural and technological improvement agendas in 
and o f themselves, will enhance the exchange of classified information between ADF 
personnel. To date, contemporary defence science and policy in both Australia and 
elsewhere has succeeded in drawing attention to the need to examine new 
organizational structures that may be more responsive in dealing with the vast array of 
non-traditional functions that military organizations are required to fulfil (see Warne, 
Ali et ah, 2003). It has succeeded to an even greater extent in terms of specifying and 
developing complex information technologies capable of increasing the volume, 
speed, and breadth with which classified information can be exchanged amongst 
defence personnel (see Wilson, 2004). On the basis of the work reported here, what is 
required now is an approach that looks beyond these factors and also resists the 
temptation to relegate the disclosure and non-disclosure of classified information to 
the status of a simple ‘security matter’.
At the very beginning of the thesis, reference was made to a phenomenon 
known colloquially as “the Wall” (United States House Committee, 2002). Complex, 
politically thorny, and problematic, the Wall is as much a psychological phenomenon 
as it is a procedural or a physical one. In this thesis, we have taken the first steps 
toward teasing out the psychological ‘building blocks’ of the Wall as it might relate to 
the ADF. In doing so, work from across psychology and sociology has been brought 
together to formulate relevant psychological hypotheses and these have been tested 
with ADF personnel in the context of their daily work environments. In many 
respects, the teasing out of the psychological factors likely to be at work here has been 
a difficult process. Yet, these initial steps mark a shift in the study of contemporary 
defence problems and with the impeding arrival of network-centric warfare, this shift 
is needed now more than ever.
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A p p e n d i x  A
D E P A R T M E N T  O F  D E F E N C E
D E F E N C E  S C I E N C E  & T E C H N O L O G Y  O R G A N I S A T I O N DSTO
RESEARCH ON TRUST AND DISCLOSURE 
WITHIN THE STRATEGIC DEFENCE ENTERPRISE
Introduction
The knowledge environment of the ADF, especially as it relates to C3I decision-making, 
depends primarily upon the disclosure and non-disclosure of information within and between 
its elements. The aim of this study is to investigate how strategic-level ADF personnel make 
decisions about disclosing information within the Defence enterprise. Gaining an awareness 
of such decision-making will begin to provide a deeper understanding of the Defence 
knowledge environment.
This study is part of a broader research program within Joint Systems Branch, DSTO, 
and is expected to complement work being conducted under the Enterprise Social Learning 
Architectures Task (JNT 98/004) and the ADF Cultural Survey. It also forms part of a PhD 
being conducted at the ANU.
Please be assured that participation in this research is entirely on a voluntary basis and 
that all information you provide is anonymous and confidential. If you have any questions 
relating to this study or would like more information about the broader research program, 
please don’t hesitate to contact me.
Derek Bopping 
Joint Systems Branch,
DSTO
02- 6265-8826
derek.boppinu@dsto.defence.gov.au
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INSTRUCTIONS
1. Please read the hypothetical scenarios and the associated ‘dilemmas’ as they are 
presented in turn.
2. Then respond to the questions following each dilemma, by circling a number, ticking 
a box, or marking a line, where indicated.
3. Upon completion of the dilemmas, please fill-in the ‘General Attitudes’ and 
‘Participant Details’ sections.
4. You may provide any comments on the final page.
This questionnaire should take around 15 minutes to complete.
A NOTE ABOUT THE DILEMMAS
5. Some of the hypothetical dilemmas presented here entail decisions that may be more 
difficult to make compared to others.
In those dilemmas it is appreciated that you would usually want to obtain more 
information before making decisions.
Please assume though that in all these dilemmas the information you are presented is 
all that is available.
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SCENARIO A
Scenario A below provides the backdrop to Dilemmas 1 - 4 .
In the course of your normal working week you meet regularly with an ADF friend to 
informally discuss strategic-level Defence projects.
On this particular occasion, your friend shares with you some information outlining 
upcoming changes to the funding of certain projects. These changes would 
immediately interrupt a number of major projects with important force structure and 
capability implications.
Your friend informs you that this information is reliable and trusts you not to provide 
the information to others.
236
DILEMMA 1
Imagine yourself in Scenario A and you now face a dilemma where:-
Providing the information to others will permanently damage the valued relationship 
you have established with your ADF friend who has trusted you not to disclose the 
information, yet...
Not providing the information to others will cause an ADF colleague from another 
work area within your Headquarters to make a bad decision that will unfairly limit their 
career advancement prospects.
(a) In this dilemma, how important do you think it is to maintain the trust of your ADF 
friend who provided you with the information? (please circle one number)
Not at all important 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Very important
(b) In this dilemma, how important do you think it is to provide the information to others? 
(please circle one number)
Not at all important 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Very important
(c) What would you decide in this dilemma? (please tick only one box)
I I I would not provide the information to others 
I I I would provide the information to others
(d) What percentage of peers from your Headquarters would you expect to decide as you did 
in this dilemma? (please mark the line with an x ’ at any point)
0% 100%
(e) How confident are you that your decision in this dilemma is the most appropriate 
decision? (please circle one number)
Not at all confident 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Very confident
237
DILEMMA 2
Again, imagine yourself in Scenario A and you now face a dilemma where:-
Providing the information to others will permanently damage the valued relationship 
you have established with your ADF friend who has trusted you not to disclose the 
information, yet...
Not providing the information to others will result in a significant and costly disruption 
to the implementation of a major project belonging to your Service.
(a) In this dilemma, how important do you think it is to maintain the trust of your ADF 
friend who provided you with the information? (please circle one number)
Not at all important 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Very important
(b) In this dilemma, how important do you think it is to provide the information to others? 
(please circle one number)
Not at all important 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Very important
(c) What would you decide in this dilemma? (please tick only one box)
I I I would not provide the information to others 
I I I would provide the information to others
(d) What percentage of peers from your Headquarters would you expect to decide as you did 
in this dilemma? (please mark the line with an x ’ at any point)
100%0%
(e) How confident are you that your decision in this dilemma is the most appropriate 
decision? (please circle one number)
Not at all confident 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Very confident
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DILEMMA 3
Again, imagine yourself in Scenario A and you now face a dilemma where:-
Providing the information to others will permanently damage the valued relationship 
you have established with your ADF friend who has trusted you not to disclose the 
information, yet...
Not providing the information to others will result in a significant and costly disruption 
to the implementation of a major project belonging to another Service.
(a) In this dilemma, how important do you think it is to maintain the trust of your ADF 
friend who provided you with the information? (please circle one number)
Not at all important 1 2 3 4  5 6 7 Very important
(b) In this dilemma, how important do you think it is to provide the information to others? 
(please circle one number)
Not at all important 1 2 3 4  5 6 7 Very important
(c) What would you decide in this dilemma? (please tick only one box)
I I I would not provide the information to others 
I I I would provide the information to others
(d) What percentage of peers from your Headquarters would you expect to decide as you did 
in this dilemma? (please mark the line with an X’ at any point)
0% 100%
(e) How confident are you that your decision in this dilemma is the most appropriate 
decision? (please circle one number)
Not at all confident 1 2 3 4  5 6 7 Very confident
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DILEMMA 4
Again, imagine yourself in Scenario A and you now face a dilemma where:-
Providing the information to others will permanently damage the valued relationship 
you have established with your ADF friend who has trusted you not to disclose the 
information, yet...
Not providing the information to others will lead to a situation in which certain 
strategic and operational areas of the ADF will be severely compromised in their 
ability to achieve key goals, and will likely lead to an increased risk of casualties to 
ADF personnel.
(a) In this dilemma, how important do you think it is to maintain the trust of your ADF 
friend who provided you with the information? (please circle one number)
Not at all important 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Very important
(b) In this dilemma, how important do you think it is to provide the information to others? 
(please circle one number)
Not at all important 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Very important
(c) What would you decide in this dilemma? (please tick only one box)
I I I would not provide the information to others 
I I I would provide the information to others
(d) What percentage of peers from your Headquarters would you expect to decide as you did 
in this dilemma? (please mark the line with an X’ at any point)
0% 100%
(e) How confident are you that your decision in this dilemma is the most appropriate 
decision? (please circle one number)
Not at all confident 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Very confident
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SCENARIO B
Scenario B below provides the backdrop to Dilemmas 5 - 8
In the course of your normal work duties you are involved in the development and 
management of a range of strategic-level Defence projects.
On this particular occasion your work area provides you with some information 
outlining upcoming changes to the structure and staffing of certain projects. These 
changes would immediately interrupt a number of major projects with important force
I
structure and capability implications.
Your work area informs you this information is reliable and you are directed not to 
provide the information to others outside your work area.
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DILEMMA 5
Imagine yourself in Scenario B and you now face a dilemma where:-
Providing the information to others outside your work area will break the confidence 
it had established. This will result in you receiving an informal reprimand which will 
not be explicitly referred to on your annual report, but may affect your immediate career 
advancement prospects, yet...
Not providing the information to others outside your work area will cause an ADF 
colleague from another work area within your Headquarters to make a bad decision 
that will unfairly limit their career advancement prospects.
(a) In this dilemma, how important do you think it is to maintain the confidence established 
by your work area? (please circle one number)
Not at all important 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Very important
(b) In this dilemma, how important do you think it is to provide the information to others 
outside your work area? (please circle one number)
Not at all important 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Very important
(c) What would you decide in this dilemma? (please tick only one box)
I I I would not provide the information to others outside my work area 
I I I would provide the information to others outside my work area
(d) What percentage of peers from your Headquarters would you expect to decide as you did 
in this dilemma? (please mark the line with an x’ at any point)
0% 100%
(e) How confident are you that your decision in this dilemma is the most appropriate 
decision? (please circle one number)
Not at all confident 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Very confident
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DILEMMA 6
Again, imagine yourself in Scenario B and you now face a dilemma where:-
Providing the information to others outside your work area will break the confidence 
it had established. This will result in you receiving an informal reprimand which will 
not be explicitly referred to on your annual report, but may affect your immediate career 
advancement prospects, yet...
Not providing the information to others outside your work area will result in a 
significant and costly disruption to the implementation of a major project belonging to 
your Service.
(a) In this dilemma, how important do you think it is to maintain the confidence established 
by your work area? (please circle one number)
Not at all important 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Very important
(b) In this dilemma, how important do you think it is to provide the information to others 
outside your work area? (please circle one number)
Not at all important 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Very important
(c) What would you decide in this dilemma? (please tick only one box)
I I I would not provide the information to others outside my work area 
I I I would provide the information to others outside my work area
(d) What percentage of peers from your Headquarters would you expect to decide as you did 
in this dilemma? (please mark the line with an X’ at any point)
0% 100%
(e) How confident are you that your decision in this dilemma is the most appropriate 
decision? (please circle one number)
Not at all confident 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Very confident
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DILEMMA 7
Again, imagine yourself in Scenario B and you now face a dilemma where
Providing the information to others outside your work area will break the confidence 
it had established. This will result in you receiving an informal reprimand which will 
not be explicitly referred to on your annual report, but may affect your immediate career 
advancement prospects, yet...
Not providing the information to others outside your work area will result in a 
significant and costly disruption to the implementation of a major project belonging to 
another Service.
(a) In this dilemma, how important do you think it is to maintain the confidence established 
by your work area? (please circle one number)
Not at ali important 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Very important
(b) In this dilemma, how important do you think it is to provide the information to others 
outside your work area? (please circle one number)
Not at all important 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Very important
(c) What would you decide in this dilemma? (please tick only one box)
I I I would not provide the information to others outside my work area 
I I I would provide the information to others outside my work area
(d) What percentage of peers from your Headquarters would you expect to decide as you did 
in this dilemma? (please mark the line with an x ’ at any point)
0% 100%
(e) How confident are you that your decision in this dilemma is the most appropriate 
decision? (please circle one number)
Not at all confident 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Very confident
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DILEMMA 8
Again, imagine yourself in Scenario B and you now face a dilemma where:-
Providing the information to others outside your work area will break the confidence 
it had established. This will result in you receiving an informal reprimand which will 
not be explicitly referred to on your annual report, but may affect your immediate career 
advancement prospects, yet...
Not providing the information to others outside your work area will lead to a situation 
in which certain strategic and operational areas of the ADF will be severely 
compromised in their ability to achieve key goals, and will likely lead to an increased 
risk of casualties to ADF personnel.
(a) In this dilemma, how important do you think it is to maintain the confidence established 
by your work area? (please circle one number)
Not at all important 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Very important
(b) In this dilemma, how important do you think it is to provide the information to others 
outside your work area? (please circle one number)
Not at all important 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Very important
(c) What would you decide in this dilemma? (please tick only one box)
I I I would not provide the information to others outside my work area 
I I I would provide the information to others outside my work area
(d) What percentage of peers from your Headquarters would you expect to decide as you did 
in this dilemma? (please mark the line with an x ’ at any point)
(e) How confident are you that your decision in this dilemma is the most appropriate 
decision? (please circle one number)
0% 100%
Not at all confident 2 3 4 5 6 7 Very confident
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SCENARIO C
Scenario C below provides the backdrop to Dilemmas 9-12.
In the course of your normal work duties you are privy to classified information 
about ADF activities. Upon receipt of official requests you provide this information 
to other areas of the ADF.
On this particular occasion, for reasons beyond your control, no time is available 
for an official request to be made and instead you have been asked to provide the 
information unofficially.
Assume that providing the information unofficially would not adversely affect any 
current or planned ADF operation.
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DILEMMA 9
Imagine yourself in Scenario C and you now face a dilemma where:-
Providing the information unofficially will constitute a breach of national security and 
will lead to an investigation that will reveal prima facie  commission of an offence 
under the Crimes Act, yet...
Not providing the information to those making the unofficial request will cause an ADF 
colleague from another work area within your Headquarters to make a bad decision that 
will unfairly limit their career advancement prospects.
(a) In this dilemma, how important do you think it is to only provide the information to 
those making an official request? (please circle one number)
Not at all important 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Very important
(b) In this dilemma, how important do you think it is to provide the information to those 
making the unofficial request? (please circle one number)
Not at all important 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Very important
(c) What would you decide in this dilemma? (please tick only one box)
I I I would not provide the information to those making unofficial requests 
I I I would provide the information to those making unofficial requests
(d) What percentage of peers from your Headquarters would you expect to decide as you did 
in this dilemma? (please mark the line with an X ’ at any point)
0% 100%
(e) How confident are you that your decision in this dilemma is the most appropriate 
decision? (please circle one number)
Not at all confident 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Very confident
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DILEMMA 10
Again, imagine yourself in Scenario C and you now face a dilemma where:-
Providing the information unofficially will constitute a breach of national security and 
will lead to an investigation that will reveal prima facie  commission of an offence 
under the Crimes Act, yet...
Not providing the information to those making the unofficial request will result in a 
significant and costly disruption to the implementation of a major project belonging to 
your Service.
(a) In this dilemma, how important do you think it is to only provide the information to 
those making an official request? (please circle one number)
Not at all important 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Very important
(b) In this dilemma, how important do you think it is to provide the information to those 
making the unofficial request? (please circle one number)
Not at all important 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Very important
(c) What would you decide in this dilemma? (please tick only one box)
I I I would not provide the information to those making unofficial requests 
I I I would provide the information to those making unofficial requests
(d) What percentage of peers from your Headquarters would you expect to decide as you did 
in this dilemma? (please mark the line with an X ’ at any point)
0% 100%
(e) How confident are you that your decision in this dilemma is the most appropriate 
decision? (please circle one number)
Not at all confident 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Very confident
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DILEMMA 11
Again, imagine yourself in Scenario C and you now face a dilemma where:-
Providing the information unofficially will constitute a breach of national security and 
will lead to an investigation that will reveal prima facie commission of an offence 
under the Crimes Act, yet...
Not providing the information to those making the unofficial request will result in a 
significant and costly disruption to the implementation of a major project belonging to 
another Service.
(a) In this dilemma, how important do you think it is to only provide the information to 
those making an official request? (please circle one number)
Not at all important 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Very important
(b) In this dilemma, how important do you think it is to provide the information to those 
making the unofficial request? (please circle one number)
Not at all important 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Very important
(c) What would you decide in this dilemma? (please tick only one box)
I I I would not provide the information to those making unofficial requests 
I I I would provide the information to those making unofficial requests
(d) What percentage of peers from your Headquarters would you expect to decide as you did 
in this dilemma? (please mark the line with an X’ at any point)
0% 100%
(e) How confident are you that your decision in this dilemma is the most appropriate 
decision? (please circle one number)
Not at all confident 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Very confident
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DILEMMA 12
Again, imagine yourself in Scenario C and you now face a dilemma where:-
Providing the information unofficially will constitute a breach of national security and 
will lead to an investigation that will reveal prima facie commission of an offence 
under the Crimes Act, yet...
Not providing the information to the unofficial request will lead to a situation in which 
certain strategic and operational areas of the ADF will be severely compromised in their 
ability to achieve key goals, and will likely lead to an increased risk of casualties to 
ADF personnel.
(a) In this dilemma, how important do you think it is to only provide the information to 
those making an official request? (please circle one number)
Not at ali important 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Very important
(b) In this dilemma, how important do you think it is to provide the information to those 
making the unofficial request? (please circle one number)
Not at all important 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Very important
(c) What would you decide in this dilemma? (please tick only one box)
I I I would not provide the information to those making unofficial requests 
I I I would provide the information to those making unofficial requests
(d) What percentage of peers from your Headquarters would you expect to decide as you did 
in this dilemma? (please mark the line with an X ’ at any point)
(e) How confident are you that your decision in this dilemma is the most appropriate 
decision? (please circle one number)
Not at all confident 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Very confident
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GENERAL ATTITUDES
Please indicate the extent to which you agree with the following statements:- 
(please circle one number)
(a) I identify with my work area
Not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 A  g rea t deal
(b) I identify with my Service
Not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 A  g rea t deal
(c) I identify with the ADF as a whole
Not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 A  g rea t deal
(d) I feel strong ties with the personnel of my work area 
Not at all i 2 3 4 5 6 7 A  g rea t deal
(e) I feel strong ties with the personnel of my Service 
Not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 A  g rea t deal
(f) I feel strong ties with the personnel of the ADF as a whole 
Not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 A  g rea t deal
(g) I am committed to the aims of my work area 
Not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 A  g rea t deal
(h) I am committed to the aims of my Service
Not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 A  g rea t deal
(i) I am committed to the aims of the ADF as a whole 
Not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 A  g rea t deal
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PARTICIPANT DETAILS
Again, as with all the information you have provided, your answers here are entirely 
confidential (please tick where appropriate).
1. What is your age? < 25 □  25-34 □  35-44 □  45-54 □  > 55 □
2. What is your sex? Male Q  Female Q
3. What is your ADF rank?
Navy
LCDR and below Q CMDR □ CAPT □ CDRE and above □
Army
MAJ and below Q LTCOL □ COL □ BRIG and above □
Air Force 
SQNLDR and □ WGCDR □ GPCAPT □ AIRCDRE and □
below above
4. To what level is your current ADO clearance?
UNCLASSIFIED □ SECRET □ TOP SECRET 1
to CONFIDENTIAL and above
5. For how long have you worked within the ADF?
0-5 yrs □ 5-10 yrs □ 10-15 yrs \Z\
15-20 yrs □ 20-25yrs EH 25+ yrs Q
Please provide any comments you may have overleaf. 
Thank you for your participation.
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COMMENTS:
Appendix B
D E P A R T M E N T  O F  D E F E N C E
D E F E N C E  S C I E N C E  &  T E C H N O L O G Y  O R G A N I S A T I O N
This questionnaire continues a program of research that examines the knowledge environment 
of the Defence enterprise. It also forms part of a Ph.D being conducted at the Australian 
National University.
Your participation is entirely voluntary. To ensure anonymity, no personally identifying 
information (e.g., name, position) is requested. Hence, the results will not be reported (in any 
report or forum) in a way that identifies participants. The questionnaire should take 5 minutes 
to complete.
The researcher is responsible for secure storage of completed questionnaires at the DSTO C3 
Research Centre. Results will be made available to any participant upon request. If you have 
any questions relating to this research, please do not hesitate to contact me.
Derek Bopping
DSTO
derek.bopping@dsto.defence.gov.au 02-625-66226
INSTRUCTIO NS
In this questionnaire, a stated opinion and a short scenario provide the backdrop to a 
number of questions.
Please respond to each question by circling the number that best represents your answer. 
Comments are most welcome on the final page.
To begin, please respond to the following 3 statements by circling one number:
1 . I identify with my Service.
1 2  3  4  5
Not at all
6 7
A great deal
2. I feel strong ties with the personnel of my Service.
1 2  3  4  5
Not at all
6 7
A great deal
3. I am committed to the aims of my Service.
1 2  3  4  5
Not at all
6 7
A great deal
There are several opinions held by members of the ADF about the issue of Jointness. 
The quote shown below reflects one of the most common opinions.
“In the ADF, we work as a Joint team -  a team where Jointness sets the standards, a team that knows 
Jointness is inseparable from real capability...
The single-Service ethos is dead (or it should be dead). Retaining a ‘single-Service mentality’ is an 
excuse for not moving with the times. Ridding ourselves of single-Service traditions and replacing 
them with Joint values is the way to achieve responsiveness.
.. .In Jointness, the potential of our forces is realised. Outdated ideas about ‘single-Service loyalty’ 
compromise that potential. Such loyalty has no relevance, as our future is Joint.”
To what extent do you agree with the following statements:
1. I share this view of Jointness.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Not at all Very much
2. This view of Jointness should be widely accepted by all members of the ADF.
1
Not at all Very much
3. This view of Jointness is compatible with the traditions of my Service.
1
Not at all Very much
4. This view of Jointness has been imported into the ADF from other military 
organizations (e.g., in Canada, U.S.).
1
Not at all Very much
5. This view of Jointness is being pushed by some prominent parts of the ADF.
1
Not at all Very much
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There are several opinions held by members of the ADF about the issue of Jointness. 
The quote shown below reflects one of the most common opinions.
“In the ADF we must work as a Joint team -  one capable of integrating the unique abilities of each 
Service, one that can focus single-Service strengths into optimal capabilities.
.. .Our single-Service traditions are the building blocks of Jointness. They are, after all, highly 
relevant to Service ethos and performance. Complementing strong Service traditions and ethos with 
Joint concepts, where appropriate, is the way to achieve responsiveness.
.. .Jointness should not get in the way of the Services - it should help each Service to achieve the best 
overall outcomes.”
To what extent do you agree with the following statements:
1. I share this view of Jointness.
1 2 3 4 5
Not at all
6 7
Very much
2. This view of Jointness should be widely accepted by all members of the ADF.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Not at all Very much
3. This view of Jointness is compatible with the traditions of my Service.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Not at all Very much
4. This view of Jointness has been imported into the ADF from other military
organizations (e.g., in Canada, U.S.).
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Not at all Very much
5. This view of Jointness is being pushed by some prominent parts of the ADF.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Not at all Very much
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Please imagine the following scenario:-
You work in an Army Headquarters. As part of your usual work duties, you receive 
information about the readiness of certain force elements belonging to the Army.
On this occasion, you are one of several Army personnel privy to classified 
information that details a temporary lack of readiness of some force elements. The 
reasons for this lack of readiness would be clear to Army personnel, however this 
information could be interpreted by other personnel in a way that would severely 
damage the image of the Army.
Elsewhere, a Joint area is preparing a report on how the principles of Jointness can be 
used to improve the readiness of force elements.
We are interested in how you would respond to a request for the potentially damaging 
information from someone in the Joint area (that you don’t know personally) who is either:-
(a) a cleared member of the Army; or
(b) a cleared member of another Service.
First, imagine the request comes from a cleared member of the Army:-
To what extent would you trust this individual not to allow the information to damage 
the image of the Army?
1 2
Not at all
How likely would you be to:
Very much
2. Provide the information to this individual immediately without further consultation?
1 2
Not at all
7
Very likely
Delay responding to this request in anticipation of a change in readiness circumstances?
1
Not at all
7
Very likely
4. Personally verify this individual’s clearance and/or cneed-to-know’?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Not at all Very likely
5. Seek advice from other Army personnel before deciding whether to provide the 
information to this individual?
1 2
Not at all
6 7
Very likely
6. Pass the responsibility for dealing with this request up the chain-of-command?
1
Not at all
7
Very likely
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Please imagine the following scenario:-
You work in an Army Headquarters. As part of your usual work duties, you receive 
information about the readiness of certain force elements belonging to the Army.
On this occasion, you are one of several Army personnel privy to classified 
information that details a temporary lack of readiness of some force elements.
The reasons for this lack of readiness would be clear to Army personnel, however 
this information could be interpreted by other personnel in a way that would 
severely damage the image of the Army.
Elsewhere, a Joint area is preparing plans for an imminent Joint operational 
deployment which may require those affected force elements.
We are interested in how you would respond to a request for the potentially damaging 
information from someone in the Joint area (that you don’t know personally) who is either:-
(a) a cleared member of the Army; or
(b) a cleared member of another Service.
First, imagine the request comes from a cleared member of the Army:-
1. To what extent would you trust this individual not to allow the information to damage 
the image of the Army?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Not at all Very much
How likely would you be to:
2. Provide the information to this individual immediately without further consultation?
1
Not at all
6 7
Very likely
3. Delay responding to this request in anticipation of a change in readiness circumstances?
1
Not at all
7
Very likely
4. Personally verify this individual’s clearance and/or ‘need-to-know’?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Not at all Very likely
Seek advice from other Army personnel before deciding whether to provide the 
information to this individual?
1 2
Not at all
6 7
Very likely
6. Pass the responsibility for dealing with this request up the chain-of-command?
1
Not at all
7
Very likely
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Now, imagine the request comes from a cleared member of another Service.
1. To what extent would you trust this individual not to allow the information to damage
the image of the Army?
• 1 2  3 4 5 6 7
Not at all Very much
How likely would you be to:
2 . Provide the information to this individual immediately without further consultation?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Not at all Very likely
3. Delay responding to this request in anticipation of a change in readiness circumstances?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Not at all Very likely
4. Personally verify this individual’s clearance or ‘need-to-know’?
1 2 3 4 5 6
Not at all
7
Very likely
5. Seek advice from other Army personnel before deciding whether to provide the 
information to this individual?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Not at all Very likely
6. Pass the responsibility for dealing with this request up the chain-of-command?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Not at all Very likely
Finally,
7. If this information is not provided to anyone in the Joint area, how likely do you think 
it is that key ADF objectives will be compromised?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Not at all Very likely
Demographics:- (please tick where appropriate)
Age:- ______years
Sex:- O  Male Q  Female
Rank:- Q  NCO Q  2LT to CAPT Q  MAJ and above
Current ADO clearance:-
□  Up to CONFIDENTIAL □  SECRET □  TOP SECRET and above 
Years of Army service:- ______years
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Thank you for your participation Comments are most welcome overleaf
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A ppen d ix  C
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENCE
D E F E N C E  S C I E N C E  &  T E C H N O L O G Y  O R G A N I S A T I O N
RESEARCH ON TRUST AND DISCLOSURE IN TH E ADF.
This questionnaire is part of a program of research that examines the knowledge 
environment of the ADF. It also forms part of a PhD being conducted at the Australian 
National University.
Your participation is entirely voluntary. No personally identifying information (e.g., 
name, position) is requested. The questionnaire will take around 5 minutes to complete.
Completed questionnaires will be stored securely at the DSTO C3 Research Centre, 
Canberra. Results will be made available to any participant upon request. For more 
information relating to this research, please do not hesitate to contact me:
Derek Bopping
Defence Science & Technology Organisation 
Phone:02-625-66226
Email: derek.bopping@dsto.defence.gov.au
In this questionnaire, a view of the RAN and a short scenario provide the backdrop 
to a number of questions.
To begin, please indicate the extent to which you agree with the following 3 statements:
(circle one number)
1 . I identify with the Royal Australian Navy.
1 2 3 4  5
Not at all
6 7
A great deal
2 . I feel strong ties with Royal Australian Navy personnel.
1 2 3 4  5
Not at all
6 7
A great deal
3 . I am committed to the aims of the Royal Australian Navy.
1 2 3 4  5
Not at all
6 7
A great deal
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In the ADF, there are competing views of the Royal Australian Navy. One view that 
distinguishes ‘supporters’ of the Navy, is summarised below:
"...The Royal Australian Navy makes a first-rate contribution toward the defence of 
our national interests. The complexities of the maritime environment demand 
exceptional dedication, expertise, and dependability. The Navy has provided, and 
continues to provide these qualities to the ADF. It has built a reputation for excellence 
as a sea power that is underscored by its values of courage, integrity, and loyalty."
Please indicate below whether you share this view
CU Yes, I share this view of the RAN. Q  No, I do not share this view of the RAN.
... and respond to the following items:
I am confident that this view of the RAN truly captures my own personal beliefs.
1 2  3 4
N ot a t all
5 6 7
V ery  m uch
see myself as a supporter of the RAN.
1 2  3 4
N ot a t all
5 6 7
V ery  m uch
We now want you to imagine a scenario that involves yourself and another member of the ADF 
(referred to as ‘Person X’). You will be asked 12 questions about how you would interact 
with Person X. To answer, you need to first consider the following points:
■ Person X is a member of the RAN working on a report about ADF readiness.
■ You know that Person X is a supporter of the RAN -  that is, they genuinely hold the view 
of the RAN presented earlier.
■ Person X asks you for classified information about the readiness of some RAN force 
elements (assume you’re routinely privy to this information). Person X has the appropriate 
level security clearance.
■ The information that Person X requests contains details about force elements being 
temporarily at unsatisfactory levels of readiness. The information could damage the image of 
the RAN if not managed with care.
Please turn the page...
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In the ADF, there are competing views of the Royal Australian Navy. One view that 
distinguishes ‘supporters’ of the Navy, is summarised below:
"...The Royal Australian Navy makes a first-rate contribution toward the defence of 
our national interests. The complexities of the maritime environment demand 
exceptional dedication, expertise, and dependability. The Navy has provided, and 
continues to provide these qualities to the ADF. It has built a reputation for excellence 
as a sea power that is underscored by its values of courage, integrity, and loyalty."
Please indicate below whether you share this view
O  Yes, I share this view of the RAN. O  No, I do not share this view of the RAN.
... and respond to the following items:
I am confident that this view of the RAN truly captures my own personal beliefs.
1 2  3  4
Not  at  al l
5 6 7
Ver y  muc h
I see myself as a supporter of the RAN.
1 2  3  4
Not  at  all
5 6 7
V e ry  m uch
We now want you to imagine a scenario that involves yourself and another member of the ADF 
(referred to as ‘Person X’). You will be asked 12 questions about how you would interact 
with Person X. To answer, you need to first consider the following points:
■ Person X belongs to one of the other Services, and is working on a report about ADF 
readiness.
■ You know that Person X is a supporter of the RAN -  that is, they genuinely hold the view 
of the RAN presented earlier.
■ Person X asks you for classified information about the readiness of some RAN force 
elements (assume you’re routinely privy to this information). Person X has the appropriate 
level security clearance.
■ The information that Person X requests contains details about force elements being 
temporarily at unsatisfactory levels of readiness. The information could damage the image of 
the RAN if not managed with care.
Please turn the page...
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In the ADF, there are competing views of the Royal Australian Navy. One view that 
distinguishes ‘supporters’ of the Navy, is summarised below:
"...The Royal Australian Navy makes a first-rate contribution toward the defence of 
our national interests. The complexities of the maritime environment demand 
exceptional dedication, expertise, and dependability. The Navy has provided, and 
continues to provide these qualities to the ADF. It has built a reputation for excellence 
as a sea power that is underscored by its values of courage, integrity, and loyalty."
Please indicate below whether you share this view
\Z\ Yes, I share this view of the RAN. Q  No, I do not share this view of the RAN.
... and respond to the following items:
I am confident that this view of the RAN truly captures my own personal beliefs.
1 2  3 4
N ot a t all
5 6 7
V ery  m uch
I se e  mysel f  as a suppor t er  of  the RAN.
1 2  3 4
N ot a t all
5 6 7
V ery m uch
We now want you to imagine a scenario that involves yourself and another member of the ADF 
(referred to as ‘Person X’). You will be asked 12 questions about how you would interact 
with Person X. To answer, you need to first consider the following points:
■ Person X is a member of the RAN working on a report about ADF readiness.
■ You know that Person X is not a supporter of the RAN -  that is, they genuinely do not 
hold the view of the RAN presented earlier.
■ Person X asks you for classified information about the readiness of some RAN force 
elements (assume you’re routinely privy to this information). Person X has the appropriate 
level security clearance.
■ The information that Person X requests contains details about force elements being 
temporarily at unsatisfactory levels of readiness. The information could damage the image of 
the RAN if not managed with care.
Please turn the page...
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In the ADF, there are competing views of the Royal Australian Navy. One view that 
distinguishes ‘supporters’ of the Navy, is summarised below:
"...The Royal Australian Navy makes a first-rate contribution toward the defence of 
our national interests. The complexities of the maritime environment demand 
exceptional dedication, expertise, and dependability. The Navy has provided, and 
continues to provide these qualities to the ADF. It has built a reputation for excellence 
as a sea power that is underscored by its values of courage, integrity, and loyalty."
Please indicate below whether you share this view
I I Yes, I share this view of the RAN. O  No, I do not share this view of the RAN.
... and respond to the following items:
I am confident that this view of the RAN truly captures my own personal beliefs.
1 2  3 4
N ot a t all
5 6 7
V ery  m uch
I see myself as a supporter of the RAN.
1 2  3 4
N ot a t all
5 6 7
V ery  m uch
We now want you to imagine a scenario that involves yourself and another member of the ADF 
(referred to as ‘Person X’). You will be asked 12 questions about how you would interact 
with Person X. To answer, you need to first consider the following points:
■ Person X belongs to one of the other Services, and is working on a report about ADF 
readiness.
■ You know that Person X is not a supporter of the RAN -  that is, they genuinely do not 
hold the view of the RAN presented earlier.
■ Person X asks you for classified information about the readiness of some RAN force 
elements (assume you’re routinely privy to this information). Person X has the appropriate 
level security clearance.
■ The information that Person X requests contains details about force elements being 
temporarily at unsatisfactory levels of readiness. The information could damage the image of 
the RAN if not managed with care.
Please turn the page...
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1. To what extent would you feel that Person X respected the Royal Australian Navy?
1
Not at all
6 7
A great deal
To what extent would you feel that you and Person X were “on the same side”?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Not at all A great deal
3. To what extent would you feel that you and Person X were working toward a common goal?
1
Not at all
6 7
A great deal
4. How legitimate would you consider Person X’s ‘need to know’ this information?
1
Not at all Very legitimate
5. How confident would you be that Person X would manage this information with due care?
1
Not at all
6 7
Very confident
6. How important do you think it is that Person X obtain this information?
1
Not at all
6 7
Very important
How likely would you be to...
7. ...provide this information to Person X without further delay?
1 2 3 4 5
Not at all
6 7
Very likely
8. ...delay responding to Person X until the relevant readiness circumstances changed?
1
Not at all
6 7
Very likely
9. ...go to considerable lengths to verify Person X’s security clearance?
1
Not at all
6 7
Very likely
10. ...seek advice from your Navy peers about how to deal with this request?
1
Not at all
6 7
Very likely
11. .. .pass the responsibility for handling this request up the chain-of-command?
1
Not at all
6 7
Very likely
..respect the concerns of Person X ‘if the tables were turned’?
1 2 3 4 5
Not at all
6 7
Very likely
To finish, please complete the personal details section overleaf...
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Personal details:
Age:- ______ years
Sex:- □  Male □  Female
Rank:- □  NCO □  ASLT to LEUT □  LCDR and above
Current ADO clearance:-
□  Up to CONFIDENTIAL □  SECRET □  TOP SECRET and above 
Years of RAN service:- _____years
Thank you for your participation.
Any comments are most welcome below...
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A p p e n d ix  D
DEFENCE
SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY
INTRUCTIONS
1. The aim of this questionnaire is to examine what ADF personnel think about the 
provision of classified information to each other.
2. On the next page, you will be asked to rate how confident you would be about a 
number issues involving the disclosure of classified information in the ADF. Each 
question requires that you respond twice.
That is, on the left hand side of the page, you are asked to respond keeping in mind
disclosure that takes place across Services. See the example below (do not complete).
Exam ple:
How confident would you be about being able to determine “need to know”?
Disclosing across Services
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Not at all Very
confident confident
And, on the right hand side, you are asked to respond to the same question, but this time 
keeping in mind disclosure that takes place completely within your Service:
Disclosing within my Service
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Not at all Very
confident confident
3. It is appreciated that, for some issues, your level of confidence will depend on many 
things (e.g., your experience) and that you would have more information in “real life” 
situations. However, we would appreciate if you would just try to indicate your 
general level of confidence towards the issues presented.
Please turn over...
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How confident would you be...
(a) ...about being able to determine “need to know”?
Disci os inn within mv Service Disciosinq across Services
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Not at all Very Not at all Very
confident confident confident confident
(b) ...about being able to anticipate or predict how the disclosed information might be used?
Disclosina within mv Service Disclosina across Services
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Not at all Very Not at all Very
confident confident confident confident
(c) ...that any risks to your Service associated with disclosing will be reccgnised by the 
recipient(s)?
Disclosing within my Service
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Not at all Very
confident confident
Disclosina across Services
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Not at all Very
confident confident
(d) ...that any risks to your Service associated with disclosing will be managed by the recipient(s)?
Disclosing within my Service
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Not at all Very
confident confident
Disclosina across Services
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Not at all Very
confident confident
(e) ...that you would not be seen as “personally responsible” for disclosing classified information 
that ended up having a negative impact on the image of your Service.
Disclosing within my Service
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Not at all Very
confident confident
Disclosing across Services
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Not at all Very
confident confident
(f) ...about disclosing information about your Service to recipient(s) you do not know personally?
Disclosing within my Service
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Not at all Very
confident confident
Disclosing across Services
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Not at all Very
confident confident
To finish, please complete the personal details section overleaf...
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Personal details:
Age:- ______ years
Sex:- D  Male Ö  Female
Rank:- ö  NCO ö  2LT to CAPT (equivalents) O  MAJ and above (equivalents)
Current ADO clearance:-
□  Up to CONFIDENTIAL □  SECRET □  TOP SECRET and above 
Years of ADF service:- ______years
Thank you for your participation.
Any comments are most welcome below.
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A p p e n d ix  E
D E F E N C E
S C I E N C E & T E C H N O L O G Y
RESEARCH ON DISCLOSURE IN THE ADF.
This questionnaire is part of a program of research that examines the knowledge 
environment of the ADF. It also forms part of a PhD being conducted at the Australian 
National University.
Your participation is entirely voluntary. No personally identifying information (e.g., 
name, position) is requested. The questionnaire will take around 5 minutes to complete.
Completed questionnaires will be stored securely at the DSTO C3 Research Centre, 
Canberra. Results will be made available to any participant upon request. For more 
information relating to this research, please do not hesitate to contact:
Derek Bopping
Defence Science & Technology Organisation 
Phone: 02-6125-0638
Email: derek.bopping@dsto.defence.gov.au derek.bopping@anu.edu.au
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INTRUCTIONS
1. The aim of this questionnaire is to examine what ADF personnel think about the 
provision of classified information to each other.
2. To this end, a short scenario provides the backdrop to ;a number of questions.
3. Please read the scenario, then respond to the questions by circling the number 
that best represents you answer.
NOTE:
The scenario only provides “minimal” information. It is appireciated that in many “real- 
life” situations more information than that which is provided would be sought.
For the present purposes, please just try to indicate your genera! feeling when 
responding to the questions.
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IMAGINE THAT:
You are routinely privy to classified information about the capability level o f RAAF force 
elements as part o f your normal duties.
On this occasion, you are approached by a member o f the RAAF who is preparing a report 
concerning ADF preparedness. For the purposes o f the report, this person (whom you don’t 
know personally) requests that you provide classified information regarding the current 
capability level o f certain RAAF force elements.
The information requested contains details about force elements being temporarily at 
unsatisfactory levels of capability and i f  not managed with care, could damage the image o f 
the RAAF.
The requestor (who is appropriately cleared) provides a guarantee that you w ill be able to 
view the report before it is completed and disseminated.
Keeping this scenario in mind
1. To what extent would providing the information without delay be risking the RAAF’s image?
1 6 7
Very muchNot at all
2. To what extent would providing the information without delay be risking your personal reputation?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Not at all Very much
3. To what extent would you think the requestor has a ‘need to know’?
1 6 7
Very muchNot at all
4. How confident would you be that the requestor would manage any risks to the image of the RAAF?
1 6 7
Very confidentNot at all
5. To what extent would you feel you could control how the requestor used the information?
1 6 7
Very muchNot at all
6. To what extent would you think it important that the requestor obtain the information?
1
Not at all
6 7
Very much
7. If you were to provide the information without delay, how confident would you feel that the final 
report would treat the RAAF fairly?
1 6 7
Very confidentNot at all
8. How likely would you be to provide the information to the requestor without delay?
2 3 4 5 6 71
Not at all Very likely
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IMAGINE THAT:
You are routinely privy to classified information about the capability level o f RAAF force 
elements as part o f your normal duties.
On this occasion, you are approached by a member o f another Service who is preparing a 
report concerning ADF preparedness. For the purposes o f the report, this person (whom you 
don’ t know personally) requests that you provide classified information regarding the current 
capability level o f certain RAAF force elements.
The information requested contains details about force elements being temporarily at 
unsatisfactory levels of capability and i f  not managed with care, could damage the image o f 
the RAAF.
The requestor (who is appropriately cleared) provides a guarantee that you w ill be able to 
view the report before it is completed and disseminated.
Keeping this scenario in mind
1. To what extent would providing the information without delay be risking the RAAF’s mage?
1 6 7
Very muchNot at all
2. To what extent wouid providing the information without delay be risking your personal reputation?
1
Not at all
3. To what extent would you think the requestor has a ‘need to know’?
6 7
Very much
1 6 7
Very muchNot at all
4. How confident would you be that the requestor would manage any risks to the image of the RAAF?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Not at all Very confident
5. To what extent would you feel you could control how the requestor used the information?
1 6 7
Very muchNot at all
6. To what extent would you think it important that the requestor obtain the information?
1
Not at all
6 7
Very much
7. If you were to provide the information without delay, how confident would you feel that the final 
report would treat the RAAF fairly?
1 6 7
Very confidentNot at all
8. How likely would you be to provide the information to the requestor without delay?
1
Not at all
7
Very likely
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IMAGINE THAT:
You are routinely privy to classified information about the capability level o f RAAF force 
elements as part o f your normal duties.
On this occasion, you are approached by a member o f the RAAF who is preparing a report 
concerning ADF preparedness. For the purposes o f the report, this person (whom you don’t 
know personally) requests that you provide classified information regarding the current 
capability level o f certain RAAF force elements.
The information requested contains details about force elements being temporarily at 
unsatisfactory levels of capability and i f  not managed with care, could damage the image o f 
the RAAF.
The requestor (who is appropriately cleared) reminds you that you will not be able to view 
the report before it is completed and disseminated.
Keeping this scenario in mind
1. To what extent would providing the information without delay be risking the RAAF’s image?
1 6 7
Very muchNot at all
2. To what extent wouid providing the information without delay be risking your personal reputation?
1
Not at all
3. To what extent would you think the requestor has a ‘need to know’?
6 7
Very much
1 6 7
Very muchNot at all
4. How confident would you be that the requestor would manage any risks to the image of the RAAF?
1 6 7
Very confidentNot at all
5. To what extent would you feel you could control how the requestor used the information?
1 6 7
Very muchNot at all
6. To what extent would you think it important that the requestor obtain the information?
1
Not at all
6 7
Very much
7. If you were to provide the information without delay, how confident would you feel that the final 
report would treat the RAAF fairly?
1 6 7
Very confidentNot at all
8. How likely would you be to provide the information to the requestor without delay?
1
Not at all
7
Very likely
IMAGINE THAT:
You are routinely privy to classified information about the capability level o f RAAF force 
elements as part o f your normal duties.
On this occasion, you are approached by a member o f another Service who is preparing a 
report concerning ADF preparedness. For the purposes o f the report, this person (whom you 
don’t know personally) requests that you provide classified information regarding the current 
capability level o f certain RAAF force elements.
The information requested contains details about force elements being temporarily at 
unsatisfactory levels of capability and i f  not managed with care, could damage the image o f 
the RAAF.
The requestor (who is appropriately cleared) reminds you that you will not be able to view 
the report before it is completed and disseminated.
Keeping this scenario in mind
1. To what extent would providing the information without delay be risking the RAAF’s image?
1 6 7
Very muchNot at all
2. To what extent wouid providing the information without delay be risking your personal reputation?
1
Not at all
3. To what extent would you think the requestor has a ‘need to know’?
6 7
Very much
1 6 7
Very muchNot at all
4. How confident would you be that the requestor would manage any risks to the image of the RAAF?
1 6 7
Very confidentNot at all
5. To what extent would you feel you could control how the requestor used the information?
1 6 7
Very muchNot at all
6. To what extent would you think it important that the requestor obtain the information?
1
Not at all
6 7
Very much
7. If you were to provide the information without delay, how confident would you feel that the final 
report would treat the RAAF fairly?
1 6 7
Very confidentNot at all
8. How likely would you be to provide the information to the requestor without delay?
1
Not at all
7
Very likely
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Demographie details:
Age:- ______ years
Sex:- □  Male O  Female
Rank:- □  NCO □  PLTOFF to FLTLT
Current ADO clearance:-
□  Up to CONFIDENTIAL □  SECRET
Years of RAAF service:- _____years
Thank you for your participation.
Any comments are most welcome below...
G  SQNLDR and above
□  TOP SECRET and above
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